




Structural dynamic analysis of individual labour market behaviour
Berg, Gerhardus Johannes van den
Publication date:
1990
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Berg, G. J. V. D. (1990). Structural dynamic analysis of individual labour market behaviour. [s.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG
STRUCTURAL DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL
LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR
STRUCTURAL DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL
LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, op gezag van de rector
magnificus, prof. dr. R.A. de Moor, in het openbaar te
verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college van dekanen
aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op
vrijdag 2 november 1990 te 14.15 uur door
GERHARDUS JOHANNES VAN DEN BERG








Prof.dr. Aart de Zeeuw
PREFACE
Part of the research reported in this thesis was financed by The Netherlands
Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). This part was carried
out when I worked at Tilburg University (from December 1985 until August
1988). The other part was carried out at Groningen University, at which I
started to work in September 1988.
Data were provided by The Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor
Market Research (OSA), The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and
by Geert Ridder.
Chapter 2 resembles van den Berg (1990c), which is published in the
Economic Journal.
Chapter 3 is virtually identical to van den Berg (1990b), which appeared
in the Review of Economic Studies.
Chapters 4 and 5 are based on van den Berg (19891 and van den Berg
(1990a), respectively, which are under revision for publication.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am much indebted to Arie Kapteyn and Ceert Ridder for their guidance of my
research. Arie Kapteyn increased the pleasure I took in econometrics and
stimulated me in developing a professional attitude. Geert Ridder displayed a
great willingness to detect problems and to help solving them, thus sharing
some of his profound econometric knowledge with me.
I am grateful to a number of colleagues who made helpful comments on
papers underlying this thesis. In particular I would like to mention Peter
Kooreman, John Rust, Andrew Chesher, Tony Lancaster, Wiji Narendranathan, Ken
Burdett, Maarten Lindeboom and Richard Blundell. Further, I thank those
colleagues at Tilburg University and Groningen University who helped creating
a good and professional atmosphere at the Department. The results in Chapter 4
benefited from the computational assistance of Rob Aalbers. Jacobien Bruining
accurately typed versions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Finally, I thank Els
Boerrigter for a lot of reasons that I can't spell out in a few lines.
Groningen, August 1990.




2. Search behaviour, transitions to nonparticipation
and the duration of unemployment 5
3. Nonstationarity in job search theory 40
4. A structural dynamic analysis of job turnover and
the costs associated with moving to another job 72
5. The effect of an increase of the rate of arrival





Summary in Dutch 159
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The four essays in this dissertation deal with microeconometric models of
individual labour market behaviour. In particular, the models try to explain
transitions between different states on the labour market and durations in
those states. Job search theory serves as the underlying framework of the
models. This theory explicitly incorporates various forms of uncertainty. It
is dynamic in the sense that it concentrates on behaviour over time. Job
search theory has a distinctly neoclassical flavour, since it assumes that
decisions of individuals are governed by the aim to maximize their own
expected utility.
The empirical analysis in this dissertation is structural. This means that
it is attempted to uncover the primitive objects underlying the strategies of
the individuals. In this case these objects include the individuals'
preferences and the probability distributions characterizing the uncertainty
about future events. Structural empirical analysis enables one to make
detailed inferences on the determinants of job and unemployment durations and
on the characteristics of job search. For instance, a distinction can be made
between choice and chance components of the transition rate from unemployment
to employment. Furthermore, it is possible to examine the reasons for the
(in-)effectiveness of policies aimed at, for instance, a reduction of
unemployment durations or an increase of job mobility. Generally, the models
considered are highly nonlinear in the parameters and contain latent ( i.e.
unobserved) variables. The estimation methods used are maximum likelihood and,
occasionally, nonlinear least squares. The four studies, Chapters 2 through 5
in this thesis, all start with an extensive introduction of their own, so this
introductory chapter is kept brief. In what follows we briefly point at the
distinctive features of the different studies.
Up to now a number of empirical studies on unemployment using structural
search models have been published. To our knowledge, no previous study has
estimated a model which allows for transitions from the state of unemployment
into the state of nonparticipation. However, by now there is ample evidence
that a large portion of the flow out of unemployment consists of transitions
into nonparticipation. In Chapter 2 we construct and estimate a structural job
search model that allows for such transitions. For unemployed individuals the
optimal strat.egy with regard to job offers is affected by the rate at which
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transitions into nonparticipation take place. As a result, characteristics of
the search process, like the probability of accepting a job offer, depend on
this transition rate.
Another objection to the structural empirical analyses in the literature
on unemployment is that the job search models used so far do not take into
account that wage increases during employment may be expected. The optimal
strategy of unemployed individuals is likely to be dependent on wage changes
that may occur after the acceptance of a job. In Chapter 2 we therefore also
estimate an extended version of the model, which deals with these aspects. For
both model versions we examine the effect of a decrease in unemployment
benefits on unemployment duration and we explain the magnitude of this effect
in terms of the characteristics of the search process.
Chapter 3 extends the literature on job search theory by weakening the
so-called stationarity assumption. Generally, the search models used in
structural empirical (and theoretical) studies on unemployment are stationary.
This implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival
of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment, which
is often at variance with reality. Moreover, various reduced-form empirical
studies on unemployment duration indicate a significant duration dependence of
the transition rate from unemployment into employment, which is generally
interpreted as evidence against stationarity. In Chapter 3 we examine the
consequences of nonstationarity in continuous-time job search models in which
the explanatory variables (the level of unemployment benefits, the job offer
arrival rate and the wage offer distribution) are allowed to vary over time in
a very general way. Throughout the chapter we are concerned with job searchers
with perfect foresight in the sense that they are assumed to correctly
anticipate changes in the values of the explanatory variables. A general
differential equation describing the evolution of the optimal strategy over
time is derived. The more specific the assumptions made on the time paths of
the explanatory variables, the more detailed our inferences on the solution of
this differential equation. We also present comparative dynamics results
concerning the shift in the time path of the optimal strategy if some
particular time path of an explanatory variable is replaced by another.
In addition to these theoretical results, Chapter 3 contains an empirical
illustration of the importance of allowing for nonstationarity. In The
Netherlands, the benefits level during the first few years of unemployment is
related to the pre-unemployment wage while the level after those years is
determined by the public assistance system. As a consequence, benefits
generally decrease substantially when the duration of unemployment exceeds a
.~
certain period. We estimate a nonstationary structural model that allows for
this. Civen the parameter estimates of the model, we can analyze the effects
of the decrease of the benefits level on the time path of the optimal strategy
and the exit rate out of unemployment. Also, the estimated model can be used
to examine the effects of changing (part of) the existing time path of the
level of benefits.
Chapter 4 provides a structural empirical analysis of the labour-market
behaviour of employed individuals, using a so-called on-the-job search model.
Search theory is a popular tool for explaining job mobility; by now there is
an extensive theoretical literature on search on the job for better jobs.
However, to our knowledge there are no published papers that empirically test
the on-the-job search model. We construct and estimate a model that pays
particular attention to the costs associated with moving to another job, since
it is likely that these are among the most important of the factors causing
inflexibility of the labour market. It is shown that under certain conditions
the optimal strategy of an employed individual can be characterized by a
reservation wage. The parameter estimates are used to examine the effects of
changes in the level of the costs of moving to another job and the value of
the job offer arrival rate on the optimal strategy and the duration of a job.
Chapter 5 is of a theoretical nature and does not contain empirical
results. The issue of this chapter is the relationship in job search models
between, on the one hand, the rate at which an unemployed individual obtains
job offers and, on the other hand, the expected duration of unemployment.
Generally it is acknowledged that an increase of the job offer arrival rate
has two opposite effects on the expected duration of unemployment. First,
there is a negative effect because of the increased expected number of
occasions on which one is able to leave unemployment. Secondly, there is a
positive effect because of the increased selectivity of the searcher in face
of this increased opportunity to leave unemployment. In the literature
sufficient conditions on the shape of the wage offer distribution have been
derived that ensure that an increase of the arrival rate causes a decrease of
the expected unemployment duration. However, these conditions are not
satisfied for the families of distributions that can realistically represent
wage offer (and income) distributions. Therefore they seem to be of limited
practical interest in guiding the interpretation of estimates of reduced-form
models of unemployment durations. Also, since the assumed families of wage
offer distributions in structural empirical analysis generally do not satisfy
those conditions, the suspicion may arise that the estimates of structural job
search models are sensitive with respect to the assumed family. In Chapter 5
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it is shown that the previously derived sufficient conditions can be weakened
at no cost, to include virtually every conceivable (wage offer) distribution.
Thus it seems that the scope for the problems in empirical analysis which were
mentioned above is narrowed a great deal.
Chapter 6 contains a brief summary and evaluation of the various results.
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CIIAPTER 2
SEARCH BEHAVIOUR, TRANSITIONS TO NONPARTICIPATION
AND THE Dt1RATION OF UNEMPLOYM~NT
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter we examine the estimation of a structural job search model
using data on individual unemployment durations. The model allows for
transitions from unemployment to nonparticipation. In an extended version of
the model we deal with the influence of on-the-job search and prospective wage
increases on search behaviour of the unemployed.
In empirical studies on unemployment duration the reduced-form approach,
in which only hazards of the duration distribution are estimated (see for
example Lancaster (1979)), seems to be replaced gradually by a structural
approach. The latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use of
the framework of job search theory in empirical analysis. The results from
such analyses can be used for inferences about the behaviour of the
unemployed. In particular a distinction can be made between choice and chance
components of the transition rate into employment.
Several empirical studies using structural search models have been
published (see for example Yoon (1981), Lancaster 8e Chesher (1983), Lynch
(1983), Narendranathan 8e Nickell (1985), Ridder 8i Gorter (1986), Wolpin
(1987)), some of which use a very restricted model specification (notably the
first three references). None of those studies uses a model that allows for
transitions from unemployment to nonparticipation. In reality an individual
who is unemployed and actively searching for a job may drop out of the labour
force at some point of time during unemployment. It may be that the papers
referred to do not take account of transitions into nonparticipation because
the data used are not rich enough to make the distinction between the states
of unemployment and nonparticipation. This can be the case if the data
collection is based on the receipt of unemployment benefits. Another cause for
not taking account of such transitions may be that in the time those data were
collected (typically the seventies) the occurrence of such transitions was
less prominent. However, by now there is much evidence that a large portion of
the flow out of unemployment consists of transitions into nonparticipation
(for a survey of the literature, see Micklewright (1988) who also forcefully
argues that the state of nonparticipation should be incorporated in duration
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models of the labour market, especially if one is interested in the effects of
benefits on unemployment duration). In the sample we use, almost 309b of all
spells of unemployment ends up in a transition into nonparticipation.
Therefore we estimate a structural job search model that allows for such
transitions.
Further, up to now the structural models used in empirical analyses do not
take into account that wage increases during employment may be expected. Wages
can increase for several reasons such as accumulation of human capital or
transitions from jobs with lower wages to jobs with higher wages without
intervening spells of unemployment (on the job search, see for example
Mortensen ( 1986)). The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual is likely
to be dependent on changes of wages and jobs that occur after the acceptance
of a job. We estimate an extended version of the model, which deals with these
aspects.
In Section 2.2 we discuss the specification of the model. As a starting
point we take a search model that resembles Narendranathan 8c Nickell's (1985)
model. This model is extended to allow for transitions into nonparticipation.
We outline how the model may be given an alternative interpretation which is
more realistic with regard to the process of search. This interpretation
allows for knowledge of the wage rate associated with a vacancy before one
responds to that vacancy, i.e. before the job is actually offered. Section 2.3
contains a description of the data and a discussion of the empirical
implementation of the model. The structural model is estimated by ML using the
Newton-Raphson algorithm. The estimation method is analogous to that used by
Narendranathan 8s Nickell ( 1985) and Wolpin (1987) in the sense that for every
individual in the sample, for every iteration, the optimal search strategy,
which follows from a dynamic programming problem, needs to be solved. Section
2.4 deals with the estimation of the wage offer distribution. Section 2.5
presents the main results. We present estimates of the job offer arrival rate,
the transition rate into nonparticipation and the utility function. For
distinct age categories and levels of education we present sample averages of
the main characteristics of the job search process. From a policy viewpoint it
may be of interest to see whether a decrease in unemployment benefits has any
influence on duration. If not, this may lead to a re-evaluation of benefits as
a policy tool. Therefore we give special attention to the effects of changes
in benefits on the reservation wage and the expected duration. In Section 2.6
the construction of the extended model is described and the results of the
estimation of the extended model are discussed. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2. The model
2.2.1. Job search theory and model specáfácatáon
We start by presenting the basic job search model for unemployed individuals
who are searching sequentially for jobs until a suitable one has been found
(for surveys on job search theory, see Mortensen (1986) or McKenna (1985)).
Job offers arrive randomly in time at the arrival rate a. Such job offers are
random drawings from a wage offer distribution F(w). During unemployment a
benefit b is received. The variables a, b and w are measured per unit time
period. Unemployed individuals aim at maximization of their expected
discounted lifetime utility (over an infinite horizon). To begin with we also
assume that once a job is accepted it will be held forever at the same wage.
The per-period utility function is a separable function of two arguments,
income and state:
utility ( income - x, state - employment) - v~.u(x)
utility ( income - x, state - unemployment ) - v.u(x)
in which v~ and v do not depend on income x. This utility function was first
used by Nickell (see Lancaster 8c Chesher (1983)). The function u is increasing
in its argument and may take account of risk aversion. Somewhat loosely we
call v the disutility of unemployment. Note that v and vw may differ not only
because of the difference between the amount of leisure in both states, but
also because of other differences between those states, like the difference in
social status. We normalize by setting v~- 1.
In the sequel only stationary job search models are considered. This means
that we take a, b, u, v and F(w) to be independent of unemployment duration
and calendar time and independent of all events during unemployment. Obviously
this is not very realístic. The level of unemployment benefits depends
generally on the elapsed duration of unemployment. The job offer arrival rate
may decrease during unemployment as a result of the stigma that the long-term
unemployed may have. Further, a, b and F(w) may change due to business cycle
effects. The motivation for adopting the stationarity assumption is basically
the same as it was in the other empirical studies using structural search
models (see for example Lancaster 8c Chesher (1983) and Narendranathan 8e
Nickell (1985) ). That is, when estimating a nonstationary model the
computational difficulties are likely to be even more burdensome, so it seems
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a good strategy to start off with a stationary model. (For an analysis of
nonstationarity in job search theory, see Chapter 3. ) In Section 2.5 we turn
to the effects that the presence of nonstationarity might have on the
estimation results.
The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual in the model sketched
above can be characterized by a fixed reservation wage ~. A job offer is
accepted if its wage exceeds ~ while a wage that is smaller than ~ induces one
to reject the offer and search for a better one. The transition rate from
unemployment into employment B can be written as the product of the job offer
arrival rate and the conditional probability of accepting a job offer.
(1) B - ~~(~)
In reality an individual who is unemployed and actively searching for a
job may drop out of the labour force, at some point in time during
unemployment. This may be the result of a personal decision such as deciding
to dedicate all available time to household activities. It can also be a
forced transition, for example when he is conscripted or when he becomes
disabled or when he retires. All these cases can be labelled as transitions
out of unemployment into nonparticipation.
Flinn 8c Heckman (1982) present a three-state structural search model which
could serve as a starting point for our model. In this three-state model the
distribution of returns of nonparticipants enters the equations that describe
the behaviour of the unemployed. This implies that data on returns of
nonparticipants are needed in order to estimate the model. Such data are not
available. Therefore we adopt a reduced-form model of the transitions from
unemployment into nonparticipation. Specifically, such transitions are assumed
to occur according to a Poisson process with a parameterized transition rate
~-
The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual depends on the expected
utility of becoming a nonparticipant. If the latter is high with respect to
the expected utility of becoming employed then it is optimal to accept a job
offer only if the wage corresponding to it is very high. Let x denote the flow
of income of a nonparticipant. We make the assumption
(2) Eu(x) - u(b)
For a lot of cases the income flow after becoming a nonparticipant is close to
the benefit level (for example when an unemployed individual becomes disabled,
when he retires, when he is conscripted, when he returns to school and applíes
for social assistance). If the dispersion of the distribution of x is small,
which we expect to be the case, then Ex ~ b implies that Eu(x) ~ u(b). To sum
up, we do not assume anything about the distribution of the income flow x in
the state of nonparticipation except that equation (2) holds. In addition, we
assume that the state of nonparticipation is absorbing and, for the moment, we
assume that the non-pecuniary component v of per-period utility in
nonparticipation is the same as that in unemployment.
As an additional condition for stationarity to hold we require that ~ is
constant (though possibly different across individuals). Again this may not be
very realistic. Individuals may enter nonparticipation at an increasing rate
when they become discouraged about their chances on the labour market. This in
turn may happen more frequently among the long-term unemployed. However, the
empirical relevance of this effect is not well known. Reduced-form studies in
which r; and other transition rates are estimated either do not have enough
observed transitions from unemployment into nonparticipation in the data to
estimate a duration dependent ~(e.g. Ridder (1987)), or stick to the
assumption that i; is constant (e.g. Burdett, Kiefer, Mortensen 8z Neumann
(1984) and Blau 8c Robins (1986a)).
In the appendix to this chapter it is proved that the reservation wage ~,
which characterizes the optimal strategy in the model, satisfies the following
equation, in which p denotes the subjective rate of discount
(3) u(rp) - v.u(b) ~ p~ . ~ (u(w)-u(~))dF(w)
The exit rate out of unemployment is equal to the sum of B and i;, with B given
by equation (1). Because B and ~ do not depend on duration or on time or on
events during unemployment this implies that the unemployment duration has an
exponential distribution with parameter B f r;.
2.2.2. An alternatáve interpretatáon
It can be argued that the modelling of the search process so far is not very
realistic. Generally one knows the wage rate associated with a vacancy before
one responds to that vacancy, i.e. before the job is actually offered.
Narendranathan 8c Nickell (1985) constructed a search model that deals with
this. Job vacancies arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
ql. A vacancy is characterized by a random drawing from a distribution of
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wages associated with the flow of vacancies, G(w). The decision whether to
apply or not is made with knowledge of the wage corresponding to the vacancy.
If one does apply, then there is a(known) probability of q2(w) that the job
will actually be offered. The dependence of q2 on w represents increased
competition for vacancies with higher wages.
It is straightforward to show that the model developed in Subsection 2.2.1
is equivalent to the model described here. To see this, set
~




(5) F(w) - 0~
f 9a(W)dG(W)0
Consequently, the estimation results of the original model can be
reinterpreted according to equations (4) and (5). Narendranathan 8e Nickell
(1985) make the convenient assumption that
(s) qz(w) - qs(w)-qa
in which q3 depends on w only, while q4 represents the dependence of q2 on
personal characteristics. If (6) holds then F(w) in (5) does not depend on q97
i.e. does not depend on personal characteristics which influence the
probability that the job is offered given application.
2.3. Tlie data
2.3.1. The data set
The data set used is constructed from the Netherlands Socio-Economic Panel, a
survey conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Since April
1984 a random sample of about 12000 individuals has been interviewed twice a
year (in April and October). At every interview except the first one,
respondents were asked to recall their labour market history for the past 6
months, that is, they were asked between which dates in the last 6 months they
had a job, between which dates they were unemployed and searching for a job
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and between which dates they were doing something else. The latter category of
activities includes being disabled, doing unpaid work in the household, being
retired ( the retirement age varies between (roughly) 55 and 70 years and
centres on 65 years), being in full-time training, being conscripted and just
doing nothing. At the first interview the observation period is extended to 12
months. Given present information we have labour market histories for 2.5
years, from May 1983 up to October 1985.
For our purposes we selected 223 men aged between 17 and 65, who reported
that at the moment of the first interview ( April 1984) their main activity was
being unemployed and searching for work. We determined for how long they were
unemployed and searching for work at that moment, and (using subsequent waves)
also for how long they would remain unemployed and searching for work after
that moment. By analogy with the renewal theory literature we call these
durations the backward and forward recurrence times, respectively. For 40
individuals we could not construct the forward recurrence time because they
were not interviewed in subsequent waves. These are mainly young people
leaving their parents' home. Note that this might create a selection problem
since these people might leave because they found a job elsewhere. We return
to this issue in Section 2.5.
Of the backward and forward recurrence times, 6496 and 3946 are censored in
the sense that it is only known that the reali2ed time exceeds a certain
value. Part of the 3946 is due to respondents who drop out of the panel before
October 1985. Of all 112 uncensored forward recurrence times 714b ended in a
transition into employment. The other 2996 became nonparticipants. This means
that according to the labour market history as defined above there is a date
such that the spell of unemployment ends on it while after that date the
individual is doing something else than working in a paid job. Consequently,
the state of nonparticipation covers the wide range of activities that was
mentioned above as being included in the `third' category of activities. The
limited amount of observations in the sample prohibits a subdivision of the
state of nonparticipation into different states.
By taking a closer look at the uncensored forward durations we observe a
phenomenon that appears strange at first sight. Of the 112 uncensored forward
recurrence times 5496 seem to have ended at the day of an interview. That is,
at wave n(n - 1,2,3) the individual reports that he is unemployed whereas at
wave nfl he reports that as of the date of the previous interview he has been
in a different state. Clearly these people over-estimate the elapsed duration
of the activities that they perform after leaving the state of unemployment.
We have to account for these `memory problems' when deriving the likelihood.
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The data set provides a range of personal characteristics. We used the
characteristics as reported in April 1984. Since we do not know the level of
benefits that individuals obtained during spells of unemployment that sta.rted
and finished between two successive waves of the panel, we decided to consider
only those spells that contained the date of the first interview. Subsection
2.3.3, in which the explanatory variables in the model are discussed, contains
a table with sample characteristics.
The data on income variables all count for the survey. The
unemployment-insurance benefit variable is not imputed but instead is measured
directly by asking respondents who are unemployed in the first wave of the
panel what their net (after-tax) unemployment income was at the date of the
interview. Benefits need not be constant throughout the spell. In The
Netherlands in the beginning of the eighties the benefits level during the
first years of unemployment is related to the pre-unemployment wage while
after about two years it is determined by the public assistance system.
However, if the benefits level related to the pre-unemployment wage is below
the public assistance level, or if the individual did not have a job before
becoming unemployed, then he obtains public assistance benefits from the
beginning. Given the lack of information on pre-unemployment wages it is not
possible to infer whether an individual in the sample faced decreasing
benefits or not. In Subsection 2.5.2 we examine the consequences that ignoring
decreases in benefits (if present in reality) have on the estimation results.
As said before the data do not contain information on the return from
being a nonparticipant. In some cases nonparticipants can receive unemployment
insurance benefits, for example if according to their own perception they do
unpaid work in the household and do not search for a job while they are still
officially registered as being unemployed. For most activities covered by the
state of nonparticipation however the income level is not directly related to
the unemployment insurance system. For example an individual who is retired or
disabled obtains a fixed amount of money every month, usually supplemented by
a pension if he is retired.
The data on the income variables that are used to estimate F(w) will be
discussed in Section 2.4 as that section is devoted entirely to the estimation
of F(w).
2.3.2. Lákelihood function
In our stationary model the backward and forward recurrence time and the state
of destination given exit from unemployment are stochastically independent
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(see for example Ridder (1984)). Because of this independence the individual
log-likelihood contribution is simply the sum of three parts. The state of
destination given exit from unemployment has a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter B~(Bf~). The forward recurrence time has an exponential distribution
with parameter B~í;. By assuming that the individual entry rate into
unemployment is constant before the moment of the first interview, the
backward recurrence time follows this distribution as well. The forward and
backward recurrence times are denoted as r and t, respectively. The state of
destination is denoted as E with e- 1 if the state is employment and e- 0 if
the state is nonparticipation. The occurrence of censoring and the occurrence
of the so-called memory problems are taken to be exogenous. If r is missing
then this is taken to be exogenous as well.
First consider the state of destination. Let cl - 1 if r is censored and
cl - 0 otherwise. Let c2 - 1 if r is missing and c2 - 0 otherwise. The part of
the individual log-likelihood contribution L due to the state of destination
is Ll,
(7) Ll - (1-c2)(1-cl)(e.log B t (1-e).log ~ - log(Bf~))
So if r is censored or missing then e is not observed and consequently LI - 0.
Next consider the backward recurrence time. Let c3 - 1 if t is censored
and c3 - 0 otherwise. The part of L due to t is L2,
(8) La - (1-c3).log(Bf~) - t.(Bf~)
If no memory problems are present then the part of L due to T can be
obtained by replacing in equation (8) 1-c3 by (1-cl)(1-cZ) and t by (1-c2)r.
Recall that memory problems are present if the data suggest that the spell of
unemployment ended on the day at which the individual was being interviewed
for the first, second or third time. For such individuals it can only be
inferred that the spell ended somewhere between two subsequent interviews, say
the n-th and the (nfl)th (n - 1,2 or 3). By assumption it is ruled out that
transitions can be forgotten. One is inclined to think that when the spell of
unemployment ends shortly before the (nfl)th interview the date of the
transition will be reported more accurately than when the spell ends shortly
after the n-th interview. This is confirmed by the fact that most reported
transitions between two subsequent interviews took place less than three
months before the second interview. Therefore, if a memory problem is present
in the sense that a spell seems to have ended at the date of the first, second
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or third interview, then this is interpreted as evidence that the spell has
ended between that date and three months later. Later on it will be examined
whether the results are sensitive with respect to the assumption that memory
problems can only occur if the transition takes place in the three month
period after each interview. Let TI denote the length of this three month
period. Let c4 - 1 if a memory problem is present and c4 - 0 otherwise. The
part of L due to T is L3i
(9) L3 - (1-C2).I ( 1-Cl)~l ( 1-C9)(log(BfS) - T.(BfS))
t c4.(log( é (Bt~)T - é (Bt~)(T}Tl) )) } f Cl.{ -T.(9fZ) } 1
- (1-Cy).~ -T.(B-i~S) f ( 1-Cl)(1-C4)lOg(Bf~)
} (1-Cl)Cq.log( 1 - 2 (B}~)Tl ) ~
It is likely that similar to the occurrence of inemory problems in the
reported values of T there may be problems in the reported values of t. In the
sample ahnost no transitions into unemployment are reported for the first
three months after April 1983. We assume that whenever a transition into
unemployment occurred before July 1983, individuals with a memory problem
report at the date of the first interview that they have been unemployed for
more than a year. Consequently in case the reported censored t equals one year
then this is interpreted as evidence that t exceeds nine months. Let tl denote
the length of that nine month period. Equation (8) has to be modified to
(10) LZ - (1-c3)(log(Bt~) - t.(Bf~)) - c3.t1.(Bft,)
The log-likelihood contribution L of an individual with known c1i cZ, c3, c9,
t, T and e is given by the sum of the right-hand sides of equations (7), (9)
and (10). The structural parameters and functions of the job search model
(u,v,p,a,F(w)) enter the likelihood via B(see equations (1) and (3)). The
parameter ~ enters L both directly and indirectly via B.
2.3.3. The e~rcpirácal imple~ae~rttatian
Now that we have specified the structural model and described the data we
examine in this subsection the functional forms of the exogenous variables and
discuss parameterizations. However, the wage offer distribution will be
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examined in Section 2.4 as that section is devoted entirely to the estimation
of F(w).
The job offer arrival rate a and the transition rate into nonparticipation




The vector x includes variables which are of interest to employers, for
example because they give an indication of the productivity of the job
searcher. Examples are level of education (we distinguish between five levels:
(1) no certificate after primary education, (2) lower secondary education, (3)
secondary education, (4) higher vocational training, (5) university), age,
nationality, whether the individual has had a job before (this was asked
explicitly) and whether he is married. We include the local unemployment
percentage as a(crude) indicator of labour market tightness. The vector x
also includes a variable that depends on the number of working individuals in
the household. If this number is high then the unemployed individual may have
easier access to employers.
The vector z consists of variables which are important for the process of
transiting into nonparticipation, either by chance or by choice. Obviously,
age is important because young individuals may get drafted into the armed
forces and older individuals retire or get disabled more often than younger
ones. Furthermore, young unemployed individuals often return to school for
additional training especially if they did not have any job before.
Note that some of the variables in x and z change, or may change, over
time. It can be argued that, for the model to be correctly specified, this
should explicitly be taken into account. However, by doing so, the analysis
would be complicated enormously. Therefore we assume (in accordance with the
bulk of the literature on both structural and reduced-form empirical duration
analysis) that the rate at which the variables in x and z change and the
magnitude of these changes are sufficiently small for the model in which these
variables do not change to be reliably usable for inference.
Table 1 contains some sample characteristics of the explanatory variables
in the model. From the previous subsection it is clear that sample averages of
the duration variables are not informative. Therefore those are not presented.
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Table 1. Sample characteristics.
variable mean standard deviation
benefits (guilders~week) 305 114
local 9b unemployment rate 18 2.7
age 32 11
level of education 2.0 1.0
~ working in household 0.37 0.62
Dutch 0.91
head of household 0.71
married 0.48
new entrant 0.11
Similarly to Narendranathan 8c Nickell (1985 ) and Ridder 8c Corter (1986 )
the utility function of income u is taken to be logarithmic. The subjective
rate of discount p is fixed at lOYb per year. In Section 2.5 we examine the
robustness of the results with respect to changes in the functional form of u
and with respect to the numerical value of p.
Non-wage income is not included in the model because figures on personal
non-wage income components are not available in the first wave of the panel
survey. A reduced-form estimation of B with income of other household members
included as a regressor in log B showed that this variable has no influence at
all on the transition from unemployment into employment. Therefore it was
omitted in the structural model.
The estimation method we have employed was ML using the Newton-Raphson
algorithm. Because of the assumptions that were made on the functional forms
of F(w) (see Section 2.4) and u, it follows that equation (3) can be rewritten
as an equation that can be solved numerically for ~ with a high level of
precision. Via equation (1) the likelihood contributions can then be
calculated as a function of the parameters.
2.4. The wage offer distribution
The most natural way to obtain information on F(w) in a structural job search
model is to use data on post-unemployment wages, for these are drawings from
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F(w) truncated at ~. Combining such data with duration data makes it possible
to estimate F(w) jointly with the other parameters in the model, provided that
F(w) satisfies Flinn 8L Heckman's (1982) recoverability condition. However, as
we saw in Subsection 2.3.1, in our sample there are only 79 transitions from
unemployment into employment. Obviously we want to allow for different F(w) in
different segments of the labour market. For some segments there are not
enough post-unemployment wages available in order to be able to estimate F(w).
For example there are only two individuals with a university degree who
provide such wages. Therefore we take a totally different route in estimating
F(w). We estimate F(w) a priori using data on individuals who were employed at
the date of the first interview. Analogous to Narendranathan 8c Nickell (1985)
the a priori estimation results serve to predict individual wage offer
distributions for the unemployed. These predictions are plugged in when
estimating the structural model.
Wages of employed individuals are not random drawings from F(w). A working
individual accepted his present job because its wage exceeded his reservation
wage when he was unemployed. Consequently, observed wages are drawn from a
truncáted distribution. However, the point of truncation (the reservation wage
before obtaining the job) is unknown and cannot be estimated, because the
level of unemployment benefits received before obtaining the current job is
not available in the data set. In order to deal with this problem we use an ad
hoc reduced-form wage model. The wage w is observed if and only if one is
employed. Previous studies (for example Kiefer 8z Neumann (1979a)) assumed this
to be equivalent to w~~, Lhat is, w is observed if and only if it exceeds
the reservation wage prior to employment. However, this is only true in a
discrete time model in which exactly one job offer arrives per period (see
Flinn 8e Heckman (1982) ) which is a very strong assumption because it neglects
various sources of the dynamics and uncertainty in the process of search.
Therefore we take a latent variable y` as determining whether one is employed:
w is observed if and only if y~` ~ 0. The wage offer distribution F(w) is
assumed to be log-normal with parameters {a and o2; {~ - r~'xl with xl observed.
The unobserved variable y` is assumed to be a linear function of observed
exogenous variables xZ and an error term. Obviously every factor that
influences F(w) influences y` as well. Therefore the variables in xl are
included in the set of variables in xZ. In order to allow for different values
of the parameters of the wage model in different segments of the labour market
the wage model is estimated separately for each segment. Details of the
estimation and the results are given in van den Berg (1988). The wage offer
distribution of an unemployed individual with characteristics xl and
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parameters ~7 and a2 associated with the segment he can be ascribed to, is
predicted as being log-normal with parameters ~'xl and QZ. The predicted F(w)
are plugged in when estimating the structural model. The sample averages of
the estimated expectation and standard deviation of the wage offer
distribution equal 470 and 99 guilders per week, respectively. (Sample
standard errors of these estimated values equal 86 and 27 guilders per week,
respectively.)
In terms of the alternative interpretation of the structural model (see
Subsection 2.2.2) the procedure described above does not give estimates of
F(w) but instead it provides estimates of the individual distributions of







A final thing to note is that for a variety of reasons the current wage
rate of an employed individual may exceed the wage rate that he obtained
directly after becoming employed. In Section 2.6 a model that deals with this
issue is considered. Further it is outlined how the wage offer distribution
can be estimated in the presence of such wage differences.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Paranzeter estiTnates
The parameter estimates for the structural model described in Subsections
2.2.1 and 2.3.3 are presented in Table 2. The unit time period is one week.
For the age and education dummies the reference categories are the age
category 46-64 and the level of education 1, respectively. Cenerally, the
results seem to be in accordance with intuition. Education has a very
significant influence on the job offer arrival rate. An individual having the
highest level of education receives offers more than seven times as frequently
as an individual with the lowest level of education. New entrants, having no
experience, are offered jobs less often than experienced individuals. Being
married is perceived by employers as a desirable property whereas being a head
18
of a household is not. Single living individuals are also defined as being
head of a household, so it may be that what really matters for employers is
not the sheer presence of a partner but the presence of a family which makes
the employee feel responsible. The importance of the number of working
household members may be due to the fact that unemployed individuals for which
this number is high have easier access to employers. However, it may also be a
consequence of a positive correlation between unobserved characteristics of
the unemployed individual and characteristics of other household members, as
far as these characteristics are relevant for employers. The local
unemployment rate has no significant influence on ~. Other indicators of the
tightness of the labour market like the local UV ratio performed even worse.
Van Opstal 8e Theeuwes (1986) who estimated a reduced-form duration model using
Dutch data from 1984, also report this lack of significance. Presumably, job
search is not restricted to a region anymore. Another explanation is that
numbers on registered vacancies and unemployed individuals may not be accurate
indicators of labour market tightness. Still, the estimate of -0.04 seems
plausible: it implies that moving from the province with the highest rate of
unemployment (249b) to the one with the lowest (1596) increases a with a factor
of almost 1.5.
The separate age coefficients in ~ are not significant. Replacement of the
age dummy variables by log(age) and its squared value results in even less
significant estimates. However, a Likelihood Ratio test of the hypothesis that
all age dummy coefficients equal zero leads to a rejection at the 1096 level.
In Section 2.3 it was noted that in some cases censoring of the forward
recurrence time of young individuals may arise because they leave their
parents' home in order to start working elsewhere. If so, then the coefficient
on the age category 18-23 in the job offer arrival rate is under-estimated.
In terms of the alternative interpretation of the model (see Subsection
2.2.2) a is the product of the vacancy arrival rate ql and the term q4 which
captures the influence of non-wage variables on the acceptance probability
conditional on application q2. We expect the unemployment rate, experience in
previous jobs, education and age to be linked to ql while nationality and
household characteristics probably are linked to q9. The signs of the
coefficients seem to confirm these prior expectations.
Turning to the rate of transition into nonparticipation, we see that being
an unemployed new entrant has a positive effect on the exit rate out of the
labour force (though not significantly), and that being unemployed and aged
below 24 or over 45 also has a positive effect on this exit rate.
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for the search model.
variable~parameter


























0.78 ( 2.5 )
in household ) 1.03 ( 3.0 )
local 96 unemployment rate -0.04 (1.1)
(ii) rate of transàtáon into nonpartácápatáon
constant -4.91 (16.4)
age category I8-23 -0.41 (0.8)
age category 24-29 -1.06 (2.3)
age category 30-45 -1.39 (2.9)
new entrant 0.66 (1.4)
(iii) disutility of une~rtployraent 0.74 (5.2)
Log-likelihood - -898.23
The estimate of the disutility of unemployment v is smaller than one,
implying that being unemployed is regarded as unpleasant. From the standard
error of 0.14 it follows that the hypothesis v- 1 is rejected by a Wald test
at the 104b level but not at the 54b level. However, the Likelihood Ratio test
statistic for this hypothesis equals 20.4 ~ Xi(0.95) so v- 1 is strongly
rejected. This is in accordance with Narendranathan 8e Nickell (1985), who also
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found that v is significantly smaller that one. On the other hand, the
estimate of v in Ridder 8c Corter (1986) is not significantly smaller than one.
2.5.2. The characteristics of the search process
Given the parameter estimates, the main variables of the search process can be
estimated and the influence of changes of the benefit level on these variables
can be evaluated. We first present and interpret sample averages of the
estimates. Subsequently the results are compared with other results in the
literature and it is shown why our results differ in some respects. Table 3
presents sample averages of the estimates of a, F`(~) and ~ for different age
categories and levels of education. The expected numbers of job offers and
transitions into nonparticipation in a yea.r can be obtained by multiplying the
numbers in the ~ and ~ row by 52.1. What strikes most is that in most cases
~(~) is nearly equal to one. In particular those who are aged under 24 or over
46, or who have a primary education only, accept virtually every job that is
being offered. Still, even individuals with a university degree have a
probability of 0.8 of accepting the first job offered. It means that the
reservation wages are located in the left part of the left tail of the wage
offer distribution. The reason for this is the combination of on the one hand
a very small job offer arrival rate and on the other hand very low values of
the utility function in unemployment (v.u(b)) relative to employment (u(w)).
Rejection of an offer may well imply a waiting time of more than a year before
the next offer arrives. In the meantime the only source of income is benefits,
which appear to be rather low relative to wages: the sample average of ~(b)
equals 0.9 and the ratio of the sample averages of b and E(w) equals 0.65.
Moreover, because v ~ 1 there is a premium on being employed and one is
willing to offer money for it by accepting lower-paid jobs. In fact, in our
sample 79~ of the unemployed even accept jobs with wages below their benefit
level, that is, for these individuals ~ ~ b.
From Table 3 it can be inferred that for groups with a very low job offer
arrival rate, almost 505~ of all spells of unemployment end in a transition
into nonparticipation. In other words, without such transitions the durations
of unemployment for such individuals would be approximately twice as long. On
the other hand, for the group of individuals with the highest level of
education about 9046 of all spells of unemployment end in a transition into
employment.
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Table 3. Probabilities and expectations.
(i) by age category
age category 18-23 24-29 30-45 46-64 average
~(job offer arrival rate) 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.012
F(~) (proportion of offers
acceptable) 0.99 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.97
[; (rate of transition into
nonparticipation) 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.004
(ii) by level of education
level of education 1 2 3 4 5
a 0.004 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.033
F(~i ) 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.89 0.82
~ 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
The results so far enable us to investigate a number of questions related
to the effectiveness of policies aimed at a reduction of unemployment
durations. Table 4 presents for different age categories and levels of
education sample averages of the elasticities of the reservation wage, the
transition rate from unemployment into employment B, and the expected duration
d, with respect to the level of benefits. The results are unambiguous: a
decrease in the level of benefits has virtually no effect on durations. Even
for unemployed individuals with a university degree a 1046 drop in benefits
causes only a 146 drop in the expected duration. The individuals who suffer
most from long spells ( having primary education only, or aged under 24 or over
46) are completely insensitive to the benefits policy instrument. Note that
elasticities refer only to infinitesimal changes. Still, even a large decrease
in the level of benefits does not have much influence on duration. Individuals
accept most jobs already, so a decrease in ~ forced by a large decrease in b
does not help much. The expected duration is bounded from below by 1~(~f~).
From the results it is also clear that at an individual level additional
educational training increases labour market opportunities.
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Table 4. Elasticities with respect to benefits.
(i) by age cate,gory
age category 18-23 24-29 30-45 46-64 average
a log ~(reservation wage) 0.36 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.30a log b -
a log B
8 log b (hazard)
-0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03
a log d ex ected duration 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03a log b ( p )
(ii) by level of education







0.44 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.16
-0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11
0.00 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10
d equals the expected duration of unemployment.
The result that changing the benefits level has virtually no effect on the
transition rate into employment and on the expected duration is in contra,st
with most empirical literature on unemployment durations. Early studies by
Lancaster (1979), Nickell (1979), Lancaster 8s Nickell (1980) and Lancaster and
Chesher (1983) suggest values of around 0.6 to 1.0 for the elasticity of the
expected duration with respect to benefits. More recent work by Atkinson,
Gomulka, Micklewright 8e Rau (1984), Narendranathan, Nickell 8c Stern (1985),
Narendranathan 8s Nickell (1985) and Main 8c Shelly (1988) reports values of
this elasticity that are typically ranging from about 0.1 to 0.3. The early
studies use U.K. data from the beginning of the seventies while the later work
uses more recent U.K. data. On the other hand, some studies that use Dutch
data from the same observation period as we do (the mid-eighties), do not find
any effect on duration of changing the benefits level. Van Opstal 8z Theeuwes
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(1986) and Groot 8e ter Huurne (1988) obtain zero estimates for the elasticity
of expected duration with respect to benefits from the estimation of
reduced-form duration models, using data from young individuals only. Vissers
8c Croot (1989) estimate a series of reduced-form duration models: they
consider several model specifications and several ways of defining the
unemployment benefit variable, and they use different Dutch data sets from the
mid-eighties to estimate the model. Nevertheless, their results are
unambiguous in the sense that the elasticity of the transition rate into
employment with respect to the benefits variable is insignificantly different
from zero. Thus it seems that the results in Table 4 are not just an artefact
of our particular sample but instead may be typical for The Netherlands in the
mid-eighties.
In order to shed more light on this issue we examine in some detail the
expression for the elasticity e of B with respect to b. For simplicity we set
~ equal to zero. (Alternatively, ~ is put into p.) From equations (1) and (3),
with u-1og substituted in (3), it follows,
8 log B r f(~)~ ppv
e-al~s--L~'~(m) ~
with f being the derivative of F. One sees immediately that e depends on all
other variables in the model. In other words, according to search theory
cross-effects play a role in the effect that changing the benefits level has
on duration. Consequently it is hard to regard the elasticity as a parameter
that is equal in different economic environments. (See Feldstein 8c Poterba
(1984) and Atkinson, Gomulka, Micklewright 8c Rau (1984) for similar
statements. ) Now let us have a look at the way e varies with the other
variables. The second part of the right-hand side of (11) is an increasing
function of ~. At first sight it seems that the way the term between brackets
k(~) varies with ~ depends crucially on the class of wage offer distributions
under consideration. However, it can be shown that for virtually every class
of distributions for F, including the (truncated) normal, log-normal, Weibull,
gamma, uniform, triangular, beta, (truncated) t, (truncated) logistic and
log-logistic class of distributions, k(~) is a strictly increasing function on
the interval in (0,~~ on which f is positive, with k(0) - 0 (see Chapter 5).
This implies that for almost every class of F, including the class we adopted,
it holds that the smaller the reservation wage is, the smaller the effect of
changing the benefits level on the transition rate into employment is. (The
Pareto class of distributions is an extreme case because then k(~) is a
constant. This may explain the exceptionally high estimate of e in Ridder 8t
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Corter (1986), who estimated a structural model in which F is a Pareto
distribution). Because the derivatives of ~ with respect to b and v are
positive, it therefore follows that the smaller the benefits level and the
smaller the non-pecuniary utility of unemployment are, the smaller the effect
of changing b on 9 is. (This result is robust with respect to the functional
form of u; for example, it can be shown that it also holds if u is linear. See
also Feldstein 8c Poterba (1984 ) for some numerical examples in a simple model
framework). Further, numerical calculations show that in the neighbourhood of
the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 it holds that the smaller the job offer
arrival rate is, the smaller the effect of changing b on B is. In The
Netherlands in the years around 1984 there was a very slack labour market. The
level of unemployment was extremely high (the national unemployment percentage
reached its peak in 1984 when it equalled 17.396) while at the same time the
number of vacancies was small (the V~U ratio was about 0.02 in 1984). Clearly
labour market conditions were worse than the conditions that prevailed when
the data for most of the previous studies mentioned before were collected.
This shows up in the relatively low estimates of a as reported in Table 3.
Further, as shown before, in our data set the level of benefits is generally
very small as compared to most of the wage offers. As a result, the estimated
reservation wages are located in the left part of the left tail of F(w) and
the elasticities of B and the expected duration of unemployment with respect
to b are almost zero. (Note that for ~~0 the latter elasticity is always
smaller in absolute value than the former.)
A point that is related to the previous paragraphs concerns the influence
of the sampling scheme on the sample averages in Tables 3 and 4. The data set
used to estimate the model is basically a sample from the stock of the
unemployed (on the date of the first interview). The distribution of the
observed explanatory variables in the stock of the unemployed differs from
that in the flow into unemployment, in the sense that values that are
associated with a high expected duration are over represented in the stock
(This can be inferred from the analytical results in Ridder (1984)). As a
result, a comparison of sample averages of, for example, the estimates of a
and e obtained by using stock data (such as ours), with sample averages
obtained by using flow data (such as those in Narendranathan 8L Nickell
(1985)), is hampered by the fact that a and e depend on observed explanatory
variables that are unequally distributed in the two sampling schemes. Further,
it follows that the results in Table 4 only refer to the effect that changes
in b on average have on individuals in the stock of the unemployed. Note that
in a reduced-form model framework such problems with regard to e do not exist
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because in reduced-form models e is a parameter that does not depend on
explanatory variables.
In light of the previous paragraphs it is not surprising that the values
of the elasticity of ~ with respect to b are somewhat different from those
found in other studies. Lancaster 8L Chesher (1983) and Narendranathan 8e
Nickell (1985) suggest values between 0.1 and 0.2 for this elasticity. Main 8e
Shelly (1988) report values of about 0.32 for youth training scheme
participants and values of about 0.16 for other unemployed youths. In our
sample the job offer arrival rate is extremely small so for an unemployed
individual b is an important determinant of the expected discounted lifetime
utility. Consequently the effect on ~ of a change in b is relatively large. As
explained above this does not translate into a substantial change in B.
Obviously in the present context only micro effects of a cut in benefits
can be investigated. On a macro level such a policy is likely to generate
additional effects both on the inflow into unemployment and on the transition
from unemployment into employment (Narendranathan, Nickell 8e Stern (1985)).
Also, if there is an element of choice as to whether to become nonparticipant
or not, then a cut in benefits may have an effect on ~. The sign of this
effect depends among other things on the dependence of the distribution of
income of nonparticipants on the level of benefits. If benefits are decreased
whereas the incomes of nonparticipants like conscripts and disabled remain
unchanged then equation (2) does not hold anymore. Therefore an investigation
of the relation between b and r; should be made in a wholly structural model
setting and is beyond the scope of this chapter. Inclusion of log (benefits)
as a regressor in log r; resulted in a highly insignificant parameter estimate
of -0.14 (t - 0.3), all other things being almost identically equal.
Since the model does not allow for nonstationarity, it may be interesting
to examine in what sense the results are affected by this omission. It is
widely believed that the transition rate into employment B is a decreasing
function of duration. On the other hand, as we saw in Subsection 2.3.1, b may
decrease during unemployment, and this makes B ceteris paribus an increasing
function of duration. One possible explanation for a decreasing B is that the
job offer arrival rate decreases sharply during unemployment, for example as a
consequence of a scar effect of being unemployed for a long time, and that
this decrease of ~ offsets the increase in F`(~). If 9 is a decreasing function
of duration then the expected duration of the backward and forward recurrence
times exceeds the expected duration of completed durations of unemployment and
a stock sample of unemployed individuals contains a relatively large number of
long-term unemployed individuals. Further, if both b and a decrease during
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unemployment then ~ also decreases. So if nonstationarity is present in
reality in the sense that b, a, ~ and B all decrease, then b in the sample is
on average smaller than the benefits level for the short-term unemployed and
a, ~ and B are under-estimated in the sense that shortly after the inflow into
unemployment these variables are larger than estimated. From the discussion of
equation (11) it then follows that in such cases the short-term unemployed are
more sensitive with respect to changes in b than the results in Table 4
suggest, because in such cases e shortly after the inflow into unemployment is
more negative than reported. However, short-term unemployed individuals may
anticipate decreases of a or b by modifying the reservation wage before these
decreases take place. If such anticipations are strong then it is hard to
elaborate on the effects that not allowing for nonstationarity may have on the
estimates of the elasticity (see Chapter 3).
Another kind of nonstationarity is present if the transition rate into
nonparticipation ~ increases as a function of duration, as a result of a
discouraged worker effect, for example. By analogy from the argument pointed
out above it may be expected that in such a case ~ is under-estimated for
individuals who are long-term unemployed.
2.5.3. The model specáficatáon revásáted
This subsection examines whether the results are sensitive with respect to
changes in some of the assumptions. Changes in the way jobs are characterized
in the model ( infinite duration, constant wages) are referred to Section 2.6
where estimation results are presented for an extended model dealing with
this.
In the structural model used for the empirical analysis v is the only
exogenous variable which is estimated but not parameterized. It thus seems
natural to extend the model by making v a function of observable individual
characteristics. Also, one might ask why p is not estimated and why u is not
parameterized, say, by assuming it to be a one-parameter CARA utility
function. (CARA - constant absolute risk aversion; u(x) --exp(-cx) with c~0.)
Though such extensions do not raise identification problems in the statistical
sense, it appears that there is not sufficient information in the data to be
able to estimate such additional parameters. Apparently the likelihood is an
almost completely constant function of such parameters in the neighbourhood of
the optimum. This can be explained by recalling the results in Tables 3 and 4.
First note that generally ~ is small with respect to most wage offers, which
implies that f(~) is small so small changes in ~ given values of a, [; and F(w)
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do not affect the value of the likelihood function much. Secondly, u, p and v
enter the likelihood only via ~. Therefore the correlation between estimates
of parameters of u, v and p will be very high.
In the empirical model v is the only parameter that enters the likelihood
via ~ only. The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that v might be
biased if u is misspecified or if p has the wrong value. This is investigated
by re-estimating the model with different u and p. Throughout the range of
acceptable values of p the estimation results for a and ~ hardly differ from
the original results (which are obtained by assuming p- 109b per year.) The
differences in the value of p are absorbed by v, higher values of p resulting
in higher values of v thus holding ~ and therefore the fit of the model
constant. For instance if p- 596 then v- 0.67 (standard error: 0.19) while if
p- 159b then v- 0.78 (0.12). Still, v is always significantly smaller than 1
according to LR tests at the 146 level. Even in the limiting case of p-~ the
estimate of v is significantly smaller than 1(v - 0.91).
We also tried to re-estimate the model using a linear utility function u
of income. This did not work. In the process of maximizing the likelihood v
tended to zero. This may be regarded as a justification for using a
risk-averse specification of u because in that case the level of ~ for v- 0
is ceteris paribus lower than the corresponding level in the risk-neutral
case.
In Section 2.2 we stated the assumptions that equation (2) holds and that
the non-pecuniary utility of being a nonparticipant equals that of being
unemployed. In what sense are the results affected if these assumptions are
relaxed? Denote the non-pecuniary component of utility in nonparticipation by
vl and the corresponding component in unemployment by v2. It can be shown that





in order to obtain the equation for the optimal reservation wage. So then v
represents the estimate of expression (12 ). It follows that
v1.Eu(x) ~ vZ.u(b) r~ v~ v2
so if we believe that vl ~ v2 or that Eu(x) ~ u(b) then the estimate of v
implies that the estimate of the disutility of unemployment is even smaller
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than 0.74.
In Section 2.3 we discussed the so-called memory problems. There it was
argued that values of 3 and 9 months for rl and tl respectively, were
plausible. It appears that the parameter estimates are insensitive to changes
of these values, though standard errors increase if rl increases or t~
decreases.
When deriving the distribution of the backward recurrence time t we
assumed that the rate of entry into unemployment is constant until May 1984.
One may question whether this assumption holds true. According to Pissarides
(1986) in the U.K. the entry rate was fairly constant between 1967 and 1983
apart from an increase in 1979-1981. In the absence of reliable Dutch data we
examine the sensitivity of the results with respect to the constant entry rate
assumption by re-estimating the model with a time-varying entry rate. In
particular we take as an alternative assumption that the entry rate q between
January 1980 and January 1983 is twice as large as it is outside that time
interval. In the appendix to this chapter the appropriate likelihood is
derived. The main effect of the alternative assumption about q on the
estimation results is that the exit rate out of unemployment B f~ is
estimated to be 1396 larger. However, B and ~ are still very small, and v, F(~)
and the elasticities are insensitive to the change in the assumption on q.
Thus, the main results and conclusions from Subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 do not
appear to be sensitive to changes in the assumptions about the time pattern of
the entry rate into unemployment that are reasonable a priori.
One may question whether the estimation results are affected by a possible
misspecification of the wage offer distribution which is estimated a priori.
Obviously, F(w) plays a central role in the model because the trade-off
between wages and benefits is a major determinant of search behaviour. We
constructed F(w) which are log-normal and have same variances as before, but
which have expectations that are shifted by 2096 in comparison to the
expectations derived in Section 2.4. Re-estimation of the model using these
alternative F(w) resulted in values that are almost identical to those
presented in Tables 2-4. The shifts in E(w) are absorbed by v, a value of 1.2
times the original E(w) resulting in v- 0.82 and a value of 0.8 times the
original E(w) resulting in v- 0.64. Consequently, the main conclusions are
insensitive with respect to small misspecifications in the location of F(w).
When deriving the likelihood no account has been taken of unobserved
heterogeneity in the sample. If unobserved heterogeneity is present in reality
then the estimates may be inconsistent. However, estimating a structural model
that allows for such heterogeneity is extremely complicated. For example,
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consider the case in which unobserved heterogeneity is present in a. We may
rewrite ~ as a product.
(13) a - v.exp(x'Q)
in which the random term v represents unobserved heterogeneity in a across the
population. Substitution of equation (13) in equations (3) and (1) reveals
that the hazard cannot be written explicitly as an explicit function of v.
Therefore, calculating the unconditional (on v) duration density by
integrating the conditional density with respect to the density of v will be
very complicated and is not pursued here.
2.6. An extended model
2.6.1. The ~nodel
In reality the duration of employment is not infinite, nor are wages constant
during employment. The prospective rate of wage increases and the distribution
of the duration of employment affect the value of search of an unemployed
individual. Therefore they should be incorporated in the model. In this
section we deal with this.
We assume that the duration of employment has an exponential distribution
with parameter s which is the layoff rate. During one period of employment one
can hold several consecutive jobs without intervening spells of unemployment.
It is assumed that one returns to the state of unemployment if a layoff
occurs, and that the duration of employment is stochastically independent of
both the initial wage rate and the duration of unemployment that precedes
employment.
During a spell of employment wages can increase for several reasons such
as rising productivity or transitions from jobs with lower wages to jobs with
higher wages without intervening spells of unemployment (on-the-job search).
As a stylized description of this we assume that the wage pattern during
employment is characterized by w(t) giving the wage rate as a function of the
time t that one is employed conditional on the initial wage w(0).
(14) w(t) - w(0).ecxt
in which cx does not depend on w(0) or t or on the duration of unemployment
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preceding employment. Though it is conceivable that mechanisms linking a, t
and w(0) exist, the exploration of this is beyond the scope of the chapter.
The extensions of the model do not affect the stationarity property of
search behaviour of the unemployed. In the appendix to this chapter it is
proven that the reservation wage ~ corresponding to the optimal strategy
satisf ies
(15) log ~- v.log b f P}~..PPs . J (log w- log ~)dF(w) - P}s
~
F(w) is the distribution of initial-wage offers, which is the distribution
from which the w(0) are drawn. Note that the derivative of ~ with respect to a
is negative. If a is large then the value of search is high. However, this
does not make the searcher more selective with regard to wage offers. It is
profitable to give up more present income (a low w(0)) in order to obtain a
higher income in the future.
The estimation of F(w) has to be reconsidered because in Section 2.4 we
used a(cross-section) sample from the stock of the employed and therefore
used data on current wages, that is, data on wages which are higher than the
initial wages offered at the start of the current employment spell. We assume
that the distribution of current wages is log-normal with parameters ~ and oz.
Thus, in Section 2.4 these parameters are estimated. The distribution F(w) of
initial-wage offers has to be recovered from the distribution of current
wages. In the appendix to this chapter it is shown that F(w) can be
approximated by a log-normal distribution with parameters (~Ctlog((s-a)~s) and
zo,
(16) F(w) ti LN (~, t lo
s-cx ~z
g s ' )
This requires s~ a. The approximation is good for s~~ a.
2.6.2. The results
The approximation in equation (16) is used to obtain a priori estimates of the
individual distribution functions F(w). The results from Section 2.4 provide
the individual values of ~ and az. The parameter a is fixed at 4~b per year. We
used the elapsed duration of employment of individuals who were employed in
April 1984 to estimate s. Since we assume that the entry rate into employment
is constant (the stationarity assumption) these incomplete durations have an
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exponential distribution with parameter s. In accordance with the treatment of
the memory problem in Subsection 2.3.2 durations are censored at 9 months. The
ML estimate of s equals 14.4Y6 per year (t-ratio equals 14.2) which implies
that the expected duration of employment is almost seven years. This estimate
may be biased for a variety of reasons (such as neglected unobserved
heterogeneity) but we believe that for our purposes it is accurate enough.
From equation (16) it can be deduced that the expectation and the standard
deviation of F(w) are 100.(a~s)4b - 284b smaller than those obtained in Section
2.4. The sample average of the probability that a random initial-wage offer
exceeds the benefit level is 0.61 as opposed to 0.91 when F(w) is estimated as
in Section 2.4.
The estimates and t-ratios of the parameters of a and i; hardly differ from
those presented in Table 2. Further, the general pattern of the results
presented in Tables 3 and 4 is preserved. Therefore only sample averages of
the main variables are presented for the extended model (see Table 5).
Table 5. Estimates for the extended search model.





8 log ~~8 log b 0.49 0.30
8 log B~8 log b -0.04 -0.03
8 log d~8 log b 0.03 0.03
F(~), a and ~ have almost the same sample averages as before. The
parameter v is significantly smaller than 1 according to a LR test
(test-statistic value 36.0 ~ Xi(0.99)). The job offer acceptance probability
is large because of the combination of a small job offer arrival rate and a
low utility value attached to being in the state of unemployment. The latter
holds both because one dislikes being unemployed for non-pecuniary reasons and
because, in unemployment, income is constant whereas one expects it to
increase in employment. In the extended model b is generally close to the
median of F(w). So in this model it is the rate of income increases rather
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than the level of income which makes employment preferable from a material
point of view. The elasticity of the expected duration with respect to the
level of benefits is very small. The reasons for this are similar to those
given in Subsection 2.5.2 to explain the results in Table 4.
In order to examine whether the estimates are sensitive to changes in the
assumed values of p and cx, the model is re-estimated for alternative values of
p( 5 and 1596 per year ) and a( 3 and 596 per year ). It appears that the
differences in the values of p and a are absorbed by v and that all other
results in Table 5 and the fit of the model are almost constant for the cases
considered. The value of v ranges from 0.82 to 0.85 so the sensitivity of v to
changes in the value of p is less than in the basic model.
In sum, the main conclusions from Section 2.5 about the parameter
estimates, about the relative magnitudes of the main variables for different
age categories and levels of education, and about the effects of changes in
the level of benefits, remain unaffected. The results in this section suggest
that on-the-job search may be an important factor for search behaviour of the
unemployed. Therefore a topic for further research would be to extend the
model to include on-the-job search explicitly. Using data of employed and
unemployed individuals simultaneously, the wage offer distribution could be
estimated along with the other variables. Also, some of the rather rigid
assumptions that were made in this section could be relaxed in such a model.
2.7. Conclusions
In this chapter we have extended the existing empirical literature on
structural job search models by specifying and estimating a model that allows
for transitions from unemployment into nonparticipation. Moreover, a version
of the model deals with the influence of prospective wage increases during
employment on the search behaviour of the unemployed. The model is estimated
using Dutch data from 1983-1985. The results indicate that almost every job
offer is acceptable. The reason for this is the combination of a very small
job offer arrival rate and low values of the utility function in unemployment
relative to employment. If one turns down an offer then generally one has to
wait for a very long time before the next offer arrives. In the meantime one
is unemployed, which is disliked both for pecuniary and for non-pecuniary
reasons. As for the pecuniary reasons, in the basic model these refer to the
low level of benefits relative to wages. If account is taken of wage increases
during employment then generally the estimated difference between benefits and
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initial-wage offers is much smaller. However, the prospect of wage increases
causes the unemployed searcher to set a low reservation wage as well. The
results imply that at an individual level a decrease in benefits is
ineffective in reducing unemployment duration. The estimation results appear
to be robust to varying certain assumptions.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A.1. Derivation of equation (3)
Basically, the derivation proceeds along the lines of Lancaster 8e Chesher's
(1983) derivation of the reservation wage equation in a standard model with
income maximization and ~- 0. First, consider a moment t at which an offer is
pending. Let Ie denote the value at time t of following the optimal strategy.
An acceptance policy can be characterized by a function p mapping [0,~~ onto
[0,1] and giving for every w the probability that a wage offer w will be
accepted. R is defined to be the return of rejecting the offer and behaving
optimally afterwards. Because of the stationarity assumption Ie, p and R do
not depend on t. Thus, at every moment at which an offer is pending, Ie
denotes the present value of following the optimal strategy.
(Al) Ie - suP Ó [P(w).upw) f (1-P(w)).R] ~(w)
A
It follows that the optimal acceptance policy p~` is given by
p~`(w) - 1 if u(w) ~ p.R
p~(w) - 0 otherwise
(A2)
so p~ can be characterized by a reservation wage ~, satisfying
(A3) u(~) - p.R
Thus (Al) can be written as
(A4) Ie - R f p. f u(w)-u(~) dF(w)
~
Let I,~ denote the expected return at a moment at which a transition into
nonparticipation occurs. From the assumptions on the expected utility during
nonparticipation it follows that
(A5) I,a - J f e pt.v.u(x) dt dH(x) - v.u(b)
00 p
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in which H(x) is the c.d.f. of income flows of nonparticipants. Let k(r)
denote the p.d.f. of the distribution of the waiting time at t until the next
event (job offer or transition into nonparticipation) occurs. Because of the
stationarity assumption k(r) does not depend on t and is distributed
exponentially with parameter ~f~. If an event occurs, the probability that
this event is a job offer is equal to a~(at~). Now R can be written as
(A6) R- ó k(r) f ó v.u(b).é~ds f épt{ ~}~.Ie t A}~.I,n } 1 dr
which reduces to
(A7) R -
v.u(b) f aIe f ~I~
pf a ti;
Substitution of (A3), (A4) and (A5) in (A7) gives the desired result. Note
that for equation (3) to hold it is not necessary that the distribution of
income flows of nonparticipants and the per-period utility function of
nonparticipants are independent of the time spent in the state of
nonparticipation. What is essential is that the expected discounted lifetime
utility at the moment that one becomes a nonparticipant equals In equals
v.u(b)~p. Therefore equation (A5) can be replaced by
(A8) In - J e-pt f v(t).u(x;t) dH(x~t) dt - v.u(b)
0 0 p
in which t denotes the duration in the state of nonparticipation; the
definitions of v(t), u(x;t) and H(x~t) are obvious.
The model can also be extended in another direction without changing the
outcomes. From the examples of transitions from unemployment into
nonparticipation it is clear that one can also expect transitions from
employment into nonparticipation to be present in reality. If so then the
unemployed individual can be assumed to take account of this when determining
his optimal strategy. Let transitions from employment into nonparticipation
arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate w. We assume that the
expected discounted lifetime utility at the moment that one becomes a
nonparticipant is independent of the origin state and is denoted by I,n. It can
be proven that, instead of equation (3), the reservation wage satisfies
(A9) u(~) - p}~.{ pln.(~-w) t v.u(b).(pt~) } f p~~ .f u(w)-u(~) ~(w)
~
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If we impose that m-~, that is, if we assume that the transition rate into
nonparticipation is the same for employed and unemployed individuals, then
equation (A9) reduces to equation (3). This result holds regardless of the
value of I~ as long as it is fixed. For our purposes it is even more
interesting that if equation (A8) is substituted in equation (A9), this
equation again reduces to equation (3). That is, the reservation wage does not
depend on w if (A8) holds.
2.A.2. Likelihood function in case of a time-varying entry rate
If the entry rate into unemployment is dependent on time then the backward
recurrence time t no longer has an exponential distribution. Consequently the
likelihood contribution LZ (see equation (10)) has to be modified. From Ridder
(1984), the density function h(t~x) of t given time-independent personal
characteristics x is given by
(A10) h(t~x) - q(-t~x).e
wt
~ -wsJ q(-s~x).e ds
0
in which w- w(x) - B(x) f~(x) and in which q(-t~x) is the entry rate at t
units of time before April 1984. In Subsection 2.5.3 it is assumed that
q(-t~x) - q(O~x) O~t~t2 or t~t3
(All)
q(-tlx) - 2q(o~x) t2st~t,
with t2 and t3 equal to 16 and 52 months, respectively. The variable t is
censored at tl (see Subsection 2.3.2). By substituting (All) in (A10), taking
account of the censoring, and by taking the logarithm, the modified LZ is
obtained. This expression does not depend on q(O~x).
2.A.3. l~rivation of equation (15)
The line of argument and the notation of Appendix 2.A.1 are followed.
Equations (A7) and (A8) remain valid. Equation (Al) is replaced by
(A12) Ie - suP ó fP(w).Et~ ó e~.u(eo`w.w)d~ t éPt.R) i- (1-P(w)).RJdF(w)
P L )))
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The expectation Et is taken w.r.t. the duration of employment. The reservation
wage ~ characterizes the optimal strategy,
t
(A13) Et J e ~.u(eaw.~)dw - Et(I-é Pt).R
0
Substitution in (A12) gives, noting that u is the logarithmic function,
I t x(A14) Ie- R t ó.Et(1-e P).J (log w-log rp)dF(w)
~
Equation (A13) can be simplified to
t
(A15) Et f cxwe~dw - Et(1-éPt) rR - log ~10 L PJ
Because t~ exponential ( s) it holds that
Et(1-e-Pt) - Ppfs
t




so equations (A14) and (A15) can be simplified to
(A16) Ie- R f P}s . j( log w-log ra)dF(w)
~
(A17) log ~ - P.R - P~s
Substitution of (A16), (A17) and (A8) in (A7) gives the desired result.
2.A.4. Approximation of the distribution of initial-wage offers
In order to avoid confusion between initial wages and current wages the latter
are denoted by y and the former by w. The distribution over the population of
completed durations of employRnent is exponential with parameter s. We observe
a(cross-section) sample from the stock of the employed, which means that the
durations of employment t are incomplete. However, the entry rate into
employtnent is time-independent due to the stationarity assumption. Therefore
such incomplete durations have an exponential distribution with parameter s as
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well.
An observed (current) wage y is the product of two unobserved stochastic
terms
(A18) y - eat w
in which t denotes the incomplete duration of employment. Since t and w are
independent, the moments of y are easily expressed in terms of the moments of
w,
(A19) E(Y) - E(ecxt).E(w) - sSa.E(w)
(A20) var(y) - (ssa)Z.var(w) f Ísaa)2'ss2a'E(w2)
Define i; - a~s. Equations (A19) and (A20) can be rewritten as
E(w) - (1-~).E(Y)
var(w) - (1-i;)Z.var(y) f o(~)
Consequently, if we use
(A21) w - (1-~).y
in order to recover F(w) from the distribution of y, then the first moment of
the distribution thus obtained is correct while the second central moment is
correct up to the second order of a~s. For cx small as compared to s the
distribution of w based on equation (A21) is a good approximation of the true
F(w) though the variance of F(w) is somewhat overstated. It is assumed that y
~ LN(~,a2) so
(A22) (1-~).y ~ LN(Ecflog(1-s;), 02)
Therefore F(w) is approximated according to equations (A21) and (A22). Note
that from equation (A18) and from the assumptions on the parametric forms of
the distributions of y and t, F(w) could be deduced exactly. However this
gives rather problematic results for the parametric forms that were chosen.
Rather than modifying these choices we prefer to approximate F(w) as set out
in the previous paragraph.
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CHAPTER 3
NONSTATIONARITY IN JOB SEARCH TI~ORY
3.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the movement of a job seeking individual's reservation
wage over time in a general nonstationary job search model. Also, results
concerning comparative dynamics of the reservation wage and the distribution
of the duration of unemployment are derived. As an empirical illustration a
nonstationary structural model is estimated. The nonstationarity originates
from the decrease of the level of benefits when unemployment duration equals
two years. From the results some detailed policy recommendations can be
deduced, as one is able to distinguish the effect of a change of the level of
benefits in the first two years of unempíoyment from the effect of a change of
the level after that period.
Recently the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment
duration has become widespread. The reduced-form approach in empirica] studies
(see for example Lancaster (1979)) in which only the hazard of the duration
distribution is estimated seems to be replaced gradually by a more structural
approach. The latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use in
empirical analysis of the reservation wage equation as stated by the theory.
For example Yoon (1981), Lancaster 8L Chesher (1983), Lynch (i983),
Narendranathan 8c Nickell (1985) and van den Berg (1990c) use the complete
theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search
behaviour.
However, the structural models used in these studies are stationary. This
implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival of
job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment, which is
often at variance with reality. What's more, various reduced-form empirical
studies indicate a significant duration dependence of the re-employment
probability, which is generally interpreted as evidence in favor of the
presence of nonstationarity (see e.g. Blau 8c Robins (1986b), Kooreman 8c Ridder
(1983), Lancaster (1979) and Narendranathan, Nickell 8e Stern (1985)).
Consequently there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time
based on a nonstationary theoretical framework.
In the last two decades a few papers have been published that pay some
attention to nonstationarity in job search theory (see e.g. Burdett (1979),
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Gronau (1971), Heckman 8e Singer (1982), Lippman 8c McCall (1976b) and Mortensen
(1986)). Though these articles draw important qualitative conclusions
concerning the movement of the reservation wage over time, generally no
attention is paid to a rigorous derivation of formulae for the time dependence
of the reservation wage. Furthermore, only very specific departures from
stationarity are examined, like finite lifetimes or shifting wage offer
distributions. Most models are specified in discrete time which means that an
empirical implementation would require a arbitrary choice concerning the
length of the unit time interval. These remarks also apply to Wolpin (1987)
who estimates a structural model that allows for duration dependence of the
job offer arrival rate. Kiefer 8e Neumann (1979b) estimate a discrete-time
search model in which exactly one job offer per period is assumed to arrive
and in which the reservation wage is a linear function of some explanatory
variables including unemployment duration. This linear specification is not
derived from theory so the model might be called semi-structural. It appears
that duration has a significant negative influence on the reservation wage
though it is not clear which economic causes should be held responsible for
this effect.
In this chapter we examine the consequences of nonstationarity in
continuous-time job search models in a rather general setting. Section 3.2
gives a brief overview of job search theory. Various causes of nonstationarity
that may arise are discussed, like macro-economic events and changes in the
personal situation of individuals during the spell of unemployment. In
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we present the main theorems concerning the movement of
the reservation wage over time in nonstationary models. The exogenous
variables like unemployment benefits and the wage offer distribution are
allowed to vary over time in a very general way. The more specific the
assumptions about the time paths of the exogenous variables, the more detailed
are our inferences about the time path of the reservation wage. In Section 3.3
we also give some comparative dynamics results. These results concern the
shift in the optimal reservation wage path if we replace some particular time
path of an exogenous variable by another. We also examine the unemployment
duration density in the case of nonstationarity.
In Section 3.5 we illustrate by means of an empirical example the
importance of allowing for nonstationarity. In The Netherlands in the
beginning of the eighties the benefits level during the first years of
unemployment is related to the pre-unemployment wage while the level after
that is determined by the public assistance system. As a consequence benefits
generally decrease substantially when duration equals about 2 year~. Tn a
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nonstationary structural model one can analyze in detail the effects of these
changes, not only on the expected duration but also on the optimal reservation
wage path. Using survey data on unemployed individuals from 1933, a
nonstationary continuous-time structural job search model that allows for such
changes is estimated. Civen the parameter estimates we calculate the
elasticities of the expected duration with respect to the level of benefits
before and after 2 years of unemployment. It appears that for most individuals
the elasticity of duration with respect to the level of benefits after 2 years
is much larger than the elasticity of duration with respect to the level
before 2 years. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Job search theory and the introduction of nonstationarity
Job search theory tries to describe the behaviour of unemployed individuals in
a dynamic and uncertain world. Job offers arrive at random intervals following
a(non-homogeneous) Poisson process with arrival rate a. Such job offers are
random drawings (without recall) from a wage offer distribution with
distribution function F(w). Every time an offer arrives the decision has to be
made whether to accept the offer or reject it and search further. Once a job
is accepted it will be kept forever at the same wage. It is assumed that
individuals know a and F(w) but that they do not know in advance when job
offers arrive and what wages are associated with them. During the spell of
unemployment, unemployment benefits b are received. Unemployed individuals aim
at maximization of their own expected present value of income (over an
infinite horizon).
The job search model described here contains three exogenous variables (a,
b and F(w)) and one constant parameter p which is the subjective rate of
discount. For expositional purposes the theoretical results in this chapter
are stated in terms of this basic model. At the end of Section 3.4 it is
outlined how the results can be generalized to a setting that is more
realistic with regard to the function that is to be maximized and also with
regard to the process of search. We now discuss the concepts of stationarity
and nonstationarity in the basic model. Let time To denote the point of time
at which an individual becomes unemployed. We call the job search model that
describes the search behaviour of this individual stationary if the exogenous
variables a, b and F(w) are constant on the time interval [To,~~ and do not
depend on realizations of offer times or wage offers. In combination with the
infinite horizon assumption this means that in the case of stationarity the
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unemployed individual's perception of the future is independent of time or
unemployment duration. Consequently, the optimal strategy is constant during
the spell of unemployment. Let us assume that F(w) is continuous in w, that
this distribution has a finite first moment and that O~J~~m, 0~ p~~ and O~b~~.
For a stationary job search model satisfying these conditions it has been
shown many times that the optimal strategy can be characterized by the
reservation wage property (see e.g. Lancaster 8z Chesher (1983)). A job offer
is acceptable if its wage exceeds the reservation wage ~ while a wage below ~
induces one to reject the offer and search for a better one. The reservation
wage is the unique finite solution of
(1) ~ - b t p f (w-~) ~(w)
~
Nonstationarity arises if one or more of the exogenous variables change
after T,,. Such a change may he due to business cycle effects. For instance, an
increase in the aggregate unemployment level may induce a fall in a. Changes
may also occur because of policy changes like a reduction of all unemployment
benefits. Finally, for a job searcher the exogenous variables may change
because of changes in his personal situation. Unemployment benefits and ~ may
be dependent on the elapsed unemployment duration. Sooner or later these
features of the labour market and personal characteristics of job searchers
are recognized and used in determining the optimal strategy. So, generally,
the optimal strategy is not constant in the case of a nonstationary model.
In this chapter we consider nonstationarity as a result of the time
dependence and duration dependence of exogenous variables. Dependencies of
exogenous variables on the number of rejected offers or the levels of wages
associated with rejected offers are ruled out. Further, throughout the chapter
we will be concerned with job searchers with perfect foresight in the sense
that they are assumed to correctly anticipate changes in the values of the
exogenous variables. In other words, we expect people to know how the
exogenous variables are related to unemployment duration. In Section 3.6 we
turn to the issue of relaxing this assumption.
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3.3. The reservation wage in nonstationary job search models
3.3.1. Assumptions
For ease of exposition we let calendar time start at the moment that one
becomes unemployed, so that calendar time and unemployment duration coincide.
In this way duration dependence and other forms of nonstationarity can be
considered simultaneously. In order to obtain properly defined present values
and in order to restrict attention to economically meaningful cases, the
following weak assumptions concerning the exogenous variables and p are made.
1. Wage offers at táme t are drawn randomly from a distrábutáon wáth a
distribution functàon F(w;t), which is a continuous functáon of w and
strictly monotonically increasing in w on some ánterval ~cx(t),Q(t)~ with
0 ~ cx(t) ~ J3(t) 5~, F(a(t);t) - 0 and Wl~r~tl F(w;t) - 1 for every t~0.
The mean of the distrábutáon ás a uniformdy bounded functáon of t.
2. For every t~0, 0 ~ a(t) 5 K ~~ and 0 ~ b(t) 5 K ~~; K beáng a fáxed
number.
3. F(w;t), a(t) and b(t) are contánuous functions of t on [0,~~ except
possábly for a fánite number of points. If an exogenous variable is
dáscontinuous in t at some point, say t~, then it ás ráght - continuous, and
the left- hand limát of thás variable at t~ does exist ( e. g. án the case of
b: lim b(t) - b(t~) and lim b(t) exásts).
tat~ tTt~
4. There exásts some number T such that all exogenous varáables are constant
on [T,m~.
5. 0~p~~.
Note that a model which satisfies Assumptions 1-5 allows for quite general
patterns of movement of the exogenous variables over time, comprising
virtually every nonstationary situation that may arise in practice.
3.3.2. The optimal path of the reservatáon wage
We now present a characterization of the time path of the optimal strategy.
Theorem 1.
Let Assumptions 1-5 be satásfáed. Then the optimal strategy of a job searcher
can be characterized by a reservatáon wage functíon ~(t) giving the
reservatáon wage at táme t. ~(t) is a unáque, bounded and continuous function
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of t and it satisfáes the fodlowáng differential equatáon for every point in
time at which b(t), a(t) and F(w;t) are continuous in t.
Í2) ~'(t) - p.~(t) - p-b(t) - a(t) .Q(~(t);t)
where Q(~(t);t) is defined as
~ ~
Q(~(t);t) - f (w-~(t))dF(w;t) - f F`(w;t)dw wáth F`(w;t) - 1-F(w;t)
~(t) ~(t)
If one or more of the exogenous variables are discontinuous in t at some
point, then the ráght - hand sáde of ( 2) gáves the ráght - hand derávatáve of ~
with respect to t at that point. The left-hand derávative can be calculated by
replacing the values of the exogenous variables at t in the ráght-hand side of
(2) by their left-hand lámáts at that dáscontánuity point.
The proof is in the appendix.
The differential equation (2) is also given by Mortensen (1986). However,
in Mortensen's model the exogenous variables are forced to have very simple
functional forms; in fact the only departure from stationarity is (in terms of
our model ) a simultaneous discrete change in a and b when the unemployment
duration equals T time-units. This change is interpreted to be a consequence
of liquidity constraints.
In order to get an intuitive feeling for equation (2) we rewrite it in
terms of the optimal present value of search R(t) at time t. From the
appendix, ~(t) - p.R(t) so ~(t) is the wage rate which makes the individual
indifferent between working and being unemployed at t. It follows,
(3) pR(t)dt - aát t t b(t)dt t a(t)dt . f rW - R(t)l dF(w;t)
~(t)lp J
Suppose the optimal value R is an asset which can be traded in a perfect
capital market with an interest rate that equals the discount rate p. In
equilibrium the return from the asset value in a small time interval [t,ttdt~,
which is pR(t)dt, must equal what one expects to get from holding the asset in
that period. The latter consists of three parts: first, the appreciation of
the asset value in the time interval; second, the benefits flow in the
interval; and third, the expected gain of finding a job during the period (see
Pissarides (1985) for other examples of such an interpretation).
Another way to look at equation (2) requires the introduction of a
45
function ~o(t), giving the optimal reservation wage at time t if the
environment remains stationary after t, i.e. from equation (1), ~o(t) is the
unique finite solution of
(4) ~o(t) - b(t) f ~pt) . Q(~o(t);t)
Suppose we want to compare ~(t) and ~o(t). Of course, ~(t) -~o(t) implies




a~(t) - P t a(t)~(~(t);t) - P} 9(t) ~ o
in which B(t) denotes the exit rate out of unemployment at time t(see
Subsection 3.3.4). Consequently,
(6) ~(t) i ~0(t) p ~R(t) i ~
Let Ro(t) denote the optimal value of search at t in case rpo(t) is the optimal
reservation wage. It is clear that ~o(t) - p.Ro(t). Using Ro(t) and R(t) it
can be shown that relationship (6) is perfectly plausible. If for example
tp(t)~~o(t) then R(t)~Ro(t) which means that there are future changes in the
values of the exogenous variables that altogether benefit the value of search
R(t) as compared to the `stationary state' value of search Ro(t). As time
proceeds, these future changes come nearer. Both because future income is
discounted by a positive rate p and because the probability of not finding a
job before the changes take place (following the optimal strategy) increases
as time proceeds, this implies that R will rise at t(compare equation (5)).
So the right-hand derivative of R with respect to time at t is positive and
consequently ~R(t) ~ 0. Note that the argument applies to every two possible
reservation wages at t, in the sense that it makes clear that given the values
of the exogenous variables at t, ~1(t) ~~Z(t) implies ~1R(t) ~~ZR(t). In
Section 3.4, where we make an additional assumption concerning the exogenous
variables, we return to the interrelations between Q~, ~' and ~o.
Theorem 1 can be used in order to determine ~ as a function of time. First
solve for ~ at the point T after which all exogenous variables are constant
(this is easily done using equation (1)). ~(t) is a continuous function of t.
Therefore ~(T) serves as an initial condition for the differential equation
(2) in the time interval ending at T within which the exogenous variables are
continuous. Thus ~(t) can be solved for every t in this interval. Backward
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induction leads to the solution ~(t) for every t~0.
If restrictions are placed on the way that the exogenous variables may
vary over time, then sometimes qualitative conclusions can be drawn concerning
the time path of m. In the remainder of this subsection sufficient conditions
are given for the reservation wage to be strictly decreasing. Consider models
in which one of the exogenous variables is time dependent in a way that is
described by one of the following four cases, while the others are constant on
the interval [O,a~~.
Kl) b'te[o,T~, bT~O, b(t) ~ b(tfT).
Ky) btE[O,T~, b'T~O, a(t) ~ a(tfT).
K3) b'te[O,T~, bT~O, F(w;t) fárst-order stochastàcally domànates F(w;t~r),
that is, bwe~a(tfr)„6(t)~, F`(w;t) ~ F`(w;tfr).
K4) bte[O,T~, br~0, F(w;t) is a ~nean-preservàng spread of F(w;tfr), that
às, E(w;t) - E(w;tfr) and
x x
b'xe~a(t),~i(t)~, f F(w;t)dw ~ f F(w;tfr)dw.
cx(t) cx(t)
Note that in all cases we allow the exogenous variable to be discontinuous in
a finite number of points. In order to rule out uninteresting situations in
which decreasing exogenous variables do not make the reservation wage time
dependent, we impose the restrictions that in case K2 for every tE[O,T~,
~(t)~Q(t) has to hold, whereas in case K3 for every te[O,T~, ~(t)~~3(t) and a~0
have to hold and in case K4 for every tE[O,T~, a(t)~Q~(t)~~3(t) and ~~0 have to
hold. These restrictions can be characterized by the following restrictions on






cxL(T).~1 f pJ - p.E(w;T) ~ b ~ Q~(T), a~ 0.
in which fL(a) denotes the left-hand limit of f(x) at x-a if it exists. Note
that if for every t~0, a(t)~0, a(t)-0 and ~3(t)-~ then these restrictions are
always satisfied. Also note that a decreasing location or scale of the wage
offer distribution are special cases of K3 and K4, respectively.
Theorem 2.
Let Assu~nptáons 1-5 be satisfied. In addition, let one exogenous varáable be
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táme dependent according to Kl, K2i K3 or K4 while the others are constant on
the tàme ánterval [o,~~. Then
(i) dte[O,T~, ~(t) ~ mo(t) wáth ~o(t) as defined án equatáon (4).
(ii) dte[O,T~, rp'(t) ~ 0 if thás derivative exásts. At yoánts t where
~'(t) does not exást ( i.e. points at whách one of the exogenous
varáables ás dáscontinuous), both rp~(t) ~ 0 and ~R(t) ~ 0 hold. If an
exogenous varáable ás discontinuous at T, then Q,L(T ) ~ 0, otherwáse
~'(T) - 0.
The proof is in the appendix. Note that simultaneous occurrence of some Kl,
K2i K3, K9 can be exa,mined by sequential application of Theorem 2. Lippman 8L
McCall (1976b) consider a generalization of case K3 for which they derive a
result similar to Theorem 2 in a discrete time model in which exactly one job
offer arrives per period.
Clearly, the results make economic sense. Any future decrease in b, a or
the mean or variance of F will make the value of search in the present smaller
than it would have been if the exogenous variables were constants. From the
discussion of equations (5) and (6) this means that ~(t) ~~o(t) for every
te[O,T~ and that ~ decreases as lower values of the exogenous variables come
nearer.
In the basic job search model that is described in Section 3.2 and
Subsection 3.3.1 it is assumed that once a job offer is accepted it will be
held forever. The model equations become intractable if one tries to relax
this assumption by allowing individuals to quit or to be laid off, because
nonstationarity in future spells of unemployment influences the optimal
strategy in the present spell. However, Burdett 8e Sharma (1988) argue that the
no-quits assumption is unduly strong if there is duration dependence in
unemployment according to Kl. Basically, the argument is that rejecting a job
offer is sub-optimal to accepting it and quitting immediately thereafter,
because in the latter case one starts with a fresh spell of unemployment and
as a result one obtains a higher level of benefits. However, such behaviour is
very unlikely to occur in practice since generally there are effective legal
barriers that discourage individuals to act that way. For instance in The
Netherlands individuals who quit voluntarily do not get any benefits at all.
Moreover, usually the level of benefits in the first period of unemployment is
positively related to the pre-unemployment wage if one has had a job before
becoming unemployed. Since a model in which quits and layoffs are allowed a.nd
in which each and every feature of the benefits system is incorporated would




In this subsection we examine the consequences for the optimal reservation
wage path when replacing some particular time path of an exogenous variable by
a different (higher) path. For sake of convenience we will be using the term
`reference model' in case every exogenous variable follows the reference path,
while the term `alternative model' denotes cases in which one exogenous
variable does not follow its reference path while the others do. Variables in
the reference model will be labelled with a subscript r. Consider two
arbitrary points in time tl and t2i such that OSt1~tz5~. We consider four
different departures from the reference model:
CI) dtE[tl,tZ~, b(t) ~ br(t).
Cz) `dtE[ti,tz~, ~(t) ~ ~r(t).
C3) b'tE[t1,t2~, F(w;t) first-order stochasticadly dominates Fr(w;t), that
is, dwE~ar(t)~Q(t)~, ~`lw;t) ~ ~`r(w;t).
C4) dtE[t1it2~, F(w;t) is a mean-preserving spread of Fr(w;t), that is,
E(w;t) - Er(w;t) and
x x
dxE~a(t),~3(t)~, f F(w;t)dw ~ f F(w;t)dw.
cx(t) a(t) r
It is important to remark that in every case above, for every exogenous
variable the time paths in the reference model and the alternative model are
equivalent outside the interval [t1it2~. Notice that changing the location and
scale of the wage offer distribution are special cases of C3 and C4i
respectively.
Theorem 3.
Consider one of the deviations Cl, CZ, C3 or C9 from a reference model. Let
the exogenous variables of both the reference model and the adternative model
satisfy Assumptions 1-5. In addition, assume that in cases C2i C3 and C9 there
is a t3E[O,t2~ such that dtE[t3it2~, ~r(t) ~~i(t), whàle án case C4 adso
dtE[t3it2~, ~r(t) ~ a(t). Moreover, in cases C3 and C9 `dtE[t3,t2~, a(t) ~ 0
has to hold. Then, as a result,
(1) tÍtE[O,t2~i ~(t) ~ ~r(t).
(11) dtE[t2i~1i ~(t) - ~r(t)-
(iii) dtE[O,tl~, ~'(t) ~~T(t) if t ás a point at which ~ and ~r are
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differentiable with respect to time. If they are not dáfferentiable
at some poánt te[O,tl~ then the inequaltity stáll holds in that point
for the left- and right-hand derivatives. Further, ~~(tl) ~~rL(tl).
(A subscript t denotes left-hand derivatives.)
(iv) ~L(t2) ~ ~rL(tz)-
The proof is given in the appendix. By reversing the reference model and
the alternative model, we obtain the results in case of `downward' shifting
exogenous variables. Simultaneous occurrence of some Cl, C2i C3, C4 can be
examined by sequential application of Theorem 3. In Theorem 3, the inequality
restrictions concerning q5r(t) and a(t) are imposed only for expositional
elegance; they rule out uninteresting cases in which changing exogenous
variables do not influence the reservation wage path. Sufficient conditions in
terms of the exogenous variables are given in the appendix. If for every t~0
cx(t)-0, Q(t)-~ (which holds for example in case of log-normally distributed
wages) and a(t)~0, then the restrictions are always satisfied.
The intuition behind (i) and (ii) is straightforward. Any future shift in
the time path of exogenous variables that benefits the expected discounted
lifetime income induces job searchers to be more selective in their search
process. As for the period up to tl, the shift in exogenous variables after
point tl becomes more important when going forward in time. This implies that
~(t) shifts away from q5r(t) when t comes closer to tl. However, it is not
always true that dte~tl,tZ~, ~'(t) ~~r(t), if properly defined. It is easy to
find time paths of the exogenous variables in the alternative model that cause
~'(t) ~ ~T(t) for some te~t1it2~.
Mortensen (1986) gives the signs of the derivatives of the reservation
wage with respect to exogenous variables in a stationary model. Those results
are in accordance with Theorem 3(take the reference model and the alternative
model to be stationary, so t1-0, tZ-~).
3.3.4. The unemployment duration distribution
Civen the results concerning the time path of the reservation wage, we can
construct the unemployment duration distribution in a nonstationary job search
model and extend the comparative dynamics analysis using this distribution.
Define the hazard B(t) of leaving unemplovment at time t as
(7) B(t) - a(t).~Í~(t);t)
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By virtue of Assumption 1, B(t) is a continuous function of ~(t). From Theorem
1 and Assumption 3 then, B(t) is a continuous function of t except for points
of time at which a(t) or F(w;t) are discontinuous functions of t.
The unemplnvvment dura.tion density is given by the well-known equat.ion
(8)
t
h(t) - B(t).exp{ -fB(u)du }
0
From the continuity of ~(t) and the piece wise continuity of F` and a as a
function of t and from the boundedness of F and a, it is clear that the
integral in equation (8) exists for every t~0. For points of time at which
B(t) is a continuous function of t, h(t) is continuous as well, and vice
versa. Note that though h(t) is discontinuous at points where a(t) or F(w;t)
are discontinuous functions of t, the distribution function associated with
h(t) is a continuous function of t on the whole interval [0,~~.
The expecied duration of unemployment can be wriiten as
~o t
(9) E(t) - f exp{ -f B(u)du }dt
0 0
Note that this expression may not exist. E.g. if for every t~0 a(t)-0 then
also B(t)-0 and people remain unemployed forever. Sufficient for existence is
that a(T)~0 and b(T)~Q(T)for then B(T)~0 and E(t) ~ T f(1~B(T)). From (7) we
infer that if for some t cx(t)~~(t)~Q(t) and ~(t)~0 then shifts in benefits
that cause a rise of ~(t) also cause a fall of B(t). Because of the continuity
to the right of ~(t), a(t) and F(w;t) as a function of t, B(t) will fall in a
neighbourhood of t. Consequently, we have as a corollary from Theorem 3,
Corollary.
Let Assumpttions 1-5 be satisfied. If b(t) ás raised for every te[tl,t2~ with
O~tl~tZ~oo such that the new b(t) also satásfáes Assu~aptions 2-4, and áf there
is a point t3 wáth O~t3~t2 at whách a(t3) ~~(t3) ~~i(t3) and a(t3) ~ 0 then
the expected duration of unempdoyment áncreases áf it exásts.
In the appendix sufficient conditions for a(t3) ~~(t3) ~ Q(t3) are given.
3.4. Exogenous variables as step functions of time
In the sequel we adopt an additional assumption, namely:
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6. F(w;t), a(t) and b(t) are step functions of t on [0,~~.
For b(t) in particular this is what is often seen in practice.
We can now split the positive real axis on which time is measured into
intervals within which the exogenous variables are constant. On such an
interval, equation (2) reduces to a constant coefficient differential
equation. Moreover, this differential equation has a stationary solution (i.e.
the solution for which ~'(t)-o) which is constant on that interval. This
solution corresponds to ~o as it is defined by equation (4) in a more general
setting. In Subsection 3.3.2 it was shown that ~R(t) can be considered to be a
monotonically increasing function of qf(t). This also holds for ~~(t). Further,
if, in a model that satisfies Assumptions 1-6, ~'(t) exists for some t, then
so does m"(t). By differentiating the constant coefficient differential
equation with respect to t we find that rfl'(t) and ~"(t) have equal sign. Thus
we have the following information about the shape of ~(t) within intervals on
which the exogenous variables are constant:
Theorem 4.
Let Assv,~rzptions 1-6 be satásfáed. Let the exogenous variables be constant on
an interval (tt,t~`~, 0 5 t,~ ~ t" ~ oo. Then for every te~t,~,t~~
~(t) ~~0 p ~'(t) ~ 0 q
~i~(t) ~ ~ 4b
~(t~) ~ ~0 p ~Rlt~) ~ ~ p ~1t~) ~ ~0 q !PL(t~) ~ ~.
Deviations of rp(t) from ~o arise because of anticipations of future
changes of the values of exogenous variables. As time proceeds, these changes
come nearer. Now the rate of discount is positive and the probability of
finding a job before the end of the present interval when following the
optimal strategy decreases when t rises. Therefore anticipations become
stronger and ~ shifts away further from ~o. As ~ is the only variable t.hat
changes within the interval, this in turn implies that ~' increases in
absolute value, which explains the sign of ~". Note that the sign of ~p -~o at
the end point of an interval can be thought of as determining the sign of the
slope of ~ within the interval.
Now suppose there is only one point in time T at which exogenous variables
are allowed to change values. In addition, suppose that only one exogenous
variable changes in value at T, according to one of the following four ru]es:
(if necessary, values of the exogenous variables before and after T will be
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distinguished by subscripts 1 and 2 respectively)
DI ) bl ~ b2.
DZ) ~1 ~ az while ~(T) ~ J3.
D3 ) Fl first - order stochastically dominates F2 while ~(T ) ~~31 and ~~ 0.
D4) Fl is a rrcean-preserving spread of FZ while cxl ~ ~(T) ~~31 and a ~ 0.
Let 45, and ~2 denote the stationary solutions on the time intervals [O,T~ and
[T,~~, respectively. Whether rbl ;~2 follows from the well-known comparative
statics results in a stationary model. E.g. in a stationary model an increase
in b implies an increase in the stationary reservation wage, so in case DI
~1~~2 and consequently ~(T) ~ rbl. Theorem 4 can then be applied in order to
obtain the following
Corollary.
Let Assuncptions 1-6 be satisfied. Let T be the only one potint in ti~nze at which
exogenous variables are allowed to change values, accordáng to Dl, D2i D3 or
D4. Then ~1 ~ ~2 and
(i) for every te[O,T~, ~2 ~~(t) ~~1, ~'(t) ~ 0, ~"(t) ~ 0.
(ii) ~(T) - ~z, ~i(T) ~ 0~ ~R(T) - 0.
Again, simultaneous occurrence of some Dl, DZ, D3i D9 can be examined by
sequential application of the corollary. Note that a part of this corollary
can also be proved using Theorem 3. Burdett (1979) and Mortensen (1977) proved
that in case Dl, ~'(t)~0 for every te[O,T~, in a model in which time devoted
to search is endogenous. Mortensen (1986) also proved that for every te[O,T~
~'(t)~0 if, in terms of our model, both ~ and b decrease at T.
The results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 hold for the basic job search model as
outlined in Section 3.2. However, likewise results can be obtained for models
that are more realistic in some respects. For instance, in reality one
generally knows the wage rate associated with a vacancy before one responds to
that vacancy, i.e. before the job is actually offered. Narendranathan 8e
Nickell (1985) constructed a search model that deals with this. In Chapter 2
it is shown that such a model can be rewritten as the model described in
Section 3.2 though of course the interpretation of some of the variables
changes. Some of the papers in which stationary structural search models are
estimated assume utility maximization instead of income maximization
(Narendranathan 8z Nickell (1985), van den Berg (1990c)), so it may be
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worthwhile to examine in what sense the results are affected if utility is
nonlinear. Assume that utility is intertemporally separable, the instantaneous
utility function being u(w) in case one works at a wage rate w and v.u(b(t))
in case one is unemployed for t periods, receiving benefits b(t). The
parameter v represents the non-pecuniary component of instantaneous utility in
unemployment relative to employment. In order to obtain elegant results and in
order to restrict attention to economically meaningful cases, it is assumed
that u is a differentiable function on ~0,~~ with for every tE~O,~~ u'(t)~0
and that Ew,t(u(w)) is a uniformly bounded function of t. Further, v has to be
,
positive. If u(0) is not defined then b(t) has to be positive for every t~0.
It can be proved that Theorem 1 holds in such a model with ~(t) satisfying
~
(10) u'(~(t)).ep'(t) - P.u(~(t)) - p.v.u(b(t)) - a(t). ! u'(w).~(w;t)dw
~(t)
in all points at which ~'(t) is defined. Again, (10) can be used to calculate
the right-hand derivative and left-hand derivative in points at which ~'(t) is
not defined. The model can be rewritten in terms of the basic model, defining
e.g. a transformed level of benefits b~(t) as v.u(b(t)). After doing so the
other theorems can be applied to obtain results for the model with utility
masimization.
3.5. An empirical illustration
3.5.1. Introduction
In this section we present the results of the estimation of a nonstationary
structural job search model in order to illustrate the importance of allowing
for nonstationarity. One of the main items in the applied literature on
unemployment duration is the magnitude of the effect of a change in the
benefits level on the expected duration (for a survey, see e.g. Atkinson
(1988)). However, though generally it is acknowledged that in most countries
benefits are a decreasing function of duration, the models used in empirical
analyses do not deal with this (for references, see Section 3.1). The
structural models that are used erroneously assume that b is constant
throughout duration. Estimated reduced-form models of duration generally allow
for (parametric) duration dependence that acts multiplicatively on the hazard
B whereas the observed b is treated as a constant (i.e. non-time-varying)
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regressor in B. Moffitt (1985) argued that such a proportional hazard model
cannot be a satisfactory representation of the duration dependence due to
decreasing benefits since this acts in a non-proportional way on the hazard.
This is an important point because, as will be shown, these decreases can be
substantial. It is clear that in a structural nonstationary setting such
problems do not exist. Nickell (1979) and Narendranathan, Nickell 8e Stern
(1985) estimate proportional hazard models in which both b and the coefficient
in the hazard associated with b are allowed to vary across different periods.
Though the models are more general than the proportional hazard models that
are commonly used, they are not able to represent some of the essential
features of nonstationarity due to decreasing benefits. First, and most
important, the models do not allow for anticipation of future changes of the
level of benefits. The specified hazard B at t depends on the present level of
benefits b(t) only and is not allowed to depend on future values of b which in
fact may have a large influence on the present reservation wage and therefore
also on B(t). Another objection to these models is that no account is taken of
the diminishing influence of the level of benefits within a period, as time
proceeds towards the end of that period.
Using micro data from 1983 on unemployed individuals we estimate a
nonstationarity structural model that allows for decreasing benefits. In The
Netherlands in the beginning of the eighties the benefits level during the
first years of unemployment is related to the pre-unemployment wage while
after that it is determined by the public assistance system. As a consequence,
for an individual who has had a job before becoming unemployed benefits
generally decrease substantially when duration equals about 2 years. Such a
decrease does not occur if the benefits level related to the pre-unemployment
wage is below the public assistance level, of if the individual did not have a
job before becoming unemployed e.g. because he is a new entrant on the labour
market. In those cases he obtains public assistance benefits from the
beginning. The data used to estimate the model are obtained from a survey
among some 400 males in Amsterdam. The sampling scheme of the survey was meant
to over represent unemployed individuals, but it makes no reference to the
benefits paths of the respondents or to factors that determine those paths. As
a result the level of benefits at 2 years of unemployment does not decrease
for all unemployed individuals in the satnple. Though the sample is somewhat
small, it contains some interesting information on the labour market
environment and the behaviour of the respondents including subjective
responses on reservation wages. This information is extensively used in the
analysis. From the estimated model we can calculate sample averages of the
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elasticities of the expected duration with respect to the levels of benefits
before and after 2 years of unemployment. Information on the magnitudes of
such elasticities may be valuable for policy makers.
3.5.2. The model
We use the search model described at the end of Section 3.4. Analogous to
Narendranathan 8L Nickell (1985) and van den Berg (1990c) the utility function
of income u is logarithmic so we assume that individuals are risk averse. For
the wage offer density f(w) the following functional form is chosen
1 1f(w) - W og~a if cx~w~Q
f( w ) - 0 elsewhere
with O~cx~Q~~. This distribution is positively skewed and rules out wage offers
close to zero or infinity. Moreover, in the stationary version of the model
with wage offer density (11) it always holds that ae~a~~0 (This inequality
does not follow for every conceivable class of wage offer distributions). A
particular advantage of specification (11) is that we can use subjective
responses on cx and (i to estimate individual wage offer distributions.
Nonstationarity arises if the level of benefits decreases when
unemployment duration t equals T months. After t-T the reservation wage is
constant and can be calculated by imposing ~'(t)-0 in equation (10). Before
t-T rp(t) follows the differential equation (10). For the functional forms of u
and F(w) mentioned above this is a first-order nonlinear differential equation
in log ~i(t) with constant coefficients. It can be solved using the boundary
condition ~(T).
3.5.3. The data and the empirical implementation of the ~rzoded
The data were obtained from a survey among some 400 males in Amsterdam who
were at the date of the interview between 30 and 55 years old. A descriptive
analysis of these data can be found in Ridder (1987). The respondents were
asked to reconstruct their labour market histories over the past 10 years
until the date of the interview which was between October 20 and December 18,
1983. In addition they were asked to provide information on income variables
and personal characteristics. The respondents were drawn from three different
sampling schemes. In all cases males in Amsterdam aged between 30 and 55 were
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sampled. The first subsample (RS) is a random sample from this group of
individuals. From this we selected 22 individuals who were unemployed at the
date of the interview. The second subsample (SS) is a sample of individuals
who were une.mployed at September 1, 1983. From this we selected 137
individuals. The third subsample (FS) is a sample of the inflow into
unemployment around September 1, 1983. From this we selected 41 individuals,
which gives a total number of 200 individuals. For RS we determined tb, the
elapsed duration of unemployment at the date of the interview. For SS we
determined tb, the elapsed duration of unemployment at September 1, 1983, and
tf, the duration of unemployment after that date. Finally, for FS we
determined tc, the duration of the spell of unemployment starting around
September 1, 1983. All tf and most tc are censored. Because of the lack of
information on income variables for past spells of unemployment, such spells
could not be used. The individual log-likelihood contribution of t for FS isc
~ c
(12) GFS(tc) - (1-cl) log(B(tc)) - J B(t)dt
0
in which c1-1 if tc is censored and 0 elsewhere. Assume that the individual
entry rate into unemployment is constant before the moment of the interview.
Then for RS,
tb




(14) ,CSS(tb,t f) -- Ó B(t)dt - log E(t)
( see e.g. Ridder (1984 )). Recall that tf in (14 ) is censored. E( t) in (13 ) and
(14) follows from equation (9).
Individuals who were unemployed at the date of the interview were asked
for their lowest acceptable net wage in a job at that date. These `observed'
reservation wages ~(t) may differ from the true reservation wages,
(15) ~(t) - ~(t) ~ e
e is an error term which is interpreted as a measurement error that is i.i.d.
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across individuals and independent of duration t. Consequently, individuals
use ~(t) instead of ~(t) as their strategy at t so B(t) depends on ~(t)
instead of ~(t) and equations (12), (13) and (14) do not depend on e. Further,
by assuming that e has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance oz we
have that, conditional upon the elapsed duration t(tc in case of FS, tb in
case of RS, tbttf in case of SS), ~(t) has a normal distribution with mean
zQ~(t) and variance o. The total log-likelihood contribution of an individual
can be written as the sum of the marginal contribution of the duration
variables (see equations (12)-(14)) and the conditional contribution of the
observed reservation wage. The latter equals
(16) (1-cz) ~-~ log 2a - log o - ~i .r~(t)-~(t)lz~
L a J
in which cz-1 if ~(t) is missing (16 individuals) and 0 elsewhere.
In order to be able to estimate the model additional information is
reyuired concerning F(w) (see Flinn 8c Heckman (1982)). It seems natural to use
post-unemployment wages because these are random drawings from F(w) truncated
at ~(t). However, our sample is basically retrospective and only in FS a few
post-unemployment wages are observed. Moreover, F(w) as specified is not
recoverable from the truncated F(w). Therefore we take a totally different
route in estimating F(w). Analogous to Lancaster 8c Chesher (1983) and Lynch
(1983) we use subjective responses on characteristics of F(w). Unemployed
respondents were asked what the minimal and maximal wages were of those
employed in their occupation. The questions make no references to the strategy
actually used to locate potential wage offers, so the answers can be
interpreted as `observed' minimal and maximal wage offers cx and ~3,
respectively. Again we postulate that the true a and Q are imperfectly
observed by oc and J3 because of non-systematic measurement errors. We ran an
OLS regression of log a and log ~ on observed personal characteristics, using
data from individuals who responded on oc and Q(134 and 128 observations,
respectively). For all 200 individuals a and J~ can be predicted using these
estimated relationships. Analogous to Narendranathan 8s Nickell (1985) and van
den Berg (1990c) the predicted F(w) are plugged in when estimating the
structural model.
In order to estimate the model the whole benefits path b(t), O~t~~ has to
be known rather than just the level of benefits at the moment of interview. If
an individual has had a job before becoming unemployed then during the first
half year of unemployment his benefits level equals 809b of the previous wage
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while during the next 1.5 to 2 years it equals about 7046 of the previous wage.
After about 2 years of unemployment he obtains public assistance benefits
depending on household composition and financial characteristics of other
household members. (The exact unemployment duration at which b decreases from
709b of the previous wage to the public assistance level depends on the
individual's labour market history, but is generally close to 2 years. In
order to keep the exposition simple, we take T to be equal to 2 years for
every individual in the sample. Sensitivity checks show that the results are
robust with respect to small changes in T). The decrease from 8096 to 7096 is
not very substantial and is generally much smaller than the decrease at 2
years of unemployment, so in order not to complicate the empirical analysis we
will concentrate on the latter decrease and assume that during the first two
years 704b of the previous wage is obtained. If this 7046 is below the public
assistance benefits level then the individual obtains the latter and the model
reduces to a stationary model. If the individual did not have a job before
becoming unemployed (e.g. because he is a new entrant on the labour market)
then he obtains public assistance benefits from the beginning and the model is
stationary. As a result, for 136 of the 200 individuals the model is
nonstationary. Using survey information on the (inflation-corrected) previous
wage and on the level of benefits at the date of the interview and applying
the rules of the public assistance system in 1983 in The Netherlands the
variables b(0) and b(T) were constructed.
The job offer arrival rate a and the relative disutility of being
unemployed v are parameterized as exponential functions of observable
characteristics xl and x2, respectively,
A - exP(xi'~i) v - eXP(xa'I~2)
The vector xl contains possible indicators of a e.g. because they give an
indication of the productivity of the searcher. Note that the sample is
homogeneous with respect to sex and geographic area and fairly homogeneous
with respect to age so these are not included in xl and x2. The vector x2
contains possible indicators of v e.g. because they give an indication of the
attitude towards work of people in the direct environment of the searcher.
The estimation we have employed was ML using the BFfl-IH algorithm. Because
we can solve analytically for ~(t), OJt B(u)du and E(t) as functions of t,
b(t) (OSt~~), F(w), a, v, p and o2 it follows that the likelihood can be
written analytically as a(very complicated) function of the unknown
parameters Ql, ~Z, p and o2.
59
3.5.4. The results
The parameter estimates for the nonstationary structural model described in
Subsections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 are presented in Table 1. The unit time period is
one month. For education the reference category is level 1.
Table 1. Parameter estimates for the search model.
variable~parameter coefficient ( t-ratio )
(i) job offer arrival rate
constant -3.72 (18.5)
Dutch 0.18 (1.0 )
education: level 2 0.18 ( 0.8 )
education: level 3 0.42 (1.9 )
married 0.48 ( 2.6 )
partner has paid job 0.22 (0.9)
(ii) disutiláty of unemployment
constant -0.01 (0.5)
education: level 2 -0.02 ( 0.6 )
education: level 3 -0.12 (1.9 )
partner has paid job 0.01 (0.3)
(iii) subjective rate of dáscount
(in percent per year) 1246 (3.4)
(iv) standard deváatáon of the aneasure~nent
error of the reservation wage 469 (29.9)
Log-likelihood - -2095.65
Generally, the results seem to be in accordance with intuition. Because
this is merely an empirical illustration and because our main interest is in
the elasticities of duration with respect to benefits we will not give a
lengthy account of these results. Also, we are not particularly interested in
search characteristics of unemployed individuals whose environment is
stationary so the results below are only for individuals whose environment
does change. Civen the parameter estimates, the main variables of the search
process can be estimated. Table 2 presents sample averages of the estimates of
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a, F(~(0)) and ~`(~(T)) for different levels of education. The acceptance
probability increases by about 0.1 from the moment that one becomes unemployed
until the moment that one is unemployed for 2 years. After 2 years of
unemployment most job offers are acceptable. Rejection of an offer may well
imply a waiting time of more than a year before the next offer arrives. (This
result is also found in other studies on unemployment in The Netherlands in
the beginning of the eighties, see Chapter 2.) In the meantime the only source
of income is public assistance benefit which generally is much smaller than a.
Moreover, because v~l one also dislikes being unemployed for non-pecuniary
reasons.
Table 2. Probabilities and expectations.
level of education 1 2 3
a(expected number of offers) 0.040 0.047 0.060
É(rp(0))(proportion of offers 0.78 0.68 0.87
acceptable at t-0)
F(~(T))(proportion of offers 0.88 0.83 0.95
acceptable after 2 years)
The results so far enable us to investigate a number of questions related
to the effectiveness of policies aimed at a reduction of unemployment
durations. Table 3 presents for different levels of education, sample averages
of the elasticities of the reservation wages ~(0) and rp(T) and the expected
duration 1;(t) with respect to the levels of benefits b(0) and b(T). The
effects of a simultaneous proportional change of b(0) and b(T) are found by
summing the elasticities in part (i) and part (ii) of Table 3.
Of course the elasticity of ~(T) with respect to b(0) is identically zero:
the optimal strategy does not depend on past income. What strikes is that all
other elasticities for the highest level of education are smaller than the
corresponding elasticities for levels 1 and 2. Highly educated individuals
dislike being unemployed for non-pecuniary reasons more than others do.
Further, the job offer arrival rate and the difference between the mean wage
offer and the level of benefits are larger for them. Consequently, the
expected duration is much shorter and the expected present value of search is
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not dominated by the prospect of being dependent on benefits for a long time.
Table 3. Elasticities with respect to benefits.
level of education 1 2 3
(i) wáth respect to the level of benefáts before 2 years
a 1 og ~( 0) ( reservation wage at t-0 ) 0.15 0.14 0.11al b0og ( )
a log ~(T) ( id. after 2 years)a log b(o ) 0 0 0
a log E(t) (expected duration) 0.14 0.16 0.07a log b(o)
(ii) with resyect to the level of benefáts after 2 years
a log ~(0 )
a lo~
a log rii(T )
a lo- g~





For levels of education 1 and 2 the most striking feature of Table 3 is
that the elasticity of the expected duration with respect to the benefits
level after 2 years of unemployment (the public assistance benefits level) is
much larger than the corresponding elasticity with respect to the level before
2 years (the pre-unemployment-wage-related benefits level). This implies that
a decrease of b(T) would be much more effective in reducing durations than a
decrease of b(0) would be. Note that changing the value of b(T) affects the
reservation wage ~(t) on the whole time interval [O,o~~ whereas changing the
value of b(0) only affects ~(t) on [O,T~. Moreover, the influence of b(0) on
~(t) is diminishing at t proceeds on [O,T~. For levels of education 1 and 2
the anticipation on t~T of the decrease of the benefits level at T is quite
strong because the probability of getting a job during the first 2 years of
unemployment is rather small. In other words, the short-term unemployed
individuals' strategy is sensitive with respect to changes of the benefits
level for the long-term unemployed because they know they may well become
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long-term unemployed themselves.
Information on the magnitudes of such elasticities may be valuable for
policy makers. E.g. shifting b(t) on t~T is almost as effective in reducing
duration of individuals with level of education 1 or 2, as shifting the whole
benefits path. The estimated model can be used for simulating alternative
benefits policies. For every alternative benefits path the optimal strategy
can be solved from equation (10). Note that all these results can not be
obtained by using stationary models.
The empirical model used in this section may be restrictive in some respects.
For instance, it was assumed that a and F(w) are stationary. Moreover, we did
not allow for transitions into a third state, say nonparticipation. These
features can be implemented but the empirical analysis of such extended models
requires more data and is a task for further research.
When deriving the likelihood no account has been taken of unobserved
heterogeneity in the sample, which may bias the results. However, from a
numerical point of view the inclusion of a random heterogeneity term would
complicate things enormously even in a stationary model, so it would be beyond
the scope of this illustration to do so.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined nonstationarity in job search theory. The
optimal reservation wage path over time has been derived under weak
assumptions concerning the exogenous variables. We also have given comparative
dynamics results. Furthermore, by assuming the exogenous variables to be step
functions of time we were able to derive additional properties of the
reservation wage path. Generally these properties are in accordance with
economic intuition. As an empirical illustration we estimated a nonstationary
structural job search model. The model allows for the level of benefits to be
a decreasing function of unemployment duration, which is a stylized fact in
most countries. It appeared that generally the elasticity of the expected
duration with respect to the level of benefits after two years of unemployment
is much larger than the elasticity with respect to the level of benefits that
is obtained in the first two years of unemployment.
There are some straightforward directions for further research. Instead of
assuming that unemployed individuals have perfect foresight with respect to
the future time paths of b, a and F(w), it might be more realistic to allow
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for stochastic changes in these objects. These may be due to such things as
unforeseen changes in aggregate macroeconomic conditions or changes in
personal circumstances. It then seems reasonable to assume that individuals
are aware of these additional elements of uncertainty and derive their optimal
strategies given some (subjective) assessment of the probabilities that such
changes occur. The analysis of the optimal strategy is much more complicated
in such nonstationary models because ~(t), if it exists, is not only a
function of time but also of the realizations at t of the stochastic elements
in b, a and F(w). Also, the empirical analysis will be much harder because the
probability assessments of the changes generally appear explicitly in the
structural model.
At the end of the empirical illustration in Section 3.5 we mentioned some
apparent rigidities of the model specification used. A task for future
empirical research is to relax those rigidities.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
For a derivation of the properties of the optimal strategy it is necessary to
examine in detail the expected present value of income when unemployed.
Individuals who are unemployed for t units of time are assumed to maximize the
following expression
(A1) E f ép(T-t) Y(T)dT
t
in which y(T) denotes the income flow at T and expectation is taken over job
offer arrival times and wage offers. Let R(t) denote the expected present
value of income at t when following the optimal strategy. Then R(t) is the
supremu,-n of expression (Al) over aii ad,roissible policies. For nonstationary
decision processes a recursive (Bellman's) equation in terms of the optimal
value generally does not follow trivially from some optimality principle.
Indeed the derivation of such an equation would need a rather heavy
measure-theoretic apparatus (see e.g. Hinderer (1970)) and the optimal control
literature on such problems in a continuous time nonstationary context is not
very well developed yet (see Whittle (1983)). Therefore such a task is beyond
the scope of the chapter and a different route is followed: the recursive
relation is stated and it is proved that there exists a unique solution R(t)
which is bounded and continuous in t and which can be differentiated with
respect to t almost everywhere. Using the relation between R(t) and the
reservation wage, the desired properties of the latter can be deduced.
R(t) is written recursively as a function of R(T), T~t, in which T is
interpreted as the point of time at which the next offer arrives (so r-t is
the waiting time until the next offer). First the distribution of T given t
has to be derived. The job offer probability in a small interval [T,TfdT~
conditional on not having received an offer between t and T and conditional on
being unemployed at t, is ~(T)dT. Defining G(T;t) to be the distribution
function of T for someone whose elapsed duration equals t, we have the
familiar result
T
(A2) G(T;t) - 1- exp~ -j a(s)ds ~ T~t
t
Because A is uniformly bounded and continuous almost everywhere in t, equation
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(A2) properly defines G(r;t) for every t~0. Note that Assumption 2 allows for
a(t)-0 for every t. In such a case the state of unemployment is absorbing
because job offers never arrive: G(r;t) - 0 for every r so T has a defective
distribution.
Now R(t), O~t~~, can be written recursively as
(A3) R(t) -~ f~ b(s)éP(s-t) ds f ép(r-t).Ew;rmax(~, R(r)l 1 dC(r;t)
From t to r the individual receives benefits; at r he has to choose between
acceptance of a job offer (present value w~p) and rejection of it (present
value R(r)). From Assumption 4 it follows that if duration t exceeds T then
the model breaks down to a stationary model. Therefore R(t) is constant for
t~T and, as has been shown often before, R(T) is the unique finite solution to
(A4) pR(T) - b(T) f~pT ) Ew.T max (p - R(T), Ol
if the assumptions on boundedness hold. Consequently, further analysis of
equation (A3) can be restricted to te[O,T].
It is rather straightforward but tedious to show that if the assumptions
on semi-continuity and boundedness hold, then the right-hand side of equation
(A3) is a mapping M(R) which maps the space of continuous functions on [O,T]
into itself, and the integrals in (A3) are well-defined (see e.g. Haaser 8c
Sullivan (1971)). Let C[O,Tj denote the space of continuous functions on
[O,T], normed with the sup-norm. Then C[O,T] is a Banach space. We now show
that M is a contraction mapping, i.e. that there is an cxe~0,1~ such that for
every R,R~eC[O,T] it holds that IIM(R) - M(R~)II ~ a.IIR - R~II. We have
(A5) IIM(R) - M(R~)II - p~t~r IM(R)(t) - M(R~)(t)I -
O~t~I' ~ f e-p(r-t).Ew;r( max(~, R(r)1 - max(p, R~`(ri1 1 dC(r;t) It l J l J J
~ sup ~ e-p(r-t).E
- OStST t w;r I max (p, R(r)1 - max ~p, R~(r)1 I dC(r;t)
Because for every x,y,z e 92, Imax(x,y)-max(x,z)I ~ ly-zl, the expression above
is bounded by
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~R(T) - R~(T) ~ dG(T~t)0 '- - t
sup ~ e-p(T-t)
~tlI' f
`- O~t~T t e
p(T-t),(O~T~f ~R(T) - R`(Tii1 dG(T;t)
- O~tpT ~R(t) - R~(t)~ ~ O~t~I' f e
P(T-t) dG(T;t)
t
The second part of the right-hand side of the last equation does not depend on
R or R~ so it is now sufficient to prove that
(A6) O~tIT t e-P(T-t) dG(T;t) e[0,1~
One sees immediately that the supremum lies in the interval [O,1]. It remains
to prove thaí 1 is never obtained. Ii, 'dt~U, a(t)-U, then expression (Abj
equals zero. If there is a t~0 with a(t)~0 then, from the semi-continuity of a
as a function of time and from the positiveness of p, it follows that the
expression is strictly bounded from above by the supremum over O~t~I' of
1-G(t;t), which never exceeds 1. Consequently, ( A6) holds and M is a
contraction mapping. From Banach's theorem ( Wouk ( 1979)) it follows that M
which is defined on C[O,T] has a unique fixed point. So, from equation (A3), a
function R(t) in C[O,T] exists and is the unique continuous function that
solves equation ( A3). Because of the stationarity after T, the latter can be
extended to R(t) on [O,oo~.
Equation (A3) can be used to derive the derivative of R(t) with respect to
t. It follows that
(A7) R'(t) - PR(t) - b(t) -~(t) f (w - PR(t)) dF(w;t)
p pR(t)




by partial integration. Differentiation is only allowed if ~, b and F(w) are
continuous functions of time at t. However, because these functions arP alw~~s
continuous from the right, the right-hand side of (A7) gives the right-hand
derivative of R(t) with respect to t at points at which the exogenous
~
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variables are discontinuous. Similarly, because the left-hand limits of these
variables exist, the left-hand side of R(t) with respect to t at such
discontinuity points is defined by
~
(A8) RL(t) - p.R(t) - lfm b(r) - T}m a(r) .1?m f~(w;r)dw
pR(t)
It is clear from eyuation (A3) that the optimal policy is to accept a wage
offer w at time t if and only if w~p exceeds R(t). In other words, the present
value of working at a wage w has to exceed the present value of searching
further in the optimal way. Consequently the optimal policy can be
characterized by a reservation wage rp(t) defined by
(A9) rp(t) - p.R(t)
and the theorem follows from the results on R(t). Note that the reservation
wage function determined by the unique solution to (2) characterizes the
optimal policy of an individual whose aim it is to maximize the objective
function (Al) under the assumption that the optimized value of (Al) satisfies
the recursive (Bellman's) equation (A3).
If ~(t) does not lie between the upper and lower bound of the interval on
which F(w;t) increases then there are many other reservation wages that are
able to characterize the optimal strategy. Still, ~(t) as defined by (A9) can
be used any time to describe optimal behaviour.
Finally, it should be noted that Theorem 1 can be proved without using
Assumption 4.
3.A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
The structure of the proof is as follows. First we restrict attention to an
unspecified time interval within which the exogenous variables are continuous.
In Lemma A1 we show that sufficient for (i) and (ii) to hold in the interval
is that, loosely speaking, ~o(t) is strictly decreasing within that interval.
The remainder of the proof is concerned with finding conditions that impose
the required property to ~o(t) for every interval, using backward induction.
We split the time axis into a finite number of intervals, within which
every exogenous variable is continuous in time. The intervals are closed to
the left side and open to the right. The last interval is [T,~~. Now consider
one such interval, say [t„t`~. From Theorem 1, ~ is a differentiable function
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of t and ~o is a continuous function of t on [t,,,t~~. Further, ~~(t~`) -~(t`)
but it may be that ~~(t~) ~~R(t~) or ~oL(t~) ~~o(t~).
Lemma A 1.
Let Assv,mption 1-5 be satisfied. Consider the interval [t,.,t`~ as defined
before. If ~(t~) 5~oL(t~) and if
(A10) dtE[t~„t~~, dre~0,t~`-t~, ~o(t ~ r) ~ ~o(t)
then b'te[t~,t~~, ~(t) ~~o(t), b'te~t„t~`~, ~'(t) ~ 0; ~R(t,) ~ 0 and if
~o~(t') ~~(t') then rpi(t') ~ o while áf ~o~(t') - ~(t') then ~L(t") - 0.
Proof of lemma Al
Suppose that at some te[t,~,t~~ ~o(t) S~(t) holds. Then, from the discussions
of equations (5) and (6) in Subsection 3.3.2, ~'(t)~0 if t~t,~, while ~R(t) ~ 0
if t-t,~. On the other hand, ~(t~`) ~~oL(t`). ~ and ~o are continuous functions
of t on [t,~,t~~ and ~o is decreasing in t. Therefore ~o(t) S~(t) cannot hold
for any te[t,~,t`~. If ~o(t) ~~(t) for every te(t,~,t~~ then, again from
Subsection 3.3.2, ~'(t)~0 for every te~t,~,t~`~ and ~R(t,~) ~ 0. Furthermore, if
~oL(t~`) ~~(t`) then ~~(t~`) ~ 0 while if ~oL(t~) -~(t~) then ~L(t~) - 0. This
completes the proof of Lemma Al.
Basically, we now only have to prove that ~o is decreasing in t. Consider
case KZ. For every t~T ~(t) -~o(t) holds, due to the stationarity after T. If
a is discontinuous at T, then AL(T) ~ A(T). Because b~~i holds,we have for
every t~0 that ~o( t) ~(~ holds ( see equation ( 4)). Consequently, Q( ~o( t)) ~ 0
and therefore aL(T) ~ J~(T) implies ~o~(T) ~~o(T), as can be seen from
equation (4). If aL(T) - A(T), then ~o~(T) -~o(T), So in any case
~o(T) 5~oL(T). Now consider the interval [t,,,t~`~ with t~ - T. Take a
te[t,,,t~~ and a r~0. Then, because b and F(w) are constant in case KZ,
(All) ~o(t f T) -~o(t) - A(t p r) .{Q(~o(t f r) - Q(~o(t))}
f p.Q(~o(t)) .{a(t f r) - a(t)}
Again, Q(~o(t)) ~ 0. Further, a(t f r) ~ a(t). Inspection of (All) shows that
therefore ~o(t t r) ~~o(t) cannot hold. Because this is true for every
te[t~,t~`~ and for every r~0, we infer that (A10) holds for the interval ending
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at T.
So the conditions of Lemma A1 are satisfied and we can apply it, noting
that ~oL(t~) ~~o(t~`) if aL(t~) ~ a(t~) while ~oL(t~`) -~o(t~`) if a is
continuous at t~`. In the latter case ~L(t~) - 0 of course implies ~'(T)-0.
As for the interval (u,t„~ before [t,~,t~`~ with t~ - T, we can go through
the same lines of argument. We have seen that ~(t„) ~~o(t,~). Again, a may be
discontinuous at t,,. In that case it follows that ~oL(t„) ~~o(t„). So
~(t„) ~~ot(t~,) holds in any case. Further, ~o decreases in t on [u,t,~~ and
Lemma A1 can be applied again. Going backward in time, one thus obtains
Theorem 2 for case Kz. Proofs of the other cases are analogous.
3.A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
We split the time axis into a finite number of intervals, within which all
exogenous variables from both models are continuous functions of time. The
intervals are closed to the left and open to the right. We let tl and t3 be
left-hand bounds of an interval and we let tz be the right-hand bound of an
interval. Now consider one of the intervals, say, [t,~,t~~. From Theorem 1, ~
and ~r are differentiable functions of t on [t,~,t~`~. Further, ~ and ~r are
continuous at t„ and t~` but they may not be differentiable at those points.
We outline the proof of case Cz. Just like the proof of Theorem 2, we work
backward ín time. First, suppose tz~ao. For every t~tz ~(t)- tpr ( t) holds, due
to the equivalence of the exogenous variables of both models on [tz,~~.
Consider the interval [u,tz~. (By definition t3~u.) From equation (2), we have
for every te~u,tz~
(A12) ~'(t) - ~r(t) - P(~(t) - ~r(t)) - a(t).{Q(~(t);t) - Q(~r(t);t)}
t {~r(t) - a(t)}.Q(~r(t);t)
If t-u, we replace ~'(t) - ~pr(t) by ~R(u) - ~rR(u). As for every te[u,tz~
~r(t) ~ ~3(t) holds, we have Q(~r(t);t) ~ 0 on [u,tz~. So if there is a
tE~U,tz~ at which ~(t) ~~r(t) then it follows from (A12) that ~'(t) ~~T(t).
Also, if ~(u) S~r(u) then ~R(u) ~ rprR(u). But ~(tz) -~r(tz) and ~ and ~r are
continuous functions of t. Therefore for every te[u,tz~ ~(t) ~~r(t) has to
hold. Further, according to Theorem 1,
~~(tz) - ~r~(tz) - {arL(tz) - ~~(tz)} .QL(~r(tz);tz)
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which is nonpositive.
Now consider the interval [y,u~. We just derived that ~(u) ~~r(u). Coing
through the same line of argument, if follows that for every tE[y,u~,
~(t) ~~r(t). Whether t3-u or t3~y does not matter for this result. We can
proceed this way until we arrive at the interval of which tl is the right-hand
bound, say [v,tl~. We now have for every tew,tl~
(A13) ~'(t) - ~T(t) - P(~(t)-~r(t)) - a(t) .{Q(~(t)it) - Q(~r(t)it)}
For t-v we have to replace ~'(t)-~I(t) by ~R(v) -~rR(v). If there is a
te~v,tl~ at which ~(t) ~ ~r(t) holds, then it follows from (A13) that
~'(t) ~~T(t), regardless of t; t3. Similarly, ~(v) ~ ~r(v) implies
~R(v) ~~rR(v). But Q~(t1) ~~r(tl) and ~ and ~r are continuous functions of t.
Therefore for every te[v,tl~ ~(t) ~~r(t) has to hold. Further,
(A14) ~~(ti) - ~ri(ti) - P(~(ti) - ~r(ti))
- ~L(tl) .{~[L(~(tl)itl) - Q~(Wr(tl)itl)}
which is positive. Also, from (A13) it follows that for every tE~v,tl~
~(t) ~ ~r(t) implies that ~'(t) ~ ~T(t) while ~(v) ~ ~r(v) implies that
~R(v) ~~rR(v). Backward induction leads to the results for tw.
If t2-~ we first examine the interval [T,~o~ on which the exogenous
variables are constant. Because T~t3 we have Q(~r(t);t) ~ 0 on this interval.
Therefore increasing a in this interval induces an increasing reservation
wage. Now we can go through the same line of argument as before concerning the
intervals that lie to the left of T. This completes the proof in case C2.
Proofs of the other cases are analogous.
We now give sufficient conditions for the inequality restrictions on ~(t)r
on the interval [t3itz~. Without loss of generality we take t3~t1. Suppose
that for every t~t3 it holds that br(t) ~~ir(t), while ,~r(t) does not increase
as a function of t on [t3i~~. Using Theorem 1, we can prove that as a result
~r(t) ~ Qr(t) for every te[t3it2~. In case CZ Qr(t) -~3(t) while in cases C3
and CQ ,Or(t) ~~3(t) on [tl,t2~. Further, in all three cases br(t) - b(t). This
gives the sufficient condition for ~r(t) ~~3(t) on [t3it2~. Analogously, we
can prove that in case C4 sufficient for ~r(t) ~ a(t) on [t3,t2~ is, that
ar(t) does not decrease on [t3i~o~ and that for every t~t3
b(t) ~ ar(t) - ~pt) .{E(w;t) - cxr(t)}
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CHAPTER 4
A STRUCTURAL DYNAb1IC ANALYSIS OF JOB TURNOVER
AND TNE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MOVING TO ANOTHER JOB
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the labour market behaviour of employed individuals
using a structural on-the-job search model. The model allows for nonzero costs
associated with moving to another job. Using a data set which provides
abundant information on the labour market environment of employed individuals
we are able to estimate the structural parameters of interest.
During the last decades the use of job search models for the analysis of
unemployment durations has become widespread. The reduced-form approach, in
which only the hazard of the duration distribution is estimated, seems to be
replaced gradually by a structural approach in which the search-theoretical
framework is used explicitly in empirical analysis (some examples of the
latter approach are Yoon (1981), Lancaster 8L Chesher (1983), Narendranathan 8L
Nickell (1985), Ridder 8c Corter (1986), Wolpin (1987) and van den Berg
(1990b). Structural empirical inference allows one to estimate the underlying
parameters of the search process, to formally test the adequacy of the theory
and to make detailed policy recommendations.
Burdett (1978) was one of the first to model labour market behaviour of
employed individuals in a job search context, to account for the fact that
most job-to-job transitions occur without an intervening spell of
unemployment. In these so-called on-the-job search models individuals search
for jobs which are better than their present ones. By now there is an
extensive theoretical literature on on-the-job search (see for example Hey 8e
McKenna (1979), Holmlund (1984), Mortensen (1985), Albrecht, Holmlund 8c Lang
(1986)). However, up to now there haven't been published any attempts to
confront the on-the-job search model with empirical data. In light of the
popularity of search theory as a tool for expiaining job mobility it should be
interesting to make such a confrontation. Moreover, empirical inference on
labour market behaviour of employed individuals may help in understanding the
behaviour of unemployed individuals. It is well-known that from a theoretical
point of view the possibility of search on the job influences the optimal
strategy of unemployed individuals (see e.g. Mortensen (1986)). Chapter 2
provides some empirical evidence: it is shown that the estimation results for
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a structural search model for the unemployed are very sensitive to the extent
of wage increases during employment (e.g., due to search on the job).
In this chapter we estimate a structural on-the-job search model using
micro data on individuals who were employed in 1985. When specifying the model
we pay particular attention to factors that may reduce flexibility of the
labour market. This is partly because of a growing policy interest in
obstacles discouraging individuals to change jobs. Note that using a
reduced-form analysis of job durations one cannot distinguish between the
costs of moving to another job and other factors that influence duration.
In addition to data on job durations we will use subjective responses of
working individuals on a question about the level of their reservation wage in
order to estimate the model. To our knowledge this is the first use of
`reservation wage data' of employed individuals. (As for unemployed
individuals, in a number of papers reservation wage data were used for
empirical inference, see Lancaster 8L Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983), Ridder 8i
Gorter (1986), Main 8c Shelly (1988), van den Berg (1990b)).
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 the on-the-job
search model specification is discussed. We examine in some detail the
assumptions under which the optimal strategy of an employed individual has the
reservation wage property. Section 4.3 contains a description of the data and
the empirical implementation of the model. We develop an estimation method
that identifies the parameters of interest without having to make assumptions
about the class of wage offer distributions. Section 4.4 presents the main
results. In addition to the parameter estimates we present sample averages of
the main characteristics of the search process. Furthermore we pay special
attention to the effects of changes in the level of the costs of moving to
another job and of the job offer arrival rate on the reservation wage and the
duration of a job. In Section 4.5 we examine the robustness of the model with
respect to various sources of misspecification. Also it is discussed how the
results relate to competing theories of labour market behaviour of the
employed. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. The model
4.2.1. On-the-job search theory and modet specification
The theory of on-the-job search tries to explain the behaviour of employed
individuals who search for a better job (for a survey, see Mortensen (1986)).
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In the basic version of the theory search and job turnover are costless so in
principle everybody is engaged in search. Suppose an individual works at a
wage w. Offers of new jobs arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate a. Such job offers are random drawings (without recall) from a wage offer
distribution F(x). For the moment we assume that a job is characterized by its
wage level and that jobs can be held forever. Every time a job offer arrives
the decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it. Individuals
aim at ma,ximization of their expected discounted lifetime income (over an
infinite horizon). They are assumed to know a and F(x).
Most papers on on-the-job search assume that the model is stationary (see
e.g. Hey 8c McKenna (1979), Holmlund (1984), Mortensen (1985), Albrecht,
Holmlund 8L Lang (1986), Burgess (1988)). This means that w, a and F(x) are
assumed to be independent of the duration of being in the present job and
independent of all events during the stay in the present job. Further, a and
F(x) are not allowed to depend on w. Obviously these assumptions are not very
realistic. The motivation for adopting stationarity is that in a nonstationary
setting the model equations become intractable. Also, most empirical studies
using structural job search models for the unemployed assume stationarity of
the models for computational reasons. Therefore it seems to be a good strategy
to start an empirical analysis of on-the-job search with a stationary model.
If w, a and F(x) are approximately constant within jobs and if a and F(x) do
not depend heavily on w then the results will hold approximately. In Section
4.5 a test for the stationarity assumption is presented.
The model does not allow for transitions into unemployment. From a
conceptual point of view such an extension can be made easily. However, our
main interest is in factors influencing job-to-job transitions. Inclusion of
transitions into unemployment would make the model equations more complicated
and would require more data than presently used to estimate the model. In
Section 4.5 it is examined in what way the estimation results may be affected
by the omission of possible transitions into unemployment.
It can be argued that modelling the search process in terms of job offers
is not very realistic. Sometimes one knows the wage rate associated with a job
opening before the job is actually offered. Narendranathan 8e Nickell (1985)
constructed a search model in which vacancies arrive according to a Poisson
process. A vacancy is characterized by a random drawing from the distribution
of wages associated with the flow of vacancies, so the decision whether to
apply or not is made with knowledge of the wage corresponding to the vacancy.
In Chapter 2 it is shown that such a model can be rewritten as the model
described in this section with a different interpretation of a and F(x). In
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Section 4.3 we show that both model versions generate the same empirical
specification.
The optimal strategy of an employed individual in the environment sketched
above can be characterized by a very simple rule: accept a job offer if and
only if its wage exceeds the wage presently earned. The transition rate from
the present job to other jobs B can be written as the product of the job offer
arrival rate and the conditional probability of accepting a job offer.
(1) 8 - aF(w)
One of our main interests is in factors causing inflexibility of the
labour market, that is, factors that prevent employed individuals from
accepting a job offer they would have accepted in the absence of those
factors. It is likely that the transaction costs associated with moving to
another job are among the most important of these factors. There are numerous
kinds of costs associated with moving and they may add up to a considerable
amount. Moving to another job usually involves moving to another town which
implies that one has to search for a new house, possibly sell the old house,
make costs in order to transport furniture (though this sometimes is paid by
the new employer) and redecorate the new house. Moving to another job may also
be costly if other members of the household have a job too; it may be that the
choice is between other members giving up their job in order to move together
or splitting up the household which may incur considerable psychic costs. The
loss of non-transferable pension claims is a commonly recognized transaction
cost that may have a large impact on labour mobility between jobs. People who
have built up large claims will be reluctant to move especially when the
number of years until retirement is small. Psychic costs associated with
moving may also be considerable. The family has to integrate in the new social
environment while the worker has to familiarize with a new working
environment. Further, he may have to learn new skills during the first period
in the new job. Also, a change of the educational environment may not be
beneficial for children in the household. Special financial benefits (in
addition to the wage) in the present job, like fringe benefits, may prevent an
individual from moving to another job if a new job does not offer benefits or
offers these only after having worked for a certain length of time in that
job. We extend the basic on-the-job search model by introducing transaction
costs c. Specifically, every time one moves from one job to another an amount
of money c has to be paid (it is assumed that non-material (psychic) costs
have a monetary equivalent). Some papers have been published that analyze
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on-the-job search models with transaction costs (Hey 8z McKenna (1979),
Holmlund (1984), Holmlund 8e Lang (1985), Burgess (1988)). Hey 8c McKenna (1979)
and Burgess (1988 ) give a thorough theoretical analysis of the influence of c
on labour mobility, including comparative statics results.
In all papers mentioned above c does not depend on the present wage w.
However, there are various reasons to assume that c in fact does depend on w.
In particular, the amount of pension claims that may be lost is related to the
present wage. Also, individuals who earn a high wage may have spent more money
on their house and their children's education. If the costs associated with
changing houses and education are correlated with the value of the old house
and the money already spent on education then c will be larger for individuals
who earn a high wage.
In order to maintain stationarity we assume that c as a function of w does
not depend on the time spent in the present job nor on events during the stay
in the present job. In combination with the infinite horizon assumption
stationarity of the model implies that the employed individual's perception of
the future is independent of the time spent in the present job. Consequently,
the optimal strategy is constant during the present job.
Allowing c to be a non-constant function of w has important consequences
for the properties of the optimal strategy of an employed individual. The
qualitative comparative statics results derived for the model with constant c
do not necessarily hold anymore. Indeed, the set of acceptable wage offers may
not be connected. In that case the optimal strategy does not have the
reservation wage property, that is, there is no number such that a job offer
is acceptable if and only if its wage exceeds that number. In Subsection 4.2.2
we derive conditions on A, F(x), c and the subjective rate of discount p which
ensure that the optimal strategy does have the reservation wage property.
Analogous to Hey 8c McKenna (1979) we do not incorporate per-period search
costs in the model. This is because in our opinion actual search (noticing
advertisements when reading newspapers, contacting potential employers, making
an expenses-paid visit to them etc.) is relatively costless for the
individuals in the data set. Also, allowing for nonzero search costs would
generate computational problems when estimating the model because non-zero
search costs make it optimal for some individuals not to search on the job
(see e.g. Burdett (1978)). As we shall see in Section 4.3 the data suggest
that in some sense all employed individuals are engaged in search.
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4.2.2. The optimal strategy of e~nployed individuals
Let R(w) denote the expected present value of income if the present wage
equals w, when following the optimal strategy. Because of the stationarity
assumption R(w) does not depend on the elapsed duration of the present job so
R(w) is constant during the present job. R(w) is written recursively as a
function of R(x), in which x is interpreted as the wage offer associated with
the next job offer. The waiting time t until the next offer has an exponential
distribution with parameter a. At t the individual has to choose between
acceptance of the offer (present value R(x)-c(w)) and rejection (present value
R(w)). This gives
(2) R(w) - ó r ó we-psds t épt.Ex(max(R(x)-c(w), R(w))) lae-~tdt
- pt~ .(w ~ a.Ex(max(R{x)-c(w), R(w))))
A wage offer x is acceptable if R(x)-c(w)~R(w) while it is not if
R(x)-c(w)~R(w). If R(x)-c(w)-R(w) then the individual is indifferent with
respect to accepting the offer or not.
The following example shows that contrary to virtually all search models
for labour market behaviour our model does not guarantee the reservation wage
property to hold. Suppose that c(w) is constant except for a large discrete
upward jump at say wo, e.g. c(w)-0 for w~wo, c(w) is `large' for w~wo. An
individual earning wo-e will accept a wage offer wo-~ze. However, it is
conceivable that he will reject an offer wo because the wage increase e does
not offset the increase of c that has to be paid for another transition. So in
such a case the optimal strategy does not have the reservation wage property.
Moreover, there always are sufficiently high wage offers that do offset the
increase of c, so the set of acceptable offers is not connected. We now
present some propositions regarding existence, uniqueness and properties of
R(w) as given in (2) and regarding the characterization of the optimal
strategy, given conditions on the structural parameters a, F(x), c(w) and p.
First these conditions are listed.
1. OG.`Coo, OcpGm.
2. F(x) is a stráctly increasing dáfferentáable functáon on [O,wj wáth O~w~~.
For x50 F(x)-0, for x~w F(x)-1. Further, O~w~w.
3a. c(w) is a continuous function on [O,w].
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3b. c(w) is a continuously differentiable function on [O,w].
4a. V 05w~w~`~w, c(w') ~ c(w) f~.(w"-w).
4b. d O~w~w, c'(w) ~~.
c'(w) is the derivative of c(w). Conditions 1, 2 and 3a are fairly general.
Choosing zero to be the lower bound of the domain of F(x) is a matter of
convenience, we might as well choose another number. Likewise, w can be
thought of as being a very large number. Conditions 4a and 4b assure that c(w)
does not increase too fast, in order to avoid the kind of problems related to
the reservation wage property that were discussed before. Note that a can be
interpreted as an upper bound on the rate at which payment of transaction
costs occurs. Consequently, the quantity (w-ac(w)).dt can be interpreted as
the wage earned in a small time interval with length dt minus an upper bound
on the expected amount of transaction costs to be paid in that small time
interval, if the wage rate equals w. Conditions 4a and 4b state that this
quantity must be increasing in w. Whether these are strong conditions cannot
be said a priori but, as we shall see, it will turn up empirically. Note that
Condition 4b is sensible only if Condition 3b also holds. Conditions 3b and 4b
make it possible to give a characterization of the optimal strategy in terms
of a differential equation. Condition 3b is not very strong since a
differentiable function can approximate discontinuities well.
The proofs of the propositions are given in the appendix.
Proposition 1.
Let Condátáons 1, 2 and 3a be satisfáed. Then R(w) exists and át is the unique
continuous functáon on [O,w] that solves equation (2).
Proposition 2.
If in addátion Condition 4a is satisfied then R(w) is strictly increasing on
[~,w].
This means that if c does not increase too fast as a function of w in the
sense that Condition 4a is satisfied, then a high wage rate associated with a
job implies a large (expected present) value of that job. From now on it is
assumed that Conditions 1, 2, 3a and 4a hold. If R(0)~R(w)fc(w)~R(w), then,
because R is strictly increasing on [O,w], there exists a unique ~(w) such
that
(3) R(f(w)) - R(w)tc(w)
78
while R(x) ~ R(w)fc(w) if x ~~(w). Consequently, the optimal strategy for an
individual earning a wage w then can be rewritten as follows: accept a wage
offer x if x~f(w) and reject it if x~l;(w). ~(w) is the reservation wage, which
of course depends on all explanatory variables in the model. If R(0)~R(w)tc(w)
then any offer is acceptable for an individual earning w, so ~(w) may be
anything ~0; in that case we define ~(w)-0. Similarly, for R(w)tc(w)~R(w) we
define ~(w)-w. Note that whether t;(w)-0 or ~(w)-w occurs for the range of w in
the data set is an empirical matter. However, as we shall see, F(x) is not
identified for our data and therefore neither is w. We may assume that w is so
large that for every relevant case (every individual in the data set)
R(w)~R(w)fc(w).
Because R is strictly increasing and continuous in its argument on [O,w],
it follows that the inverse of R exists and in continuous in its argument on
[R(0),R(w)]. Therefore ~(w) as defined above is continuous on [O,wJ. In
summary, the optimal strategy satisfies the reservation wage property and the
reservation wage l; is a coiitinuous function of w on [O,w]. If Condition 4a is
weakened by replacing the strict inequality by a weak inequality then we can
only prove that R(w) is non-decreasing on (O,w]. In that case there may be an
interval [~I,f2] with O~~I~fZ~w such that an individual is indifferent between
acceptance and rejection of wage offers from that interval. Because there is a
positive probability that wage offers xe[~1i1-2] arrive, this arbitrariness
would raise problems in any analysis of models in which such cases are
allowed.
By strengthening Conditions 3a and 4a it is possible to derive expressions
for the derivatives of R(w) and f(w) with respect to w.
Proposition 3.
If Condátions 1, 2, 3b and 4a are satisfied then R(w) is contánuously
differentáable on [O,w] and for every O~w~w there holds that
(4) R,(w) - 1-c'(w)~~(f(w))
pta~(E(w))
Proposition 4.
If Condátáons 1, 2, 3b and 4b are satisfied then R'(w)~0 on [O,w] and ~(w) ás
a contánuously differentáable function of w for the wage intervals on [O,w] on











ltp. c'(w) Pfe( ~(w))
1-B(~(w)).c'(~(w)) Pfe(w)
From the results so far the following corollary can be obtained.
Corollary.
Let Condátáons 1, 2, 3b and 4b be satásfáed. Further, let i;(w)e~0,w~. Then
(i) f(w) ~ w ea c(w) ~ 0.
(ii) E'(w) ~ o e-s c'(w) ~- p a R'(w) ; P a B'(w) ; 0.
(iii) if c'(w)-o, then: i;'(w)~l a c(w)~0.
The results in (i) and ( ii) make sense. If job changing costs are positive
then one is more reluctant to move to another job than when such costs are
absent. If c as a function of the wage level decreases very fast at w then the
job offers that are not acceptable at w become acceptable for wages larger
than w. Note that the model is not incompatible with an exit rate increasing
with the present wage. The case c'(w)-0 for every w, c~0 has been analyzed
extensively by Hey 8e McKenna ( 1979). In that case, if ~(w)~w then ~(w)~wtp.c
and the gap between ~(w) and w is a decreasing function of w. This can be
understood by the following argument. Individuals take into account that they
may change jobs more than once in the future. Therefore, the reservation wage
has to exceed the sum of the present wage and the long-run compensation of the
transaction costs that have to be paid for the first move. The more job
changes one expects, the larger the gap between i;(w) and w because one does
not want to pay too much transaction costs in order to reach a high wage
level. Because the number of job changes one expects is relatively large for
individuals who have a relatively small wage, this implies that the gap
between i;(w) and w is decreasing in w.
In order to be able to use the model for structural empirical analysis the
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reservation wage has to be solvable for given w, c(w), a, F(x) and p. It seems
that in general the differential equation (5) cannot be solved analytically.
Also, numerical methods may generate severe computational problems due to the
lack of simple boundary values and the restricted interval (0~1;(w)~w) on which
the equation holds. Therefore, a different route is taken in order to be able
to calculate i;(w) as predicted by the model. Specifically, ~(w) is
approximated by the first terms of a Taylor series expansion of ~(w) around
c(w)-0, keeping w constant in the expansion.
Proposition 5.
Let Condátions 1, 2, 3b and 4b be satásfáed. Further, let c(w) be dependent on
a para~meter ~ such that c(w)-rJ does not depend on ~ and rl does not depend on w
( rl ás an addátive para~rceter of c(w)). Then for every wE~O,w~
(7) ~(`N) - w f 1-P~;~~ .c(w) f o(c(w))
The proof is in the appendix. The reservation wage is expanded as a function
of the parameter r~ around rl --(c(w)-rl). For instance, if c(w) is a linear
function of w, say c(w)-c(o)faw, then i;(w) is expanded around c(0)--aw. Note
that g is expanded in terms of rá only, with w being treated as an arbitrary
constant. The resulting equation (7) suppresses the dependence of ~ on r~ and
highlights the dependence of e; on w. Several alternative expansions can be
proposed, but these alternatives all have disadvantages. An expansion of i;(w)
as a function of w around a specific value of w is impossible because we
cannot calculate ~ for that value of w. Also, the expansion resulting in
equation (7) is less stringent and has probably a better quality than an
expansion of r;(w) as a function of all parameters of c(w) around the parameter
values that correspond to c(w)-0 for every w. (In the example this would
amount to expanding i;(w) around c(0)-a-0 which is obviously more stringent
than c(0)--cxw). In the latter case the remainder generally is not o(c(w)).
From now on it is assumed that Conditions 1, 2, 3b and 4b are satisfied.
Further, attention is restricted to cases in which O~w~w and 0~1:(w)~w. The
approximate 1;(w) that is obtained by deleting the o(c(w)) term in equation (7)
preserves many of the properties of the exact ~(w). (Note that f(w) appears on
both sides of equation (7) because B depends on f. It can be shown that the
implicit equation for the approximate ~(w) always has a solution.) For
instance, if c(w)~0 then ~(w)~w, if c(w)-0 then ~(w)-w and if c(w)~0 then
i;(w)~w. Further, if c'(w)--l~p then ~'(w)-0, while if c'(w)-0 then there holds
that ic'(w)~l if and only if c(w)~0. If, for every we[O,w], c'(w)--l~p then the
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approximate and the exact reservation wage functions coincide. In summary, the
approximation is good for values of c(w) which are not too large and it
preserves many of the properties of the exact ~(w). Though it would be
interesting to know whether there is a systematic relationship between the
explanatory variables in the model and the approximation error it is not
possible to investigate this, since in general the exact ~(w) cannot be
solved. However, for very specific choices of F(x) and c(w) the exact ~(w) can
be solved and the relationship between w and the approximation error can be
derived. Details are in the appendix. It appears that for values of F(x),
c(w), a and p that seem to be reasonable (as far as that is possible given
that the exact ir(w) has to be solvable), and for a wide range of w, the
relative approximation error in ~(w) is less than 0.49G.
The equation for the approximate {(w) has intuitive appeal. Suppose
c'(w)-0. In that case ~(w) is approximated by wf(p~8(w)).c(w). As explained
before, if c(w) is constant and positive then f(w) exceeds wfpc(w) because one
takes into account that one may have to pay transaction costs more than once
in the future. Further, the more job changes one expects and the higher the
transaction costs, the larger the gap between ~ and wtpc(w). The term
B(w).c(w) in the approximation takes account of this. Now suppose c'(w) and
c(w) are positive. Then in (7) i;(w) exceeds the i;(w) that would have prevailed
if c'(w) were zero. This effect is more pronounced if B(w) is large. Again
this is plausible: if transaction costs increase with wages and if one is
still at the bottom of the wage distribution then ~(w) must be large to
prevent that one has to pay too much transaction costs in order to reach a
high wage level in the future. In this context it might be interesting to note
that equation (7) can be rewritten as i;(w) - w~ p.c(w) f B(w).c(~(w)) f
o(c(w)).
4.2.3. Job dwrations
As shown before, the exit rate out of the present job B(w) equals aF( f(w)) and
therefore depends on all structural parameters ~, F(x), c(w), w and p.
However, because of the stationary assumption B(w) does not depend on the
elapsed duration in the present job. Consequently, the job duration has an
exponential distribution with parameter B(w). In Section 4.5 the validity of
the stationarity assumption will be tested.
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4.3. The data
4.3.1. The data set
The data set used is constructed from the Labour Market Research Panel, a
survey conducted by the Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labour Market
Research (OSA). As of April 1985 a sample of about 4000 individuals living in
The Netherlands is interviewed every one and a half year. The sample includes
only individuals aged between 15 and 61 and it over-represents individuals who
are in certain labour market states at the date of the first interview
(notably employment and unemployment) but it is supposed to be random in all
other respects. For our study only the first wave of the panel is available.
Respondents are asked to recall their labour market history from January, 1980
until the date of the interview. Further, they were asked to provide
information on their income at the date of the interview. The data set
contains a wide range of job characteristics and information on the social and
working environment of individuals who are employed in April, 1985. This makes
the data set particularly useful for explaining individual differences in job
durations. Another distinguishing feature of the data set is that individuals
who were employed at the date of the interview were asked for their lowest
acceptable net wage offer. Responses on this question are interpreted as the
observed counterpart of the reservation ~(w).
For our estimation purposes we selected individuals who were employed in a
paid job at the date of the interview. Since we do not know the income, the
working environment and the job characteristics associated with previous jobs,
we cannot use job spells that ended before April 1985 for the empirical
analysis. Self-employed individuals are deleted because their labour market
behaviour may deviate substantially from the behaviour of employees. For
reasons that will be explained in the next subsection attention is restricted
to individuals who are aged over 22 at the date of the interview. As a result
we obtained a sub-sample containing 1757 individuals. The elapsed job duration
is constructed by determining for how long the individuals were employed in
the present job. Of these job durations, 6696 are censored in the sense that it
is only known that the realized elapsed duration exceeds 5.4 years. From all
1757 individuals, 1461 (839ó) gave an answer to the question about their
reservation wage. Using a standard test we did not find a significant
difference in the mean wage of respondents and nonrespondents on that
question. This result is interpreted as favouring the assumption Lhat
per-period search costs do not matter and that nobody precludes transitions to
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another job. Figure 1 gives a scatter diagram of all 1461 wage, reservation
wage points (measured in Dutch guilders per month). For only 59b of the
individuals the observed reservation wage is smaller than the present wa.ge. It
is clear that there is a positive relationship between the variables.
4.3.2. The lákeláhood
Information on elapsed job durations and observed reservation wages can be
used to estimate the model. By assuming that the individual entry rate into
the present job is constant before the moment of the interview and that
~(w)~w, i.e. B(w)~0, the elapsed job duration t has an exponential
distribution with parameter 9(w) (see e.g. Ridder (1984)). The entry rate may
depend on the wage of the present job and other observables without affecting
this result. Young individuals, of course, have had only a few years to enter
a job, so the constant entry rate assumption does not hold even approximately
for them. Alternatively, if one views the labour market as a Markov process
then one might say that for young individuals the process is not
(approximately) in equilibrium because the origin of the process is only a
couple of years before the point of observation. Because of this it was
decided to delete all individuals aged below 23 from the sample. Let d1-1 if t
is censored and d1-0 otherwise. The part of the individual log-likelihood
contribution G due to the elapsed duration t is ,Cl,
(8) Gl - (1-dl).(log B(w)) - t.B(w)
The observed reservation wages are denoted by ~(w). These may differ from
the true reservation wages
(9) ~(w) - ~(w) i- E
e is an error term which is interpreted as a measurement error that is i.i.d.
across individuals and independent of duration t and present wage w.
Consequently, individuals use f(w) instead of ~(w) as their strategy so B
depends on ~ instead of ~ and equation (8) does not depend on e. In addition,
t and ~ are independent. By assuming that the distribution of e belongs to
some parametric class (e.g. normal) the part of G due to ~ can be constructed.
Let g(e) be the p.d.f. of e.
(10) Gz - (1-dz) .log g(~(w)-~(w))
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with d2-1 if ~ is missing and 0 otherwise. The individual log-likelihood
contribution is given by the sum of G1 and G2. The structural parameters and
functions of the on-the-job search model (a, F(x), c(w) and p) enter the
likelihood via 8(w) in Gl and f(w) in G2. The true reservation wage ~(w) is
the solution of equation (7), deleting the o(c(w)) term in that equation.
~(w) - w ~
PfB(w) .c(w)1-c (~
When taking a closer look at the likelihood equations one sees that not
all parameters are identified using data on t and ~. In particular a and F are
not identified because both (8) and (11) only depend on the product a~(.).
This is also a commonly encountered problem in unemployment duration analysis
using structural models (see e.g. Flinn 8s Heckman (1982)), and it basically
results from the fact that only acceptable wage offers matter for the optimal
strategy and the exit rate out of the present state. The general approach to
obtain identification of a structural job search model is to assume
recoverability of F and use data on post-spell wages. Because our data set is
essentially a cross-section it dces not provide information on wages that are
earned after moving to another job than the present one so this approach
cannot be used here. Alternatively, the present wage itself could be regarded
as a drawing from the wage offer distribution, truncated at the value of the
reservation wage at the previous job or at the spell of unemployment that
preceded. However, we do not know anything about the values of these points of
truncation, simply because the data set does not provide income variables for
spells that ended before the date of the interview. Consequently, it seems
that the model cannot be estimated.
However, as was set out in the previous sections, our main empirical
interest is in factors that obstruct flexibility of the labour market and in
particular in the costs associated with moving to another job. That is, c(w)
is the `parameter' of interest. Now note from equations (10 ) and (11) that
c(w) is identified from the data on ~ if B is known. But B is identified from
the data on t(see equation (8)). Of course, B depends on a, F and f. However,
we can do a reduced-form estimation of 6 from (8) and use these estimates in
the reservation wage equation (11) in order to estimate c(w). Such an
estimation method does not require identification of ~ and F but yet uses the
theoretical framework of on-the-job search theory to interpret the reservation
wage data. One may say that the method is flexible in the sense that
identification of a structural parameter of interest is achieved without the
need to make strong assumptions on certain other structural parameters and
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functional forms. Moreover, by using a reduced-form specification for B(w) we
are able to check whether certain predictions of the theory hold. For instance
the theory predicts B'(w)~0 e~ ~'(w)~0. A fully structural empirical
specification of B(w) imposes such restrictions and therefore makes such
empirical checks impossible. In Subsection 4.3.3. which deals with
parameterizations of c(w) and B(w) some other predictions from the theory are
derived.
In Section 4.2 it was mentioned that the on-the-job search model could be
given an alternative interpretation in terms of vacancy offers instead of job
offers. However, in that case only a and F obtain another meaning and because
a and F do not appear separately in the empirical specification this implies
that there are no interpretation differences for the empirical results.
One can argue that because we use the approximation from Proposition 5 for
the true reservation wage or because the model is not well specified even if
there is no approximation error in ~(w), we actually make a specification
error. Specifically, ~(w) from equation (11) may not be the true reservation
wage. The exit rate B then depends on the unknown true reservation wage but
since B is estimated in a reduced-form this is no problem. Further, e in
equation (9) then represents the sum of a specification error and a
measurement error. Assume that the specification error is independently
distributed across individuals and is independent of duration t. We can then
still use the estimation method proposed above. (Note that an empirical
analysis of a fully structural model would (apart from the identification
problems) become very complicated if one allows for errors in the
specification of ~(w).)
4.3.3. The empirical i~rcple~nentatáon
Now that we have specified the empirical setting and described the data we
discuss in this subsection parameterizations and the choice of explanatory
variables. The cost of moving to another job c(w) is written as a linear
function of explanatory variables xl and the present wage on the relevant wage
interval,
(12) c(w) - xl'Yl t cx.w
Such a specification satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 5 for any finite
cx~l~a. The vector xl includes characteristics of the neighbourhood in which
one lives, personal characteristics and characteristics of the present job.
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The latter can be subdivided into occupation dummies and pecuniary and
non-pecuniary fringes.
The exit rate out of the present job B(w) is written as an exponential
function of explanatory variables x2 and the logarithm of the present wage
(13) B(w) - QxP(xz'Yz - Q .log w)
This specification is in accordance with specifications in the literature on
reduced-form hazards out of unemployment in that log B depends on log income
and is a linear function of x. We assume that (13) gives a good approximation
of (6) for the range of x and w in the data. From equation (6) it follows that
B depends on a, F and f and therefore also depends on c(w). Consequently, x2
has to include all explanatory variables in xl. Most of these explanatory
variables also influence a and F. For instance the age of an individual or
whether he is married may influence c(w) but may also give an indication of
the productivity of the job searcher and therefore influence a.
According to the theory the parameters Yl, Y2, a and ,Q are interrelated
and the estimation results can be used to check such interrelations. First,
a~l~a has to hold in order to be sure that one can safely use equation (11).
This cannot be checked because a is unidentified, but since B5a a necessary
condition for a~l~a that can be checked is that for every individual the
estimate of a has to satisfy a~1~6. From equation (6) it follows that B
depends on w by means of ~, so the sign of 9'(w) must be opposite to the sign
of ~'(w). From (13), ~3 and i;'(w) must have the same sign. The empirical model
specification consists of the equations (11), (12), and (13). By
differentiating ~ it can be shown that the relation between ~'(w) and ~3 does
not necessarily follow from the empirical specification and can be checked
after estimation. Another interrelation predicted by the theory is about Yl
and y2. Consider an explanatory variable that influences c(w) while it can be
safely assumed that it does not influence a, F or p. In the appendix it is
shown that according to the theoretical model (equations (6), (11) and (12))
the signs of the parameters in B(w) and c(w) associated with that variable
must be opposite if a~-l~p and i;'(w)~0, or a~-l~p and ï;'(w}~0. If the variable
has a positive effect on the cost of moving to another job then it must have a
negative effect on the exit rate to another job. Again this can be checked by
comparing the estimates of YI and Y2.
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, Q and YZ are estimated by
ML using the BHIDi algorithm. The likelihood function is (8) with (13)
substituted for B(w). (Note that we assume that there is no unobserved
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heterogeneity of B(w) in the sample. In Section 4.5 this assumption is
tested.) Next a and yl are estimated by nonlinear least squares. The objective




~. is calculated from equation (11). We plug in the individual predictedi
B(w)from the first estimation step and substitute (12) into (11). Note that by
using this estimation procedure we do not have to make strong assumptions on
the distribution of the error term e. It is assumed that the distribution of e
does not depend on the explanatory variables w and x. However, in the previous
subsection it was argued that the difference between the exact f(w) in the
model and the approximation of it (equation (11)) may be part of e and in the
appendix it is shown that for reasonable parameter values the approximation
err~r i5 decreasing in w. Still, the a.pproxima.tion error is ~.lwa.ys very small
and is therefore probably only a minor part of e, so we do not expect it to
cause a severe violation of the independence assumption on e and w. The
variance o2 of e is the variance of the sum of the specification error and the
measurement error. The subjective rate of discount p is fixed at 1596 a year.
In Section 4.5 we examine the robustness of the results with respect to the
numerical value of p.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Parameter estrmates
The parameter estimates for the model described in Section 4.3 are presented
in the Tables 1 and 2. The unit time period is one month. For the age and
occupation dummies the reference categories are the age category 41-60 and the
occupation category of scientists, engineers and artists. Though ,0 and y2 are
estimated prior to a and r~l we start by discussing the results for the latter
because those are structural parameters.
Housing accommodation circumstances have a strong influence on job
changing costs. If one expects it to be hard to sell the present house or to
find another house to rent when moving to another job, then job changing costs
are (significantly) larger than when such problems are not expected. Further,
if the distance between house and working place is less than 10 km, then job
S9
changing costs are larger, indicating that one is reluctant to give up the
advantage of short travelling times between home and work.
Table 1. Parameter estimates for the costs associated with changing jobs.
variable coefficient (t-ratio)
constant 3233 (1.0)
small distance home~work 2410 (2.4)
civil servant 199 (0.2)
fringe benefits 851 (3.0)
attached to environment (social) -109 (0.1)
married -586 (0.5)
housing problems expected 2435 (2.6)
unsatisfied with job (non-pecuniary) -4290 (2.3)
occupation administrative~commercial 3302 (2.6)
occupation services 3614 (2.3)
occupation farm-labourer~industrial -416 (0.3)
aged below 30 -13865 (9.0)
aged between 30 and 40 -8915 (5.7)
log (~ working in household) 61 (0.0)
wage 6.37 ( 7.7 )
standard error a 396
1461 observations
Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics are strong
determinants of c. If the numbers of fringe benefits categories is large then
transaction costs are high, whereas if one is very dissatisfied wíth the
present job from a non-pecuniary point of view the opposite holds. The
correlation coefficient of the present wage and the non-pecuniary satisfaction
variable equals -0.02 so there is no multicollinearity effect here. One might
argue that job characteristics do not show up in labour market behaviour just
as elements of job changing costs but are in fact properties of a job that
have intrinsic utility. However, that would imply that a job is represented by
a vector of characteristics rather than by just a wage and the optimal
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strategy would be multidimensional and generally unsolvable. Also, certain job
characteristics like special fringe benefits can be obtained only after having
worked in a job for some time so a job transition implies a temporary loss of
them which can therefore be represented as a transaction cost.
The occupation dummies show large differences. Apparently individuals who
have an administrative job or who work in the commercial or services sector
face high job changing costs. This may be because the possible loss of pension
claims is high in these sectors or that in these sectors institutional
restrictions discourage individuals to move to a competing company. It seems
that the kind of occupation one has has more influence on c than whether one
is a civil servant or not. Age is a very important and significant determinant
of c. Both the accumulation of job-specific human capital and psychological
factors like an increased attachment to the neighbourhood in which one lives
may be responsible for the high c for older individuals. Also, the amount of
pension claims increases with age. Finally, there may be a finite horizon
effect which is not included in the model. Assume that there is a point of
time T(say the retirement age) after which one cannot work and assume that
c(w)~0 for every w. Then for points of time sufficiently close to T it is
optimal to reject every possible offer. This is basically because the period
of time that can be used to earn back c(w) decreases as time proceeds. The age
coefficient in c(w) for older individuals may be biased upward because of
this. Note that the argument implies that in that case the corresponding
coefficient in B is biased downward.
Rather surprisingly, other personal characteristics like marital status
and number of working individuals in the household do not have influence on c.
Also, it seems that it does not matter whether one is attached to the social
life in the present environment. One (rather devastating) explanation of this
result is that the `reservation wage' question was (mis)understood to refer to
jobs in the present neighbourhood only. Another possible explanation is that
individuals who are more attached restrict the job search to their present
neighbourhood. In both cases one would expect that the variable under
consideration does have a significant effect on B.
The coefficient oc related to the present wage w is very significant.
Probably the wage variable takes account of many factors some of which are
mentioned in Section 4.2, because w influences the magnitude of the effects of
those factors on c. The estimated standard deviation of e is quite large as
compared to the average value of f, which is about 2530. This confirms the
supposition that the error due to using the approximation of the exact f is
only a small part of e.
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small distance home~work -0.34 (3.8)
civil servant -0.36 (3.9)
fringe benefits -0.12 (4.6)
attached to environment (social) -0.17 (2.0)
married -0.18 (1.7 )
housing problems expected -0.09 (1.1)
unsatisfied with job (non-pecuniary) 0.51 (2.4)
high education 0.28 (2.6)
occupation administrative~commercial -0.50 (4.3)
occupation services -0.10 (0.7)
occupation farm-labourer~industrial -0.40 (3.3)
aged below 30 1.69 (13.0)
aged between 30 and 40 0.86 (6.7)
log (~ working in household) 0.24 (2.0)
log (wage) -0.41 (2.2)
Log-likelihood - -3426.84
1757 observations
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for the exit rate out of the job
B. Note that explanatory variables entering B represent determinants of a, F
and c. The present wage w has a negative influence on the exit rate. This
confirms the prediction of the basic theory of on-the-job search, though our
extended on-the-job search model would not be incompatible with a non-negative
coefficient either. The common on-the-job search interpretation of the
positive correlation of wages and tenure is that once a job with a high wage
is obtained it is hard to find an even better job, so a high wage causes
tenure. In our model a high wage also implies high job changing costs which
makes individuals earning a high wage even more reluctant to change jobs.
Other factors that probably influence B by way of c are factors related to
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housing and the non-wage characteristics of the present job. These variables
all have the right sign in B and are all significant except for the variable
indicating whether housing problems are expected when one needs to move (which
has the right sign but is insignificant). The occupational dummies probably
reflect differences in a and F across different segments of the labour market.
Civil servants have a lower exit rate, which may indicate, for instance, that
the arrival rate or the variation in wage offers is smaller for them. Higher
educated individuals have a higher exit rate, which may indicate a higher
arrival rate or higher variation in wage offers. Whether one is attached to
the social life in the present social environment has a significant influence
on job duration but not on job changing costs. As suggested in the previous
paragraph, it may be that individuals who are more attached restrict the
search for better jobs to their present geographical area only and do not
experience high c by changing jobs within that area. Note that this argument
cannot be deduced from our model. The number of working individuals in a
household has a positive influence on B(but no influence on c). The same
effect for the exit rate out of unemployment was observed in Chapter 2. It may
be a consequence of a positive relation between unobserved characteristics of
the individual under consideration and characteristics of other household
members, as far as these characteristics are relevant for employers. It may
also reflect the fact that if the number of working household members is large
then one has easier access to employers.
4.4.2. The characterástàcs of the search process
Civen the parameter estimates the main variables of the search process can be
estimated and the influence of changes of the explanatory variables on these
main variables can be evaluated. Table 3 presents sample averages of w and of
the estimates of ~, 6, c and d~~dw for different age categories. Recall that ~
denotes the (approximated) true reservation wage as given in equation (11).
The sample average of ~ is about 1496 higher than the sample average of w for
every category. The variance of i; across the sample is fairly large,
especially for older individuals. The minimum estimated a; equals 1370 which is
slightly below the legal minimum wage (1450). The derivative of i; with respect
to w is positive for all individuals and is on average slightly larger than
one. The latter is a consequence of cx~0. Figure 2 gives ~ as a function of w
for an individual with average values for the explanatory variables. The
function is almost linear. However, by choosing different values of the







ó ó ó ó ó ó 0 ó ó,
~ I~ tO0 ~ M ~ U~
C~
w ~
Table 3. Characteristics of the job turnover process.
age category 23-29 30-40 41-65 average
w(wage) 1882 2304 2430 2231
(412) (721) (843) (733)
~(reservation wage) 2121 2595 2798 2534
(487) (802) (914) (817)
B(exit rate out of the 0.0161 0.0062 0.0025 0.0077
present job) (0.0071) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0068)
c(costs of changing jobs) 8136 15866 25508 17015
(3670) (5248) (5804) (8502)
d~~dw 1.17 1.10 1.08 1.11
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05)
the unit time period is one month.
in parentheses: the standard deviation of the variable across all 1757
observations.
Cenerally, older indivíduals have both a higher wage and higher
transaction costs (which is partly due to the higher wage). Note that on
average an individual aged 50 faces job changing costs that are about three
times as large as the job changing costs for someone aged 25. As a result,
older individuals are more selective in their search for a better job and have
much smaller exit rates.
The results so far enable us to investigate a number of questions related
to the effectiveness of policies aimed at an increase of job mobility. In
particular we are able to examine the effects of changes in the level of job
changing costs and changes in the job offer arrival rate by calculating
several elasticities. Table 4 presents sample averages of the elasticities of
the reservation wage and the transition rate to other jobs with respect to the
present wage, the job offer arrival rate and the level of job changing costs.
Because the values of the elasticities do not differ substantially across
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different age categories we only present averages over the whole sample. The
elasticities with respect to w can be calculated directly from the estimated
model. It is impossible to calculate the elasticities with respect to a and
c(w) using the empirical model specification only because the equation for B
(equation (13)) does not show how it depends on c(w) and ~. Moreover, a itself
is unidentified. However, by assuming that (13) represents the theoretical
equation (6) we can derive the elasticities, as is shown in the appendix.
Unfortunately the method cannot be used to derive elasticities with respect to
parameters of F. The elasticities with respect to c(w) are derived conditional
on the present wage and on a, so it is assumed that w and cx do not change if
c(w) changes. For individuals who had c(w)~0 the elasticities with respect to
c(w) were calculated by defining a log c(w) - ac(w)~~c(w)~.
Table 4. Elasticities.
( i) of the reservation wage ~
a log i` (with respect to the wage) 0.988 log w
(0.06)
á llog~ (with respect to the job offer arrival rate) 0.04
( 0.03 )
a log ~ (with respect to the level of job changing costs) 0.12a log c(w)
( 0.03 )













in parentheses: the standard deviation of the elasticity across all 1757
observations.
The elasticity of B with respect to c(w) is very small. This can be
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explained as follows. First, because for a wide range of w the elasticities of
9 and ~ with respect to w are about -0.4 and 1 respectively, it follows that
for a wide range of ~ the elasticity of B with respect to ~ is also about
-0.4. This means that F has a very long tail and small changes in ~ do not
affect B very much. Secondly, note that if c(w) were zero then f(w) would
equal w, so changing c(w) can only affect the gap between f(w) and w. In our
sample this gap is on average about 1296 of f(w). Consequently, an increase of
c(w) will not make the individual much more selective with regard to job
offers. Because c(w) influences B by way of ~ these two arguments imply that B
is insensitive with respect to small changes in c(w). The effect of a on B is
both direct and indirect (via ~). The direct effect by definition has
elasticity one and clearly dominates the indirect effect, which can only
influence ~ by affecting the gap between ~(w) and w.
In the absence of comparable studies it is hard to say whether these
results are common or not. However, it should be noted that the data used to
estimate the model are from a period in which there was a very slack labour
market (see Chapter 2), so it may well be that the elasticities have different
values in other circumstances. In particular, if a is larger, then more
job-to-job transitions are possible in the future, which implies that ~ is
larger and that ~ and B are more sensitive with respect to changes in c(w).
Also, one can show that if p or c(w) are larger then ~ and B are more
sensitive with respect to changes in c(w). However, though the sample contains
individuals with estimated c(w) as large as 50000, the estimated absolute
value of the elasticity of 9 with respect to c(w) never exceeds to 0.10.
From the results of Table 4 one may conclude that if one is interested in
an increase of job mobility then an increase of a is more effective than a
decrease of c. It is hard to say which explanatory variables influence
duration mainly through ~ and which exert their influence through c. From the
reduced-form estimation results for B one can examine the effect of changing
an explanatory variable on the expected duration. For instance, from Table 2
it follows that if the number of fringe benefits categories decreases by one
then the expected duration of the job (which is one over B) decreases by 11~.
Also, if someone changes from being a civil servant to not being a civil
servant then the expected duration of the job decreases by 30Y6.
4.5. The model specification revisited
Iri this section it is examined whether the estimation results satisfy
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non-imposed properties of the theoretical model and whether the results are
sensitive with respect to changes in some of the assumptions made.
In Subsection 4.3.3. it was shown that cx~1~B is necessary in order to have
a sensible empirical model specification. As cx-6.37 while the smallest
estimate of 1~B in the data set equals 21 it follows that this condition is
satisfied for all individuals in the data set. Also, the theory predicts that
J3 and ~'(w) have the same sign. From the results, ~ is positive (0.41) and the
smallest estimate of ~'(w) in the data set equals 1.07 so the prediction is
validated. Another prediction from the theory is that if ac~-l~p and i;'(w)~0
(which both hold according to the results) then the signs of parameters
associated with explanatory variables x that only influence c(0), are opposite
for B and c. It is hard to say which x influence c only but of all 13
explanatory variables in c(0) 9 satisfy this restriction while the others
(typically variables that represent household circumstances) are not
significant for c. Thus, the reservation wage assumption is not invalidated
and there are no inconsistencies in the results.
As said before, the rate of discount p is fixed at 1596. This is done
basically because the data are not able to distinguish between p and the
constant term in c(O). In order to examine the robustness of the results with
respect to the value of p the model is re-estimated with different p,
specifically with p-1096 and p-25SÓ a year. Note that the estimation results of
B do not depend on p at all. The estimates for c do change although sign and
significance generally remain preserved. The resulting sample average of c
equals 12012 if p-2546 and 21989 for p-104b (it is 17015 if p-1596). The value of
c for older individuals in particular is very sensitive to alternative values
of p. However, for all categories the values of the resulting characteristics
f and di;~dw and the various elasticities are almost completely insensitive to
p. Also, the estimate of a does not change when varyíng p. Consequently, the
main results are unaffected by the value of p.
One may argue that gender should be included as a separate regressor in c
and B besides the other regressors indicating personal characteristics.
However, not surprisingly, a`gender' dummy variable is highly correlated with
the `married'-dummy variable and with the variable related to the number of
working individuals in the household. Inclusion of a`gender' dummy variable
in c and B does not have notable consequences for the main results. The
variable itself is insignificant for B but the transaction costs are
significantly higher (2669 guilders, t-2.5) for men than for women. The latter
may arise because the other variables that indicate personal characteristics
may be misspecified, or because females may restrict attention to jobs in the
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present neighbourhood more than men do. Note that B for females is
over-estimated if for this category the transition rate into nonparticipation
is not negligible.
From the discussion of the elasticity estimates it is clear that the
elasticity of B with respect to ~ is an important determinant of those
estimates. The elasticity of B with respect to ~ is determined from the
specifications of B and ~ as functions of w. These in turn are of course
completely determined by equations (11), (12 ) and (13 ). In order to examine
whether the elasticity estimates are sensitive with respect to the
(restrictive) specifications of B and c as functions of w the model is
re-estimated using more flexible functional forms for B(w) and c(w).
Specifically, the variables (log w)2 and w2 are included as additional
regressors in x2 and xl, respectively (see equations (13) and (12)). Adding w2
in c(w) has almost no effect on the estimation results, whether (log w)2 is
included in B(w) or not. In both cases c(w) is virtually linear on the wage
interval of interest. If (log w)` is included in B(w) then the estimates of
the coefficients in B(w) associated with log w and (log w)2 are -17.79 (t-3.0)
and -1.112 (t-3.0), respectively. This means that B(w) attains a minimum at
w-2970, so for individuals who have w~2970 (1296 of the sample) 8(w) is
increasing in w. However, if attention is restricted to the subsample for
which w~2970, then it appears that B(w) is not increasing on w~2970. The fact
that the (log w)z term in B(w) is significantly negative may therefore be due
to the non-linearity of log B(w) in log w for small w. The estimates and
standard errors of the other parameters in B(w) and c(w) and the main
characteristics of the search process are almost identical to those in Tables
1, 2 and 3. Because of the inclusion of the (log w)Z term in B(w), the sample
average of the elasticity of B with respect to w changes from -0.41 to -0.73.
Since the elasticity of f with respect to w does not change much, this implies
that on average B is now more sensitive with respect to ~. As a result, the
average elasticities of B with respect to c and a are now -0.10 and 0.96,
respectively. However, for individuals who have w~2970, B'(w)~0 and therefore
the estimates of the elasticities of B with respect to ~ and c are positive,
which is of course in conflict with the theory. If, following the argument
above, this result is regarded as a consequence of the rigidity of the
quadratic specification of log B(w) as a function of log w, then this means
that the sample averages of the elasticities of B with respect to c and a are
over-estimated (that is, they are ~-0.10 and ~0.96, respectively). The
standard errors of the elasticities in the sample equal 0.10 and 0.04
respectively. For some individuals in the sample (most of which have low
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wages) the elasticity of B with respect to c is as small as -0.40. The
estimates of the elasticities of f with respect to c and a are identical to
those in Table 4. In sum, the main conclusions from Section 4.4 seem to be
robust with respect to the specifications of B and c as functions of w,
although the ineffectiveness of a reduction of c as a tool in stimulating job
mobility is less extreme if a more flexible specification is used.
When estimating the model, no account has been taken of unobserved
heterogeneity in the sample. This may in particular be a problem for the
estimation of B, because in duration models the estimates are inconsistent if
unobserved heterogeneity is present in reality even if the heterogeneity is
orthogonal to the included explanatory variables. Therefore we tested the
assumption of no heterogeneity in B. Specifically, we re-estimated B, assuming
that there is an unobserved heterogeneity term v that acts multiplicatively on
B and is independent of t. First assume that v in the stock of employed at the
moment of the interview has a normal distribution that is independent of x
(this is sensible only if P(v~0) is very small) with variance a2. Testing the
assumption of no heterogeneity means testing oZ-O. We find oZ-0.16 with
t-value 1.0 so a Wald test does not reject a2-0 (P(v~0) is smaller than 0.01).
Alternatively, let v in the stock have a gamma distribution independent of x
(this is equivalent to assuming that (i) v in the inflow has a gamma
distribution, (ii) the inflow rate into the present job factorizes in terms of
v and x and (iii) v and x in the population are independent) with variance o2.
Then áZ-0.14 (t-1.4) and the estimated variance of v in the inflow equals 0.16
(t-0.9) so again the Wald test does not reject. Though these results may seem
a little surprisíng, recall that the set of observed explanatory variables is
rather unique in that it contains an indicator of non-material job
satisfaction and other characteristics of the (working) environment. As
Holmlund 8e Lang (1985) point out these variables are generally unobserved
which may cause (spurious) negative duration dependence of B.
According to various theories of labour market behaviour of employed
individuals, notably human capital theory and job matching theory, some of the
basic assumptions of on-the-job search theory do not hold. It is argued that
wages are not (approximately) constant within jobs and that the exit rate out
of a job is truly duration dependent (see e.g. Mortensen (1986), Lancaster,
Imbens 8c Dolton (1987), Mortensen (1988)). Though the former conjecture cannot
be investigated given the data used, the latter one can. We examine the
assumptions that B is constant in a non-parametric way, in order to avoid the
risk of not detecting certain (non-monotonic) alternatives. If B is constant,
then z-t.B has an exponential distribution with parameter 1, so minus the log
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empirical survival function of the so-called generalized residuals t.9 should
approximately be a 450 line, B being the estimate of B that was obtained
before. If B is not constant as a function of job duration then this result
does not hold. Ridder (1987) examines for specific departures how the plot for
the minus log empirical survival function of t.8 is affected. In fact this
method can also be used to detect unobserved heterogeneity. Though Ridder's
(1987) results apply to complete durations they can also be used for elapsed
durations from a stock sample because of the intimate links between the
distributions of these durations (see e.g. Ridder (1984), these links hold
conditional on the constant-entry rate assumption). Figure 3 gives the minus
log of the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function of the generalized
residuals. Note that every point corresponds to an uncensored observation of
the job duration. For 789ó of all 600 points the generalized residual is
smaller than 0.5. The plot shows that the minus log survival function closely
follows the 45 0 line. Apparently job durations can be described fairly
accurately by an exponential distribution that depends on the explanatory
variables we used. Note however that departures from exponentiality may be
obscured because we use estimates of B from a fitted parameterized model. For
instance, if there is duration dependence due to job-specific human capital
accumulation, then w is an increasing function of duration and the estimate of
the coefficient in 9 associated with w will pick out some of the duration
dependence.
Another property of job matching models and models of job-specific human
capital accumulation is that in those models the reservation wage is smaller
than the present wage (see Jovanovic (1979), Jovanovic (1984), Mortensen
(1988)). In our sample however the reservation wage is on average 14Y6 larger
than the present wage, and for only 5Y6 of the sample the (observed)
reservation wage is smaller than the present wage. Though this does not rule
out that incorporating elements of job matching and human capital theory could
make the model more realistic, it does point out that there are other factors
that have a major influence on the reservation wage.
When specifying the model we made some assumptions concerning the labour
market environment that employed individuals face, and one might ask in what
sense the results are biased if these assumptions do not hold. First, suppose
that forced transitions from the present job into another state of the labour
market, say unemployment, occur at a rate s. The method that was used to
estimate B then in reality estimates B~s. Consequently, B is over-estimated.
It is hard to determine the effect on the estimates of c since the equation

























To examine another assumption, suppose c(0) is different (say smaller) in
a next job. In that case future jobs become more advantageous than they are if
c were equal for present and future jobs. Consequently, our estimate of c will
probably underestimate c that have to be paid when leaving the presentjob and
over-estimate future c. The alternative model specification discussed here can
be generalized by assuming that c itself is a job characteristic that is
stochastically distributed across jobs and that reveals itself when a job
offer arrives. In such a case the set of acceptable job offers is
two-dimensional (a job with a low wage is acceptable if c is small enough) and
the optimal strategy cannot be represented by a single number. However, by
making some assumptions we can obtain a model that closely resembles the model
estimated in this chapter. Suppose the job changing costs c can be written as
a sum of a non-random term cx.w and a random term co that has a distribution
function G(co) and is independent of the wage being offered. Let {(w~c) be the
reservation wage that prevails when the present wage is w and the realization
of the transaction costs is c. lf a number of regularity conditions are
satisfied then the optimal strategy can be characterized by the set of
functions i`(w~c) for all c and it can be shown that approximately




(15) B(w) - a. J f dF(x) dG(co)
-oo ~(w ~ co~aw )
Of course B(w) is again the exit rate out of the present job. Suppose that the
observed reservation wage ï;(w) is the expected value over c of ~(w~c) and
suppose that E(c) - xl'Yl. Then taking expectations over c in equation (14)
and adding a measurement error results in the equation for ~(w) in the model
from Section 4.3. If we adopt equation (13) as a reduced-form representation
of equation (15) then the resulting model is equivalent to the model that is
estimated in this chapter. The only consequence of adopting the model with
stochastic c is that one should read E(c) instead of c in Tables 3 and 4. Of
course the assumption that ~(w) - Ec(~(w~c)) is strong and cannot be tested
using the data at hand. Alternatively, one might argue that f(w) is the
minimum over all possible c of i; (w ~ c). In that case, if one assumes that the
minimum of all possible c can be written as xl'Yl, then again a model can be
derived that is equivalent to the model estimated in this chapter.
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Another objection to our model specification might be that the costs of
moving to another job may depend on the wage in the next job instead of the
wage in the present job. In such a case Condition 4 has to be strengthened by
substituting pta for a, in order to guarantee the reservation wage property.
It can be proven that if p is small then the model is approximately equal to
the model we specified before.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the labour market behaviour of employed
individuals by estimating a structural on-the-job search model. The model
allows for nonzero and wage-dependent costs associated with moving to another
job. It was shown that the optimal strategy of an employed individual has the
reservation wage property if the costs of moving do not increase too fast as a
function of the wage. The model is estimated using Dutch data from 1980-1985,
including responses on reservation wages of employed individuals. The results
indicate that housing accommodation circumstances, characteristics of the
present job and age have a large influence on the willingness to move and on
job durations. If one is interested in increasing job mobility then increasing
the job offer arrival rate is more effective than decreasing the job changing
costs. The estimation results appear to be robust to varying certain
assumptions.
There are some straightforward directions for further research. In
particular, it may be more realistic to allow for wage rates that vary
(stochastically) during the period that one has a job. It also seems
interesting to extend the model by allowing jobs to have more than one
stochastic characteristic. The presence of such characteristics may bias the
estimates of the job changing costs in the model presented. Another topic for
further research concerns the quality of the responses to the reservation wage
question and the meaning of those responses if other stochastic job
characteristics or stochastic job changing costs are present. Note that all
the extensions will make the analysis of the optimal strategy and the
resulting model equations much more complicated while any empirical analysis
will need longitudinal data.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward but tedious to show that if Conditions 1, 2 and 3a hold
then the right-hand side of equation (2) is a mapping T(R) that maps the space
of continuous functions on [O,w] into itself, and the integrals in (2) are
well-defined. Let C[O,w] denote the space of continuous functions on [O,w].
Choose the following norm:
for every XEC[O,w], ~~X~) - sup ~X(w)~
O~w~w
Then C[O,w] is a Banach space ( see Dunford 8e Schwartz (1957)). We now show
that T is a contraction mapping, i.e. that there is an ae~0,1~ such that for
every R,R~eC[O,w] it holds that ~~T(R)-T(R')~~ ~ cx.~~R-R~~~. For this it is
sufficient that Blackwell's ( 1965) conditions hold: for every R,R'eC(O,w]:
(i) T has to be monotone: if for every OSw~w, R(w)~R~(w) then for every
OSw~w, T(R)(w) ~ T(R~`)(w).
(ii) There has to be a OSQ~1 such that for every constant ó, T(Rfó) -
T(R)f,6.ó.
One sees immediately that (i) holds for our mapping T: if R(x)5R"(x) and
R(w)~R~(w) then max(R(x)-c(w), R(w)) ~ max(R~(x)-c(w), R~(w)) and
T(R)(w) ~ T(R~)(w). To prove (ii) for our T we write
T(Rtó)(w) - 1(w t a.E (max(R(x)fó-c(w), R(w)tó)))pf~ x
- 1 (w f a.E (ëfmax(R(x)-c(w), R(w))))pfa x
- 1 (w ~ aó f ~.E (max(R(x)-c(w), R(w))))pta x
- T(R)(w) f p}~ .ó
Consequently, T is a contraction mapping. From Banach's fixed point theorem
(Wouk (1979)) it follows that T which is defined on C(O,w] has a unique fixed
point. So, from equation (2), R exists and is the unique continuous function
on [O,w] that solves (2).
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4.A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
We know that if Conditions 1, 2 and 3a hold, then there exists a unique
solution R(w) of equation (2) which is continuous on [O,w]. Now it has to be
shown that this R(w) is strictly increasing if Condition 4a holds.
Let O~w~w`~w. From equation (2) it follows that
(Al) P(R(w')-R(w)) - w~-w
f a.Ex(max(R(x)-c(w~)-R(w~), 0) - max(R(x)-c(w)-R(w), 0))
Suppose c(w~`)~c(w). If R(w~)~R(w) then the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of (Al) is
positive. By contradiction it follows that R(w~`)~R(w). Now suppose c(w~`)~c(w).
Equation (Al) can be rewritten as follows,
(A2) P(R(w~`)-Ríw)) - w`-w-Ac(w~`)fac(w)
f a.Ex(max(R(x)-R(w~), c(w`)) - max(R(x)-R(w), c(w)))
The first part of the r.h.s. of (A2) is positive due to Condition 4a.
Consequently, if R(w~`)SR(w) then the r.h.s. of (A2) is positive. Again, by
contradiction it follows that R(w~)~R(w). As a result, for every O~w~w~~w,
R(w`)~R(w).
4.A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
First it is shown that if Conditions 1, 2, 3b and 4a hold then R(w) has the
property that there is a k~0 such that
(A3) b' OSw~w~~w, R(w~`) ~ R(w) f k.(w~-w)
The function c(w) is continuously differentiable on the closed, bounded
interval [O,w]; therefore there exists an m~0 such that, for every we[O,w],
c'(w)~-m. (Limits in 0 and w denote right- and left-hand limits,
respectively. ) This implies that there is an m~0 such that
(A4) d O~w~w"~w, c(w~) ~ c(w) - m.(w`-w)
Take without loss of generality mp. Now it has to be shown that the assertion
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at the beginning of this proof is true. Suppose it is not true. Then for k-m
equation (A3) does not hold, that is, there are w and w~` (O~w~w~~w) such that
R(w~`)~R(w)tm.(w~-w). Combining this with equation (A4) shows that
R(w~`)fc(w")~R(w)fc(w). From equation (Al) then, p[R(w~)-R(w)] ~ wi-w. By
contradiction it follows that the assertion above is true.
We now proceed to show that R is differentiable. Equation (2) can be
rewritten by using the reservation wage property of the optimal strategy.
so
w
R(w) - W f~ . f R(x)-c(w)-R(w) dF(x)
P P ~ ( ~, )
wR(wfh)-R(w) - 1 t ~, f R(w)fc(w)-R(w~h)-c(wfh) dF(x)
P ~ f(w)
~ ~(w~h)
- ph ~( ) R(x)-c(wth)-R(wfh) dF(x)
w
Therefore,
(A5) R(w-Fh)-R(w).~1 f p.~(~(w))} - p t p.~`(~(w)).c(wf- h~h
~ ~(wth)
- - ~ .~( ) R(x)-c(wth)-R(wfh) dF(x)
w
Consider the right-hand side of (A5). Assume h~0. If ~(wth)~~(w) then
R(x)~c(wth)fR(wth) which implies that the right-hand side is non-negative. If
~(wth)~~(w) then R(x)~c(w~h)fR(w~h) and again the right-hand side is
non-negative, so the right-hand side is always non-negative. Further, if
~(wfh)~~(w) then R(x)~c(w)tR(w) while if ~(wth)~~(w) then R(x)~c(w)fR(w).
Therefore in both cases the right-hand side is smaller than or equal to
~ ~(wfh)
~ .~( ) R(wfh)tc(w~h)-R(w)-c(w) dF(x)
w
(A6) - p .(~(f(w))-~(f(wfh)))
.jR(wfhh-R(w) } c(wfhh-c(w)~
Suppose ~(w)~i;(wth). Because of equation ( A3) and Condition 4a, (A6) is
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smaller than or equal to
(A7) p .(~(~(w))-~(~(wfh))) .(k~)
If, on the other hand, ~(w)~~(w}h) then, because of equation (A4) and because
R(wfh) exceeds R(w), (A6) is smaller than or equal to
(A8) p .(~(~(wfh))-~(~`(w))) .m
So the left-hand side of equation (A5) is non-negative and smaller than or
equal to the maximum of (A7) and (A8). If we take lim hy0 of (A7) and (A8)
then the result is zero because of the continuity of F and ~ in i;(wfh) and
wfh, respectively. Therefore lim hy0 of the left-hand side of equation (A5)
equals zero. The same holds for lim hTO. As a result,
(A9) n-i.ó rR(wfhh-R(w).(1
p.~(~(w))) - p f p.~(~(w))-c(w}hh c(w)]- 0
Because c is differentiable it follows from (A9) that R is differentiable;
R'(w) can be obtained by taking the limit. The functions c', f and ~` are
contínuous in their arguments so from the expression for R'(w) (see equation
(4)) if follows that R'(w) is continuous on [O,w].
4.A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
If Condition 4b is satisfied then c'(w).a~l and therefore also
c'(w).aF(~(w)) ~ 1. From equation (4) it then follows that R'(w)~0 on [O,w].
If 0~~(w)~w then equation (3) holds. Let h be small in the sense that also
0~~(wth)~w. Then
(A10) R(~(wfh))-R(~(w)) ~(w~h)-~(w)
- R(wth)-R(w) } c(wfh)-c(w)
~(wf )-~(w) - h ~
Because R and c are differentiable the lim h-~0 of the right-hand side of
equation (A10) equals R'(w)fc(w). According to the mean value theorem there
exists a x(w,h) lying between ~(w) and ~(wfh) such that the first part of the
left-hand side of equation (A10) equals R'(x(w,h)). Consider the lim h~0 of
R'(x(w,h)). Because x(w,h) lies between ~(w) and i;(wth) and because f(w) and
f(wth) lie between 0 and w it follows that R' is continuous in a neighbourhood
of x(w,h). The function f is continuous so the lim h~0 of ~(wth) equals f(w).
This implies that the lim h~0 of x(w,h) also equals ~(w). As a result, the
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lim h~0 of R'(x(w,h)) equals R'(f(w)) which is positive. Consequently, we can
deduce from (A10) that ~ is differentiable in its argument w if O~f(w)~w and
that
(All) ~'(w) - R'("')tc'(w)(f~ (w))
Substitution of equation ( 4) into equation (All) gives equation (5). From the
continuity of R', ~ and c' their arguments it follows from equation (All) that
~'(w) is continuous if O~f(w)~w.
4.A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
The function c(w) is written as c(w)-~fq, in which q may depend on w but not
on r~. The reservation wage ~ is expanded as a function of r~ around ~--q. Note
that ~ does not depend on w so changing the value of r~ does not affect w. We
use notation R(w,~) and f(w,~) in order to make explicit which value of r~
holds. It is tedious to show that if r~ lies in a convex, bounded, closed
set (which we take for granted), then R and ~ are continuous both in w and ~.
If r1--q then c(w)-0 and ~(w,-q) equals w(from the definition of ~(w)).
The next thing to do is to calculate a~~ar~ if it exists at r~--q. We want to
compare ~ if ~--qfh with g if r1--q. Now for every we~0,w~ one can take h small
enough in order to have 0~~(w,-q~h)~w. In that case equation (3) is valid,
R(~(w,-qth),-qfh) - R(w,-qth) f h
Therefore,
(A12) R(~(w,-qth),-qfh) - R(w,-qth) ~(w,-qfh) - w - 1~(w,-qfh) - w h
According to the mean value theorem there exists a x(w,-qfh) between w and
i;(w,-qfh) such that the first part of the left-hand side of (A12) equals
R'(x(w,-qfh),-qfh) (in which R' denotes the derivative with respect to the
first argument) which is positive. From equation (4), this derivative equals
(A13) 1 - c'(x(w,-qfh)).a~`( f(x{w,-qth),-qfh))
p t ~~(~(x{w,-qfh),-qfh))
Because of the continuity of ~ in r~,
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h-i.ó ~(w'-q}h) - w
and therefore
hyó x(w'-q~h) - w
n~ó ~(x(w'-q}h)'-q}h) - w
The lim h~0 of expression (A13) can now be derived using the continuity of c'
and F. The result is
1-c'(w)a~(w)
pfa~`(w )
From equation (A12), therefore,
(A14) lim ~(w,-qfh) - w - p-~a~`(w)b~o h 1-c'(w)a~(w)
The left-hand side of (A14) is of course a~~arl at r1--q. Note that the
denominator of the right-hand side is positive. We now have two terms of the
expansion. The remainder is o(r~fq). Consequently, for arbitrary w,




which can be rewritten by substituting c(w) for rlfq and suppressing the
dependence of ~ on rl,
(A15) ~`(w) - w t Pfa~`(w) .c(w) f o(c(w))
1-c' (w)a~`(w)
For reasons that will be explained in Section 4.3 it is preferable to have
a~`(~(w)) instead of a~`(w) in the second term on the right-hand side of (A15).
However, the difference between the second term on the right-hand side of
(A15) and the second term on the right-hand side of (7) is o(c(w)) so equation
(7) follows.
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4.A.6. The approximation error in a special model
In order to be able to derive explicit results, we have to assume that c does
not depend on w. Using equations (2) and (3) one can show that if c~0 then the
exact ~(w-Pc) equals w. Also, from equation (7) it follows that the
approximate ~(w-pc) equals w. Consequently, for w-w-pc the approximation error
is zero. Since in general the error is nonzero, this result may suggest that
the error (in absolute value) is decreasing in w.





with Y~-1, wo~0 and ~~0, while F(x)-0 for x~wo. This wage offer distribution
is in conflict with Condition 2 from the main text in the sense that here wo
may be positive and w--~. However, as noted before, choosing zero ta bc the
lower bound of the wage offers ís just a matter of convenience and may be
relaxed without loss. Also, we may truncate F at some w~wo, but it seems
reasonable to suspect that for sufficiently large w this will not influence
the results. The median of F(x) equals wo t~.log(Yf2) and for Y~l the wage
offer density decreases on [wo,~~. For y-0 F(x) reduces to an exponential
distribution while for Y~0 the density decreases at a somewhat faster rate
than an exponential density.
We also assume the following relationship between c, p, a, Y and Q:
c - P~
.log~(T}i~}~
These are obviously very strong relationships and it is clear that this model
cannot be used for empirical analyses. Not that the relationships imply that c
and y have opposite sign.
In this model there holds that for individuals earning sufficiently high w
the probability of obtaining an acceptable offer is negligible. Consequently,
the boundary condition of the differential equation (5) is
(A16) lim ~(w)-w-pc - 0
W-i ao
Suppose w is such that wo~~(w)~~o. One can show that the exact reservation
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wage and exit rate out of the present job satisfy
(A17) f(`N) - w f pc t~.log(1-Ye~(wo-w-Pc))
B(w) - (A(Yfl)fP?'].e~(wo-w)
By rewriting equation (7) it follows that in this model the approximate ~(w)
is the solution of the following implicit equation,
(A18) f(w) - w~ pc f c. A(Ytl )
e~( ~ ( w ) -wo )~Y
As an example the following parameter values were taken: p-a-0.15, y--0.1,
wo-20000, ,Q-0.0001 (time unit: 1 year, money unit: 1 Guilder). Then c-7852,
E(x)-29482 and the 95th percentile of F(x) is 48959. For these a priori
reasonable values and for w ranging from 20000 to 50000 the exact and
approximate ~(w) were calculated from (A17) and (A18) respectively. The
approximation error tends to zero for large values of w. (For instance, if
w-50000 then the exact ~(w) equals 51222 while the approximate ~(w) equals
51225). This is not surprising since the approximate ~(w) also satisfies
equation (A16). For every w the approximate ~(w) exceeds the exact f(w) and
the difference is decreasing in w. However, even for the smallest possible w
(20000) the difference is only 82, which is less than 0.496 of the exact ~(w)
(which equals 22029). For w equal to E(x) (29482) the difference is 25, which
is less than 0.196 of the exact t;(w) (which is 30999). Concluding, for
parameter values that seem to be reasonable and for a wide range of wage rates
the approximation error is quite small.
4.A.7. Proof of relation between Yl and YZ
The theoretical model consists of equations (6), (11) and (12). Further,
equation (13) can be interpreted as a summary of B(w) in the sense that for an
explanatory variable y of c(w), y2y.B which is the partial derivative of B
with respect to y, has to equal
ae(w) ac(o) - ae(w)
a~( o)~ ay ac( o)~Yly
in which aB(w)~ac(0) can be deduced from equations (6), (11) and (12). It
follows that Yly and y2y have opposite signs if aB(w)~ac(0)~0. From equation




ac(0) - (1-cxB)Zt af(s;).(lto~p).c(w)
with f-F'. From equation (6),




and the result follows.
4.A.8. Derivation of elasticities
The general procedure is as follows. From the theoretical specification
(equations (6), (11) and (12)) that underlies the empirical specification
((11), (12) and (13)) we derive expressions for the derivatives of B and ~
with respect to c(w) and a. These expressions contain the unknown ~ and F' but
by using the equality of (6) and (13) and the equality of the derivatives of
(6) and (13) with respect to w we can make some substitutions that result in
calculable functions. Consider the elasticities with respect to c(w). From
(6), (11) and (12),
(A19) aB - af(~) . a~ac(w) - ac(w)
a~ ltap ae pte(A20) ac(w) - (1-cxe)Z~c(w)~ac(w) t ~
From (A19) and (A20),
(A21) aB - -Af(~).(ptB)(1-c~8)ac(w) (1-ocB)Z t af(~).(1taP).c(w)
By differentiating equations (6) and (13) with respect to w,
af(~) - W1 .f-;e;N)
Now ~'(w) can be obtained simply by differentiating (11) after substitution of
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(12) and (13). As a result (A21) can be simplified to
8B (PfB) Q1B
8c(w) - (lfap) ' w
Analogously one can derive for example that
8 log B - ,Q1.B.c(w)
8 log a- 1- w(~
etc. The key identifying restriction is the equality between (6) and (13). In
effect, the functional form of (13) implicitly ties up the ha2ard of the wage
offer distribution on the relevant wage interval. This is not enough to




THE EFFECT OF AN INCREASE OF THE RATE OF ARRIVAL OF JOB OFFERS
ON THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter we examine the effect of an increase of the job offer arrival
rate on the hazard of the unemployment duration distribution in job search
models. It is shown that previously derived sufficient conditions on the wage
offer distribution for this effect to be positive can be generalized
considerably at no cost. This has some important implications for both
structural and reduced-form empirical analyses of unemployment duration.
In the empirical analysis of unemployment duration one of the main issues
concerns the influence of the rate of arrival of job offers on duration. The
choice of exogenous variables in reduced-form duration models is, among other
things, governed by the belief that these variables may characterize
individual differences in this arrival rate (see for example Lancaster (1979)
and Ham 8a Rea (1987 )). The elasticity of the expected duration with respect to
the arrival rate is one of the parameters of interest in the analysis of
structural job search models (see for example Lancaster 8a Chesher (1983)).
Further, the influence of the arrival rate on duration is of some importance
for the macro implications of search theory (see for example Vroman (1985)).
It is well known that changing the job offer arrival rate has two
opposite effects on the hazard or exit rate out of unemployment and therefore
on the expected duration of unemployment. First, there is a positive effect on
the hazard because of the increased expected number of occasions at which one
is able to leave unemployment. Secondly, there is a negative effect because of
the increased selectivity of the searcher in face of this increased
opportunity to leave unemployment. In job search models the sign and magnitude
of the net effect depend on other variables affecting the optimal strategy of
an unemployed individual (like the wage offer distribution and the subjective
rate of discount) and therefore the sign of the net effect is ambiguous (see
for example Flinn 8e Heckman (1982) and Mortensen (1986)). Consequently, it
seems that from the estimates of a reduced-form duration model one cannot
conclude anything about the sign of the relationship between the job offer
arrival rate and the covariates in the reduced-form hazard function. Also, it
seems that such estimates cannot be used to check whether the data are in
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agreement with a priori beliefs about e.g. the sign of the relationship
between the local rate of unemployment and the expected duration of
unemployment if it is believed that this relationship mainly acts by way of
the arrival rate.
Recently, a number of papers have been written in which sufficient
conditions are derived for the net effect on the hazard to be non-negative in
a basic job search model. (In Section 5.2 a small survey is presented.) These
conditions are stated in terms of the shape of the wage offer distribution.
However, they are not satisfied for most families of distributions generally
used to model wage offer distributions in structural job search models and
other income-related distributions. Therefore they seem to be of limited
practical interest as a guide to the interpretation of reduced-form model
estimates. Also, since the assumed families of wage offer distributions in
structural empirical analyses generally do not satisfy those conditions, the
suspicion may arise that the estimates of structural job search models are
sensitive with respect to the assumed family. If a slight change of the shape
of the wage offer distribution implies a sign-reversal of the relationship
between the hazard and the job offer arrival rate, then a very small
misspecification of the family of wage offer distributions can have dramatic
consequences for the quality of the estimation results.
In Section 3 of this chapter it is shown that the sufficient conditions on
the wage offer distribution that guarantee that the relationship between the
hazard and the arrival rate is non-negative can be weakened at no cost, to
include virtually every conceivable (wage offer) distribution. We present the
generalized counterparts of the conditions derived before and examine for
which of the well-known families of distributions they are satisfied. In fact,
it appears that in a certain sense the class of distributions satisfying the
generalized conditions is almost equivalent to the class of non-defective
distributions.
In Section 5.4 we show that the generalized conditions also imply another
regularity in the relationship between the hazard and its explanatory
variables, namely that the absolute value of the elasticity of the hazard with
respect to the level of unemployment benefits is increasing in the latter.
Section 5.5 deals with extensions of the basic job search model framework that
is generally used to analyze the relationship between the hazard and the
arrival rate. We show that for a wide class of utility functions the results
in Section 5.3 remain valid if the individuals are assumed to maximize
expected utility instead of income. Often, negative duration dependence of the
hazard is attributed to a job offer arrival rate that is a decreasing function
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of duration. Therefore, in Section 5.5 we also pay some attention to the
consequences of changes in the arrival rate during a given spell of
unemployment, i.e. to non-equilibrium changes generating nonstationarity of
the optimal strategy of an unemployed individual. It appears that the analysis
of the nonstationary model can be linked to the analysis of the stationary
model in Section 5.3. Section 5.6 concludes and lists the benefits of the
analysis for empirical work using either reduced-form duration models or
structural search models.
5.2. The model
5.2.1. Job search theory and model specáfácatáon
In this subsection we present the basic job search model generally used to
analyze the relationship between the job offer arrival rate and the duration
of unemployment. The next subsection surveys the results obtained thus far.
Job search theory tries to describe the behaviour of unemployed
individuals in a dynamic and uncertain world. Job offers arrive according to a
Poisson process with arrival rate a. Such job offers are random drawings
(without recall) from a wage offer distribution with distribution function
F(w). Every time an offer arrives the decision has to be made whether to
accept the offer or to reject it and search further. Once a job is accepted it
will be held forever at the same wage. It is assumed that individuals know a
and F(w) but that they do not know in advance when job offers arrive and what
wages are associated with them. During the spell of unemployment a benefit b
is received. Unemployed individuals aim at maximization of their own expected
present value of income (over an infinite horizon). The subjective rate of
discount is denoted by p. The variables ~, w, b and p are measured per unit
time period. It is assumed that the model is stationary. This means that ~,
F(w), b and p are assumed to be independent of unemployment duration and
calendar time and independent of all events during unemployment.
For a precise analysis of the relationship between the job offer arrival
rate and unemployment duration it is necessary to state explicitly the
assumptions that the variables a, F(w), b and p have to satisfy. The following
weak assumptions ensure that attention is restricted to economically
meaningful cases and guarantee the existence of the optimal strategy.
1. F(w) is a dástràbutáon function of w that is continuous on ~-m,m~. There
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is an interval ~a,~3~ urith O~a~~icro such that F(cx)-0, 1 ir~ F(w)-1 and F(w) ás
w.
twice dáfferentiable on ~a,Q~, its first derivative f(w) beáng positive on
~a,~i~ and its second derivative being continuous on ~a,Q~. The mean of the
distribution of w ás fináte.
2. 0~,1~~, O~p~o~, O~b~~o.
Assumption 1 rules out that there are wage offers that have a positive
probability of occurrence. On the other hand it is allowed that the wage offer
density f(w) is discontinuous or even non-existent at the boundary points a
and ,0 of the interval of support. For simplicity we then define f(cx)-0 and
f(Q)-0, respectively. We restrict attention to positive a since a zero ~
implies an infinite duration of unemployment. If p-0 or E(w)-~ then the
expected present value of income does not exist. The condition that the level
of unemployment benefits is non-negative deserves some extra attention.
Previous papers on the relationship between ~ and the duration of unemployment
have not stressed this condition since b can be interpreted as the official
unemployment benefits level minus per-period search costs, and the difference
of two positive variables has an indeterminate sign. However, in order to
survive individuals need a positive net (of search costs) income flow. Of
course assets and capital markets may be available for individuals for which
the difference between benefits and search costs is negative, but then
searching implies dissaving, which in turn implies nonstationarity of the
optimal strategy (see Danforth (1979): a model in which income minus search
costs is negative cannot be stationary). Casual empiricism suggests that, at
least in Western European countries, search costs (noticing advertisements
when reading newspapers, contacting potential employers, making expenses-paid
visits to them etc.) are small relative to unemployment benefits. Indeed, job
search may be highly subsidized by means of government-paid job-search
training facilities and institutionalized contacts between employers and job
searchers. Finally, we might note that in structural empirical analyses b is
often taken to be identical to the received amount of unemployment benefits
(see for example Lancaster 8a Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983), Narendranathan 8e
Nickell (1985), Ridder 8e Gorter (1986), van den Berg (1990c)).
For the job search model described above (and satisfying Assumptions 1 and
2) it has been shown many times that the optimal strategy can be characterized
by a reservation wage (see e.g. Lancaster 8L Chesher (1983)). A job offer is
acceptable if its wage exceeds the reservation wage ~ while a wage below 4
induces one to re~ject the offer and search for a better one. The reservation
wage is the unique solution to
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(1) ~ - b f P.j(w-~)~Íw)
~
From Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that b~~~m which implies that ~ is always
positive. The hazard ( or exit rate out of unemployment, or transition rate
from unemployment into employment) B can be written as the product of the job
offer arrival rate and the conditional probability of accepting a job offer.
(2) B - a~(~) 1: -1-F
Because of the stationarity assumption, B does not depend on the elapsed
duration of unemployment. Consequently, the duration of unemployment t has an
exponential distribution with parameter B, so E(t)-1~8.
The objective is to examine the effect of a change of the job offer
arrival rate a on the duration of unemployment, or, more specific, to examine
the sign of aE(t)~aa. Of course this is equivalent to examining the sign of
aB~aa. Knowledge of this sign allows one to rank the hazards (and the expected
unemployment durations) of individuals who differ with respect to ~ but are
identical with respect to the other explanatory variables in the model.
Alternatively, the sign of aB~aa describes the long-run (or, equilibrium)
effect of an anticipated change of a for a particular unemployed individual,
in the sense that it shows whether the B prevailing infinitely long before a
change of ~ is larger or smaller than the B prevailing after the change of ~.
(This follows from Chapter 3. In Subsection 5.5.2 we examine in detail the
time path of B in case of anticipated changes of a. ) It is sometimes argued
that aB~aa can also be used to describe the effect of unanticipated changes of
~(see e.g. Burdett (1981) ). However, it seems plausible to assume that if
such changes can occur, then individuals are aware this. In that case the
model should incorporate the individual's subjective assessments of the
probability that various changes will occur.
If ~~cx or ~~,Q then examining the sign of aB~aa is trivial since then B-a
and 8-0, respectively. In the sequel therefore attention is restricted to
cases in which cx~~~(3 (if ~-a or ~-Q then ae~a~ may not exist).
5.2.2. Preváous results
Many papers have been written presenting sufficient conditions for a8~a~ to be
non-negative. All these conditions are stated in terms of the shape of the
wage offer distribution. Before presenting them we define some functions. The
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expectation of w conditional on w~x as a function of x is denoted by ~(x), so
~,(x)-Ew(w~w~x). Of course ~(~) equals the expected wage in employment for an
unemployed individual with reservation wage ~.
We define Q(x) by
~
(3) Q(x) - f(w-x)dF(w)
x




From the definition of ~(x) it follows that Q(x)-F`(x).(~(x)-x). Q(~) equals
the expected excess income flow of an individual with reservation wage ~ at
the moment that a job is being offered.
Yet another function, y~(x), is defined by
(4) ~V(x) - f (X) x~,~
F`(x )
This is the hazard or failure rate associated with the distribution F. For
small dx the expression y~(x)dx can be interpreted as the probability that a
wage offer is in the interval [x,xfdx~ if it is given that this wage offer
exceeds x. In order to avoid confusion with the hazard B associated with the
duration distribution, we will call ~i the failure rate of F. Note that p, Q
and y~ are well-defined.
A function g(x) is called log concave if there is an interval I such that
log g(x) is concave on I and g(x) is positive on I but vanishes exterior to I.
This is equivalent to saying that g(x) is a Pólya frequency function of order
2(see Karlin (1968) or Karlin (1982)). If g(x) is twice differentiable on I
then log concavity can be checked by examining the sign of g"(x).g(x)-(g'(x))Z
for every xeI.
Before surveying the papers in which sufficient conditions were derived
for 8B~8a to be non-negative, we first list these conditions.
la. ~C'(x)~l at x-m.
lb. log Q(x) is a concave functáon of x at x-~.
2a. y~'(x)~0 for every xe~a,~3~.
2b. 1!`(x) is a log concave functáon of x.
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3a. f(x) is a dog concave fv~nction of x.
One can show that la a lb, 2a r~ 2b and 3a ~ 2a ~ la. Conditions 2a, 2b and 3a
do not make any reference to the actual ~; hence, if one of these conditions
holds then ae~aa~o for all admissible values of b, a and p. Condition la
states that if the reservation wage slightly increases, then the expected wage
in employment increases by a smaller amount. Equivalently, the expected wage
in employment in excess of the reservation wage Ew(w-~~w~~) is decreasing in
the reservation wage. If Condition 2a holds then the probability of obtaining
a wage offer we[x,xfdx~ with dx small, conditional on w~x, increases as x
increases. In terms of the literature on reliability, Condition 2a states that
the wage offer distribution F has the ffR (increasing failure rate) property.
Also, if Condition la holds for every ~e~a„0~ then F has the DMRL (decreasing
mean residual life) property (see Hollander 8c Proschan (1984)).
Burdett (1981) proved that la ~ ae~a~~o. By slightly modifying a result in
Coldberger (1983) he also showed that 3a ~ la. These results were re-published
in Burdett 8c Ondrich (1983). Both Burdett (1981) and Burdett 8c Ondrich (1983)
presented a proposition which states that if Condition la does not hold for
any ~, that is, if F is such that ~C'(x)~1 for every xe~a,Q~, then there are
always positive values of p such that BB~aa~O. However, this is incorrect, as
will be shown in Section 3 of this chapter. Sattinger (1985) incorrectly cites
Burdett 8c Ondrich (1983) by stating that if Condition 3a does not apply, then
~C'(x)~1 for all x. A counter-example for this statement is provided by the
distribution with ~`(x)-exp(-~x3-x) for every x~0: it can be checked easily
that the log of the density f(x) is not concave for small positive x;
nevertheless ~`(x) satisfies Condition 2b and therefore the Condition la is
also satisfied.
Flinn 8s Heckman (1983) proved that lb ~ ae~aJ~~o and, by using a result in
Barlow 8L Proschan (1975), it was shown that 3a ~ 2b ~ lb. Vroman (1985) also
proved that lb ~ aB~aa~O and, using a theorem in Karlin (1968), that 3a ~ 2b ~
lb. Further, the equivalence of la and lb is established and it is suggested
that if Condition 3a is not satisfied then ae~aa~o is likely to occur only if
~ is large. As will be shown in Section 5.3 this suggestion is questionable.
Finally, Jensen 8e Vishwanath (1985) proved that 2a ~ la ~ aB~aa~O. It should
be noted that some of the papers mentioned use a discrete-time model while
others use a continuous-time model. However, for the sign of a9~aa this makes
no difference. (If time is discrete then ~ and B are probabilities rather than
rates. ) Also, most of the papers mentioned do not explicitly state assumptions
(like Assumptions 1 and 2) on the values of ~, F(w), b and p.
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Cenerally, Conditions 2a and 3a are the easiest to check for a given wage
offer distribution. The class of distributions satisfying Conditions 2a and 3a
includes the exponential and beta families, the families of logistic and
extreme value distributions that are truncated from below at zero and the
family of uniform distributions for which the lower point of support is
non-negative. ( Recall that we are only interested in distributions satisfying
Assutnption 1, which implies among other things that the mean has to be finite
and that the interval ~-~,0] must have zero probability. See Mood, Craybill 8s
Boes ( 1974) for a list of the parameterized F and f associated with the
families of distributions mentioned.) Contrary to what is stated in Flinn 8c
Heckman (1983), the class of distributions satisfying Conditions 2a and 3a
also includes the whole family of normal distributions truncated at zero.
Further, it includes the members of the Weibull family ( F(x) - exp(-J3xo`) for
x~0 with ~i~0 and cx~0) that have cx?1 and the members of the gamma family
(f(x) ~ xY.é~x for x~0 with a~0 and y~-1, note that here a denotes a
parameter of f and not the job offer arrival rate) that have y?0. More
examples of distributions that have a log concave density are in Karlin
(1982). It is easily seen that truncation from below does not invalidate the
conditions. Further, convolutions of distributions satisfying Conditions 2a or
3a also satisfy those conditions ( see Barlow 8L Proschan (1975) and Karlin
(1982)).
In a sense the family of exponential distributions (possibly truncated
from below) is a boundary case for all conditions, since for these
distributions the conditional mean does not depend on the point of truncation
(~'(x)-1 for x~a), the failure rate is constant ( y,'(x)-0 for x~a) and the log
of the density is linear on the interval of support. All distributions that
have a failure rate that strictly decreases on some interval do not satisfy
Conditions 2a and 3a. Moreover, if the log of the density is strictly convex
on [~,~~ or if the failure rate strictly decreases on [~,~3~ (the former
implies the latter) then Condition la is not satisfied either. Therefore in
such cases the conditions derived before cannot be used to check whether
8B~8a~0. This would not be much of a problem if it could be safely assumed
that wage offer distributions have the IFR property. However, the families of
distributions that are widely believed to be able to represent wage offer
distributions and other income-related distributions and which are typically
used to model wage offer distributions in structural empirical job search
analyses all have a failure rate that strictly decreases on some interval.
(This will be shown in the next paragraph. ) Indeed, one can provide a priori
plausible theoretical reasons for income-related distributions to have a
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failure rate that decreases on some interval (see e.g. Singh 8c Maddala (1976):
the basic idea is that the ability to make more money may well increase with
one's income, which would imply that the expected residual income increases
with the point at which the income distribution is truncated from below, and
therefore that this distribution cannot have the IFIt property) and there is
much empirical evidence that confirms that such distributions have a failure
rate that decreases after a certain point (see e.g. Singh 8e Maddala (1976) and
McDonald (1984)). Barlow 8t Proschan (1975) and Karlin (1968) give other
illustrations of the limitations of Conditions 2a and 3a.
The most popular families of distributions used to model wage offer
distributions in a structural empirical search framework are the log-normal
family and the Pareto family. (One can give theoretical foundations for their
use as models of income-related distributions, see e.g. Cramer (1971).) For
example Narendranathan 8c Nickell (1985), Blau 8z Robins (1986b), Wolpin (1987)
and van den Berg (1990c) use the log-normal family while Lancaster 8L Chesher
(1983), Lancaster (1985), Kidder kc Gorter (1986) and Jones (1988) use the
Pareto family. The distributions of the log-normal family have a failure rate
that strictly decreases for sufficiently large values (see e.g. Lancaster
(1990)). The family of Pareto distributions has a strictly decreasing failure
rate on the whole interval of support (contrary to what is stated in Pratt
(1981)).
The family of Singh-Maddala distributions (F(x)-(lfalx~)-a3 for x~0 with
a1ia2,a3~0; if a2.a3~1 then the mean is finite) is well known for its good
empirical performance as a model for income distributions (see McDonald
(1984)). Stern (1988) uses this family to model wage offer distributions in a
search theoretic framework. In this family the failure rate strictly decreases
for sufficiently large values; in fact for some parameter values it strictly
decreases on the whole interval of support. The family of Singh-Maddala
distributions contains as a special case the family of log-logistic
distributions (see Kalbfleisch 8L Prentice (1980)). The distributions of the
log-uniform family (~(x) -(log Q- log x)~(log Q- log cx) for cx~x~,6 with
O~a~~~~), that is used by van den Berg (1990b) to model wage offer
distributions in a structural search model, have a failure rate that strictly
decreases for sufficiently small values if 1 f log a ~ log ,B.
Other families of which the distributions fail to satisfy Condition 2a are
the family of t distributions truncated from below at zero and the family of F
distributions, since these distributions have a density of which the log is
strictly convex for sufficiently large values. (It is strictly convex on the
whole interval of support for F distributions with `degrees of freedom for the
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numerator' equal to 1 or 2. ) Pratt (1981) states that all t distributions ( and
therefore all t distributions truncated from below at zero) do satisfy
Condition 2b. Clearly, this is incorrect. (In fact, this can be checked easily
by examining a table of the distribution functions. ) Note that again attention
is restricted to distributions satisfying Assumption 1, i.e. that have a
finite mean etc. The members of the gamma family for which -1~T~0 and the
members of the Weibull family for which O~a~l have a failure rate that
strictly decreases on the whole interval of support.
The discussion above on the restrictiveness of the conditions derived
before has some important implications. First of all, the conditions derived
before are of no practical interest as a guide for the interpretation of the
estimates of reduced-form models of unemployment duration. Clearly it cannot
be ruled out that the wage offer distribution is such that neither of the
conditions is satisfied, so if an explanatory variable (e.g. number of working
individuals in the household) is found to have a positive influence on the
hazard and this variable is believed not to influence F or p, then one cannot
conclude that it has a positive influence on a. Also, if it is believed that
the influence of an explanatory variable (e.g. local unemployment percentage)
on the hazard mainly acts by way of a then reduced-form estimates cannot be
used to check whether the data are in agreement with these prior beliefs.
Another implication concerns the estimation of structural job search
models. Since the assumed families of wage offer distributions in structural
empirical analyses generally do not satisfy the conditions derived before, the
suspicion may arise that the estimates of parameters in such models are
sensitive with respect to the assumed family. If a slight change of the shape
of the wage offer distribution implies a sign-reversal of the relationship
between the hazard and a, then a very small misspecification of the family of
wage offer distributions can have dramatic consequences for the quality of the
estimation results.
In the next section it is shown that the scope for the somewhat negative
implications that seem to result from the analysis of the conditions derived
before can be narrowed a great deal.
5.3. Weak new conditions on the wage offer distribution
5.3.1. Generalixatáons of the previous results
In this subsection we state the new results on the sign of 8B~8a and show that
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they are more general than previous results. The sufficient conditions for
aB~8a~0 derived before can be replaced by weaker versions. We show that all
families of distributions that were shown in the previous section not to
satisfy the conditions derived before, do satisfy the new conditions.
Proposition 1.
In a joó search model that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, and in which a~~~(3,
suffàcáent conditáons for aB~aa to be non-negative are
Ia. ddl l og~xx ) ~ 1 at x-~.
Ib. log Q(ex) is a concave function of x at x- log ~.
ddllog~xx) ~ -1 for every xe~a„B~.
IIb. ~`(e~) is a dog concave function of x.
IIIa. f(ex) is a dog concave funct4on of x.
There holds that Ia e~ Ib, IIa a IIb and IIIa ~ IIa ~ Ia. Also, Ia and IIa are
weaker than la and 2a, respectively. If for every xE~cx,~i~ f'(x)50 then IIIa is
weaker thaa 3a.
The proof is in the appendix. Conditions IIa, IIb and IIIa do not make any
reference to the actual ~; hence, if one of these conditions holds then
a9~aa~0 for all admissible values of b, a and p.
Condition Ia is necessary and sufficient for ae~aa~o if and only if b-0
(see the appendix). This suggests a necessary and sufficient condition for the
general case. It is well known that a number of properties of ~ and B as
solutions of equations (I) and (2) are invariant under simultaneous and
equally large shifts of b and F(by which we mean that F is translated by an
amount equal to the change of b, and in the same direction). In particular,
one can show that ae~aa is invariant in this sense. Consequently, necessary
and sufficient for ae~aa~o is that Condition Ia holds for the ~(as solution
of equation (1)) and F that are obtained by shifting b and F in the sense
above such that the new value of b equals zero. Note that Condition Ia itself
is not invariant under these shifts. Also note that the fact that some points
of support of the new F inay be negative raises no problem since we are only
performing a mathematical trick here. Nevertheless, the necessary and
sufficient condition derived here is not very transparent, nor is it
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convenient to work with, since it critically depends on the value of b.
Therefore, in the sequel, we restrict attention to the conditions presented in
Proposition 1.
One may say somewhat loosely that Condition Ia states that if the
reservation wage ~ slightly changes, then the proportional change of the
expected wage in employment does not exceed the proportional change of rp. For
instance, a 1096 increase of the reservation wage implies an increase of the
expected wage in employment of at most 1096. The expected wage in employment by
definition exceeds the reservation wage, so it is obvious that Condition Ia is
weaker than Condition la.
Because of the intimate relationship between the functions ~' and f(see
the appendix) one may interpret Condition Ia as being a restriction on the
magnitude of f at m, relative to the magnitude of f at values larger than ~.
If for most x~~ f(x) is much smaller than f(~), then the proportion of
acceptable job offers F`(~) decreases very much when ~ increases due to an
increase of a, thus offsetting the direct effect of this increase of a on B.
Note that this interpretation of Condition Ia is very loose, since it does not
deal with the precise relationship between ~t' and f, nor with the magnitude of
the increase of ~ due to an increase of a. Also note that Condition la can be
interpreted in the same way, though of course in that case the restriction on
f(rp) is stronger. The functions ~ and ~' at ~ can be expressed in terms of the
function y~(x) on [~,Q~, so it is not surprising that a sufficient condition
for Condition Ia can be expressed in terms of y~(x) on [~,~3~. Condition IIa
extends this to y~(x) on ~a„Q~. Note that because Condition IIa allows the
conditíonal probability that a wage w in [x,xfdx~ (with dx small) is offered
to decrease in x, it is clear that Condition IIa is weaker than Condition 2a.
The only remaining restriction in Condition IIa is that Lhis probability may
not decrease more than proportional in response to an increase of x.
The conditions in Proposition 1 are stated in a form that highlights the
differences from the conditions derived before. We now present a number of
alternative formulations of these conditions. It is easily shown that
Condition Ia is equivalent to the condition that
(5) d d gog(x)-x) ~ 1 at x-~
(this will be used in Subsection 5.3.3) while Condition IIa is equivalent to
the condition that x.y~(x) is non-decreasing on ~a,Q~. A distribution
satisfying the latter is said to have the IPFR (increasing proportionate
failure rate) property (see Singh 8c Maddala (1976)). Conditions IIa, IIb and
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IIIa can be characterized in terms of the distribution of log wage offers z.
To distinguish the functions F, y~ and f corresponding to the wage offer
distribution on the one hand and similar functions for the distribution of log
wage offers on the other, we use subscripts w and z. Because F'z(x) - Pw(ex),
fz(x) - ex.fw(ex) and ~z(x) - ex.y~w(ex), it follows that Conditions IIb, IIIa
and IIa are equivalent to the conditions that ~`z(x) is log concave, fz(x) is
log concave, and ,~Z(x)~0 for every xe~loga,log(3~, respectively. In other
words, Conditions IIa, IIb and IIIa can be checked by examining Conditions 2a,
2b and 3a for the distribution of the log wage offers. Note that if a~l then
Fz(0)~0, so the distribution of z need not satisfy the properties of the
distribution of w as stated in Assumption 1. The results in this paragraph
enable one to give characterizations of the classes of distributions
satisfying Conditions IIa or IDa by using characterizations (like those in
Dharmadhikari 8c Joag-dev (1988)) of the classes of distributions with the IF'R
property or with a log concave density.
We now examine which families of distributions satisfy Condition IIa.
Because this condition is weaker than the Conditions 2a and 3a, all
distributions listed in Section 5.2 that satisfy the latter conditions also
satisfy Condition IIa. If w has a log-normal distribution, then z- log w has
a normal distribution. Since all normal distributions have the IFR property,
it follows that the family of log-normal distributions satisfies Condition
IIa. Analogously one can show that the log-uniform family satisfies Condition
IIa. The Pareto family (F`(x)-(wo~x)v for x~wo with wo~0 and v~l) has y~(x)-v~x
for x~wo so x.y~(x) does not decrease on ~wo,~~ and Condition IIa is satisfied.
In a sense, the Pareto family is a boundary case for all the conditions listed
in Proposition 1, because for all distributions in this family
dlog~(x)~dlogx - 1 for x~wo, dlog~(x)~dlogx --1 for x~wo, and log f(ex) is
linear on ~wo,~o~. The results on the Pareto family can also be deduced from
the fact that z- log w has a shifted exponential distribution if w has a
Pareto distribution. The Singh-Maddala family of distributions with parameters
a1ia2 and a3 (see Section 5.2) has y~(x)-ala2a3x~-1~(1~a1xa2) for x~0 and it
is readily shown that this family satisfies Condition IIa. As a result, all
families of distributions that (i) are widely believed to be able to represent
wage offer distributions and other income-related distributions and that (ii)
are typically used to model wage offer distributions in structural empirical
job search analyses and that (iii) do not satisfy the conditions derived
before for ae~aa to be non-negative, do satisfy Condition IIa. This implies
that if the wage offer distribution in the job search model belongs to one of
these families, then ae~aa~o for all possible values of the explanatory
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variables in the model. From an empirical point of view, Singh 8e Maddala
(1976) argue that to model income-related distributions one should use a
family of distributions that have the IPFR property, that is, distributions
that satisfy Condition IIa. Moreover, in the next subsection it is shown that
in a certain sense the class of distributions satisfying Condition IIa is
almost equivalent to the class of non-defective distributions. Clearly, these
results narrow the scope for the problems mentioned at the end of Section 5.2.
The other families of distributions that were shown in Section 5.2 not to
satisfy the conditions derived before also all satisfy Condition IIa. The
family of t distributions truncated from below at zero and the family of F
distributions have a density satisfying Condition IIIa. The members of the
Weibull family for which O~a~l have x.,y(x)-a~.xa which dces not decrease. The
members of the gamma family for which -1~y~0 have a density satisfying
Condition IIIa.
It is easily seen that truncation of the wage offer distribution from
below does not invalidate the conditions listed in Proposition 1. Although
Condition IIIa is not affected by truncation from above, the other conditions
are. In fact, any distribution not satisfying those conditions can be made to
satisfy them by truncating it from above at a sufficiently small value.
Alternatively, if F is a distribution that is truncated from above then
ae~aa~o for sufficiently large values of ~. The appendix contains a more
detailed discussion of these issues.
Burdett (1981) and Burdett 8L Ondrich (1983) state that if ~'(x)~1 for
every xe~cx,Q~ then there is always a positive value of p such that aB~a~~O.
Counter-exa.mples for this statement are provided by distributions that have
p'(x)~1 and dlogp(x)~dlogx ~ 1 for every xe~a,Q~, because from Proposition 1
it follows that in such cases ae~aa~o for every possible ~~cx,~3~ (ae~a~~o
holds trivially if ~~a or ~~~3) and therefore for every possible p~0. Take for
instance the Pareto family with parameters v~l and wo~0. Then for every x~wo
p'(x)-v~(v-1)~1 and dlog~c(x)~dlogx - 1 (in fact, ae~aa is in this case given
-v-1by wo.p.b.~ ~(pfB) if ~~wo, which is clearly non-negative for every p~0).
5.3.2. Defectiveness and the failure rate
This subsection deals with the relationship between whether a distribution is
defective or not on the one hand, and the shape of its failure rate for large
values on the other. We examine distributions F satisfying Assumption 1,
except that now we take ,0-~ and allow for defective F. Because of this we also
skip the requirement that Ew(w)~~. The distribution is non-defective if
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1 im F(w) - 1; this is equivalent towtim
~
(6) there is an xe~0,~~ such that ! y~(w)dw -~
x
For this it is sufficient that there exist c and x(O~c,x~~) such that for
every w~x y~(w)~c.w-1. If, on the other hand, there exist E,c and x(O~e,c,x~~)
such that for every w~x y~(w)~c.w 1-E then the integral in (6) converges and F
is defective. There is a strong relationship between these sufficient
conditions for F to be (non-)defective and the value of the elasticity of y~(w)
with respect to w for large w. Because of this we can state directly a
relationship between this elasticity and the (non-)defectiveness of F.
Proposition 2.
Let F be a distrióution satisfying the assumptions stated at the beginning of
this sz~.hsrct,ion.. If GIi-eTP. P.XE-St.C an. xe~0,m? such, t.h.nt fAT r.very W~X
dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-1 then F is non-defective. If there exist e and x ( O~s,x~o~)
such that for every w~x dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-(lfe) then F is defect4ve.
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 2 implies a link between Condition
IIa and the ( non-)defectiveness of the wage offer distribution F(if ~i-m).
Specifically, if Condition IIa is satisfied, then F is non-defective. If
Condition IIa is not satisfied in the sense that there exist e and x ( O~e,x~~)
such that for every w~x dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-(lfe) then F is defective. By
restricting attention to non-defective F such violations of Condition IIa are
ruled out. Therefore, if Condition IIa does not hold in the sense that there
exists an x such that for every w~x dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-1 (which implies that
Condition Ia is not satisfied for all ~~x, see the appendix) and F is
non-defective and
W~W d loogy,Ww) exists
then it follows that this limit has to equal -1 and that the limit is
approached from below.
Note that the link between Condition IIa and the (non-)defectiveness of F
(if ~-W) is based on the behaviour of the function y~(x) as x-.m. If y~(x)
satisfies the inequality in Condition IIa for all sufficiently large values of
x but not for all small values of x, then F is non-defective but F does not
satisfy Condition IIa. (Such distributions can be constructed by making dips
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or peaks in the left part of the density of distributions satisfying Condition
IIa.) On the other hand, if attention is restricted to ,~(x) that are
sufficiently smooth on ~a,~~ then the link between Condition IIa and the
(non-)defectiveness of F can be strengthened. For instance, for the class of
distributions F for which y~(x)-c.x7 on ccx,m~ for some a,c~0 and Y~2, it holds
that Condition IIa is equivalent to the condition that F is non-defective.
5.3.3. Váolatáons of the condàtions
The previous subsections showed that the class of wage offer distributions for
which in every case ae~aa~o is very large. Still, it might be interesting to
examine which distributions violate the conditions for ae~aa to be
non-negative and in which cases ae~aa is likely to be negative if the
conditions are violated.
To start with the latter, if Condition Ia is not satisfied for certain
r~~a,Q~ and F, then one can choose b-0 and p~0 such that ~ follows from
equation (1) and aB~aa~O. To obtain more results we assume that y~ is
ultimately monotone; that is, there is an N~~ such that there is no
sign-reversal of y~' on dV,Q~. Now suppose that the wage offer distribution F
does not satisfy Condition Ia for any d~~a,~~. This is only possible if ~3-~,
for if ~~~ then Condition Ia holds for ~ sufficiently close to Q, which
implies that ae~aa~o if ~ is sufficiently close to ~. Also, if a-0 then
Condition Ia holds for most ~ sufficiently close to 0. (These statements are
proved in the appendix.) So, suppose F has a~0 and ~3-~ and F does not satisfy
Condition Ia for any ~~cx,Q~. If ~ is small due to a b that is almost zero
(though ~~a) then aB~aa~O. On the other hand, if ~ is sufficiently large due
to a sufficiently large b, then ae~a~~o (this is shown in the appendix). Thus,
it seems that if F is such that ae~aa~o is possible, then the latter only
occurs for small ~. Note however that things can be made more complicated by
allowing explanatory variables other than b to vary. For instance, if a is
almost zero, then in most cases aB~a~~O. In any case, the results in this
paragraph shade the remark in Vroman (1985) that aB~a~~O is likely to occur
only for large ~ if at all.
The link between the failure rates of the distribution of wage offers w
and the distribution of log wage offers z that was established in Subsection
5.3.1 provides a means of constructing wage offer distributions not satisfying
Condition IIa. By choosing a distribution Fz for z that does not satisfy
Condition 2a one obtains a distribution Fw for w that fails to satisfy
Condition IIa. Such a distribution Fz has to satisfy certain restrictions in
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order to be able to generate an Fw satisfying Assumption 1. In particular,
Ez(ez) has to be finite to ensure that Ew(w) is finite. This restriction
implies that most of the distributions that were shown in Section 5.2 to have
a decreasing y,(x) for some x cannot be used as a model of Fz in order to
generate an Fw not satisfying Condition IIa. The exceptions are the members of
the gamma family for which -1GyG0 and ~~1 and the members of the log-uniform
family. If z has a gamma distribution with -1~yG0 and a~l then w has a
log-gamma distribution with density
fw(x) ~ (log X)T X-a-1
XEGl,ro1
while if z has a log-uniform distribution with parameters cx and ~3 then w has a
`log-log-uniform' distribution with density
fw(x) ~ (log x)-1.x-1 xE~ea,e~~
These distributions satisfy Assumption 1. If w has a log-gamma distribution
then dlogy~w(x)~dlogx ~-1 for all xeGl,~~ while if w has a`log-log-uniform'
distribution then this inequality holds for sufficiently small x if
1 f log a G log ~. Other examples of violations of Condition IIa can be
obtained by examining Fz for which y~z(x) can be written as ctg(x) with g
continuously differentiable and g(x)~0 and g'(x)GO for every xEGCx,m~, in which
cx~-m is the lower bound of the interval of support of Fz. If c~l then Ez(ez)
is finite. The corresponding Fw then satisfies Assumption 1 while
dlogy~w(x)~dlogx ~-1 for all x in the interval of support of Fw which is
Gea,m~. It can be shown that for these distributions Fw as well as for the
log-gamma distributions with -1~y~0 and a~l there holds that the limit of
dlogy,w(x)~dlogx as x-wo equals -1.
We now show that if one translates a distribution satisfying Condition Ia
but not Condition la sufficiently far to the right, then one obtains a
distribution that does not satisfy the conditions listed in Proposition 1. Let
a subscript y(y~0) denote the number of units that the original distribution
is translated to the right. It follows that cxYaafy, Qy-Qofy, fy(x)-fo(x-y),




- ~ d lo (~uo(x)-x) I ~~a ,(3 ~
x-d -~-Y , og x x-~-y Y Y
Note that if Fo satisfies Assumption 1 then so does Fy. Suppose Fo does not
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satisfy Condition la but dces satisfy Condition Ia, for every ~~ao,~o~. Then
for every ~~ay,Qy~
O~dlo(~I ~1og x x-~-Y
On the other hand, the first part of the r.h.s. of equation (7) exceeds 1 and
increases in y. Consequently, if rb-y is held constant then for sufficiently
large eb and y the l.h.s. of (7) exceeds 1 and Condition Ia is not satisfied.
Now recall from Subsection 5.3.1 that Condition Ia is not invariant under
simultaneous and equally large shifts of F and b, though aB~a~ is. Therefore,
if we translate Fo to the right by y units and hold rp-y constant by shifting b
correspondingly (that is, by increasing b with y units), and if y is
sufficiently large, then Condition Ia is not satisfied but ae~aa remains
non-negative. On the other hand, as shown at the beginning of this subsection,
if Condition Ia is not satisfied for certain ~ and F then there always values
of b, a and p such that ~ is the reservation wage corresponding to these
values and aB~aa~O.
As an example, assume that Fa is a Pareto distribution with parameters
wo~0 and v~l. Then, for every y~0 and ~~woty, dlog(Py(m)-~)~dlog~ -~~(~-y)~1,
so Condition Ia is not satisfied for any ~~wofy if y~0. By relating this to
the discussion in Subsection 5.3.1 on a necessary and sufficient condition for
ae~aa~o it follows that if b~y and ~~wofy then ae~aa~o, while if b-y and
~~wo~y then aB~aa-O. In fact, for y~0,
aB - P wo . (b-y) if woty ~~ ~ o08a - P~ ~ (~-Y )vtl
Consequently, if ~~wo~y, then ae~aa~o if and only if b~y. One can show that if
y~0 and a~p.(v-1), then b~y implies that ~~wofy, so in those cases always
ae~aa~o whatever the value of y. For the translated Pareto distributions, the
limit of dlogy~w(x)~dlogx as x-.~ obviously equals -1 since translation has no
effect in the limit.
Other violations of the conditions listed in Proposition 1 can be found by
examining non-smooth distributions. From the interpretation of Condition Ia in
terms of the magnitude of the wage offer density f at tp, it follows that if
one makes a sufficiently high peak in the density of a distribution, and if
f(~) is at that peak, then the resulting distribution does not satisfy
Condition Ia, and aB~a~~O. Also, recall the remarks at the end of Subsection
5.3.2 about comparable violations of Condition IIa. Note that this suggests
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that for every distribution satisfying Conditions Ia or IIa there are
distributions that deviate from it only on a small interval, but do not
satisfy these conditions.
From the results in this subsection it follows that Condition Ia is
translation dependent in the sense that there are F that satisfy Condition Ia
for all possible ~e~cx,~3~, while translations of such F do not satisfy
Condition Ia for certain ~ in the domain of the translated F. From the Pareto
example it also follows that Conditions IIa and IIIa are translation dependent
in the sense that there are F satisfying them for which translation results in
a distribution not satisfying them and vice versa. This implies that the
conditions listed in Proposition 1 cannot be characterized in terms of moment
restrictions. Also note that, since all Pareto distributions with parameter
v~l satisfy the conditions, one can always find distributions for which
moments of order larger than lte (e~0) do not exist, that satisfy the
conditions.
5.4. The effect of an increase of the benefits level on the hazard
In this section we examine the implications of Condition IIa for the
relationship between B and b, which of course is a negative relationship if
a~~~(3. It follows from equations (1) and (2) that if a~~~Q then
(8) elogBa log b - b.~V(~).P~
Clearly, if F satisfies Condition 2a, then this expression does not decrease
as b increases. By rewriting (8) it becomes obvious that this result can be
generalized to F satisfying Condition IIa.
(s) alogBa log b - [~.~(~)] . ~ . P~
If Condition IIa is satisfied then the first term of the r.h.s. of (9) does
not decrease as b(and therefore rp) increases. (Note that if f'(rp)~0 then
~.y~(~) increases in b and ~, regardless of whether Condition IIa holds or
not.) The second term of the r.h.s increases as b increases, which can be
shown by differentiation, using 8~~8b-p~(pf8). Because the third term also
increases as b increases, the result follows. From this it is also obvious
that ~81ogB~8logb~ is not decreasing in b under conditions more general than
Condition IIa. Moreover, in Section 5.5 it is shown that this result holds in
133
models more general than considered here. Consequently, under fairly general
conditions the absolute value of the elasticity of the hazard with respect to
the level of benefits is non-decreasing in b.
In reduced-form models of unemployment duration, log B is generally
specified to be linear in log b, so elogBfelogb is a constant. From the
previous paragraph it follows that according to job search theory the estimate
of the elasticity of B with respect to b is likely to be biased towards zero
for individuals with a high level of benefits and biased away from zero for
individuals with a low level of benefits. This bias may be reduced
substantially by adding (log b)2 as a regressor in log B.
5.5. Extensions of the model
5.5.1. Utálity maxámázatáon
In this subsection it is shown that the results derived in Section 5.3 are
also valid in more general models of job search. Specifically, in models in
which the assumption of income maximization is weakened by allowing
individuals to maximize utility, the conditions listed in Proposition 1 remain
sufficient for 8B~8a~0 for a wide range of utility flow functions.
Suppose unemployed individuals maximize expected discounted lifetime
utility (over an infinite horizon). We assume that utility is intertemporally
separable, the utility flow function u being a function of the income flow.
(One can allow for utility flow functions that also depend separably on the
present labour market state without affecting the results. ) The following
assumptions on ~, F(w), b, p and u replace Assumptions 1 and 2.
1-u. equals Assumption 1 except that here Ew(u(w))~~ ánstead of Ew(w)~~.
2-u. equals Assumption 2.
3-u. u(x) ás twice dáfferentiaóle on ~O,oo~. For every xE~O,m~ u'(x)~0.
Further, u(bp0 and u(p)~0.
The reservation wage 4L is the unique solution of
(10) u(~) - u(b) t p. f ( u(w)-u(~))dF(w)
4
From the assumptions above it follows that O~u(~)~~ and O~QS~~. Again we
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restrict attention to cases in which a~~~J3. Let rl(x) denote the expected value
of u(w) conditional on w~x as a function of x, so ~(x)-Ew(u(w)~w~x). The
expression ~(~) equals the expected utility flow in employment for an
individual with reservation wage ~. If u is linear then of course rl(x)-p(x).
Proposition 3.
In a job search model that satisfies Assumptions 1-u, 2-u and 3-u and in which
cx~m~Q, swfficient conditions for aB~aa to be non-negatáve are
Ia-u d log ~(x) ~ d log u(x) at x-dlogx dlogx -~'
IIa-u y~(x).u(x)~u'(x) does not decrease on ~a,Q~.
There holds that IIa-u ~ Ia-u.
The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 and is
therefore omitted. Although conditions similar to Conditions Ib, IIb and IIIa
can be derived, they are not presented here since they are not very
informative or elegant. Condition IIa-u does not make any reference to the
actual value of ~; hence, if this condition holds then ae~aa~o for all
admissible values of b, a and p.
One may say somewhat loosely that Condition Ia-u states that if the
reservation wage ~ slightly increases, then the proportional increase of the
expected utility flow in employment does not exceed the proportional increase
of the utility flow associated with an income equal to rti. For instance, an
increase of the reservation wage such that u(~) increases by 104b implies an
increase of the expected utility flow in employment of at most 10~6.
If u(o~)~0, then Condition IIa-u, as a condition on F, is weaker than
Condition IIa if and only if u(x)~(x.u'(x)) does not decrease on ~a,~3~. The
latter is equivalent to the requirement that log u(ex) is a concave function
of x on ~loga,logQ~. Further, if u(a)~0 then Condition IIa-u, as a condition
on F, is weaker than Condition 2a if and only if u(x)~u'(x) does not decrease
on ~a„d~. The latter holds if and only if log u(x) is a concave function of x
on ~a,~~. Sufficient for this is that u(x) is concave on ~a,p~ or that log
u(ex) is concave on ~loga,logfi~.
In the appendix we examine under what circumstances Condition IIa-u is
satisfied for some well-known and popular classes of utility flow functions.
It appears that for all utility flow functions considered, the conditions on
the shape of F for ae~aa to be non-negative in search models with utility
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maximization are (even) weaker than the corresponding conditions in models
with income maximization.
It may be interesting to examine under what conditions the results in
Section 5.4 carry over to models with utility maximization. It follows from




8 log b ~.u (~) ' p~
Again, the third term of the r.h.s. of (11) increases as b increases while if
Condition IIa is satisfied then the first term of the r.h.s. does not decrease
as b increases. It seems to be impossible to give a simple condition in terms
of the utility flow function that ensures that the second term does not
decrease as b increases. However, in the appendix we check whether this term
does not decrease in b for some popular classes of utility flow functions. The
results reinforce the conclusions of Section 5.4.
5.5.2. Nonstatianaráty
In Section 5.3 and Subsection 5.5.1 we have examined the derivative of the job
offer arrival rate ~ with respect to the hazard B in stationary job search
models. The results can be used for interpreting the implications for B of
individual differences with respect to a. Alternatively, the results represent
the comparative statics of B with respect to a, i.e. they show how the
stationary (or, equilibrium) values of B differ when the arrival rates a
differ. It may also be interesting to examine the time path of B when a is
changing for an individual. It is widely believed that ~ is duration dependent
because of a so-called scar effect: employers may think that long-term
unemployed individuals are less productive than short-term unemployed
individuals (see e.g. Narendranathan, Nickell 8a Stern (1985)). Often, negative
duration dependence of B in an estimated reduced-form model of unemployment
duration is attributed to this scar effect (see e.g. Jensen 8c Vishwanath
(1985)). Therefore it seems to be particularly interesting to examine under
what conditions B is a decreasing function of unemployment duration if a is a
decreasing function of duration.
If a, b or F(w) change during unemployment then the model is
nonstationary. We consider nonstationarity that arises because a is a
decreasing function of duration t. (For ease of exposition we let calendar
time and unemployment duration coincide, so that time dependence of a and
duration dependence of ~ can be considered simult.aneously. ) Further, we will
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be concerned with job searchers who correctly anticipate changes in the value
of a. The following assumptions on ~, F(w), b and p replace Assumptions 1 and
2.
1-n. equals Assumptáon 1.
2-n. OCpCoo, OSbCoo.
3-n. For every te[0,~~, O~a(t)d{~~, K beáng a fáxed number. There exásts
some number Te~O,~~ such that a(t) ás constant on [T,a~~ and a(t) ás
dáfferentiable on [O,T~. For every te[O,T~, .~'(t)S0. The left-hand
lámáts aL(T) and L}~ a'(t) of ~(t) and a'(t) at T exást. There holds
that a~(T)~a(T).
From Chapter 3 it follows that if Assumptions 1-n, 2-n and 3-n are satisfied,
then the optimal strategy of a job searcher can be characterized by a unique,
bounded and continuous reservation wage function ~(t) on [0,~~ which satisfies
the following differential equation for every te(O,T~u~T,m~.
(12) ~'(t) - P.~(t) - P-b - ~(t).Qí~ít))
For t~T the model is stationary and ~(t) follows by imputing ~'(t)-0 in
equation (12). If a is continuous at T(so ~L(T)-a(T)) then ~'(T)-0, otherwise
the right-hand derivative ~R'(T) of ~ with respect to t at T equals zero while
the left-hand derivative ~L'(T) can be calculated by replacing a(T) in the
r.h.s. of equation (12) at T by aL(T). It can be shown that for every te[O,m~
~(t)~b. For the same reason as before, attention is restricted to cases in
which for every te[0,~~ a~~(t)~~i.
From Chapter 3 it also follows that for every te[O,T~ ~'(t)~0. (This can
be strengthened to ra'(t)~0 if for every tE[O,T~ a'(t)~0. However, for ease of
exposition we will only present results in terms of weak inequalities. ) If
aL(T)~a(T) then ~~'(T)~0.
If a(t) is constant on [O,T~ and a(0)~a(T) (so the only source of
nonstationarity is a discrete downward jump of a at T) then additional results
can be derived. Note that in such cases ~(t) satisfies a homogeneous
constant-coefficient differential equation on [O,T~. Let ~1 denote the
stationary solution of the differential equation (12) on (O,T~. One can
interpret ~~ as the optimal reservation wage on [O,T~ if a would not jump at
T. It can be shown (see Chapter 3) that for every te[O,T~ ~(T)~~(t)~~1,
~'(t)~0 and ~"(t)~0 and that ~L'(T)~0.
The hazard B is a function of unemployment duration t,
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(13) B(t) - a(t).~(~(t))
Because for every t~T a(t)-a(T)~0 and ~(t)-~(T)~~, it follows that for every
t~T B(t)-8(T)~0 and therefore the duration distribution is non-defective. In
fact, for every t~0, B(t)~0. The Assumptions 1-n, 2-n and 3-n and the results
on ~ imply that B(t) is differentiable on [o,T~ and constant on [T,~~. If a(t)
is discontinuous at T(ay(T)~a(T)) then so is B(t) (B~(T)~B(T), note that
BL(T) exists) and vice versa. Also, if a(t) is differentiable at T then so is
8(t) and vice versa. Finally, therefore, if ~(t) is continuous but not
differentiable at T then so is B(t). Note that if B(t) is not differentiable
then still ~}n,~ B'(t) exists.
Using a result from Chapter 3, one can show that if Assumptions 1-n, 2-n
and 3-n are satisfied and if Condition IIa holds, then for every tlI'
B(t)~B(T). Let, for every te[O,T~, ~o(t) denote the reservation wage at t that
is optimal if a is constant after t, i.e. if for every r~t a(r)-~(t). From
Chapter 3 it follows that ~o(t)~~(t). This implies that the hazard Bo(t)
corresponding to the case in which for every r~t ~(T)-.~(t) holds, satisfies
Bo(t)~B(t). Now note that both Bo(t) and B(T) can be interpreted as hazards in
stationary models, the only difference between the models being the arrival
rate, which is a(t) in the first case and a(T) in the second. Because
a(t)~a(T), Condition IIa is sufficient for Bo(t)~B(T). Consequently, if
Condition IIa holds then 9(T)~Bo(t)~B(t), and the result follows.
The main objective of this subsection is to examine under what conditions
on a(t) it holds that B(t) is a decreasing function of t on [O,T]. By
differentiation of equation (13) it follows that for every te[O,T~,
(14) B'(t) - a'(t).~(~(t)) - a(t).f(~(t)).~'(t)
From this equation it is obvious that nonstationarity due to a decreasing a
has two opposite effects on the derivative of the hazard with respect to
unemployment duration at t~T. First, there is a negative effect because of the
instantaneous decrease of the arrival rate of job offers at t. Secondly, there
is a positive effect because of the anticipation of future decreases of the
arrival rate of job offers. This effect works in the following way. If ~
decreases on ~t,T~ then the expected number of opportunities to accept a job
offer in any time period with fixed length directly after t decreases as t
increases. Therefore the expected discounted lifetime income decreases as time
proceeds. This implies that individuals become less selective with regard to
job offers as time proceeds, so ~ decreases at t and this has a positive
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effect on B'(t). Note that the instantaneous decrease of a at t(the first
effect) does not affect ~(t) (the second effect) at all because the
probability to obtain a job offer at t is zero. This makes the analysis of
B'(t} fundamentally different from the ana.lysis of ae~aa in a stationary
model. For given 45(t), F and ~(t) one can always choose ~'(t) to make B'(t)~0
or to make B'(t)~0, without affecting ~(t) or a(t). Consequently, conditions
ensuring that B'(t)SO always have to restrict a'(t) in some way. Or, in other
words, conditions on F ensuring that B'(t)50 must be conditional on some
condition that restricts the time path of a(t). The following proposition
presents such conditions.
Proposition 4.
In a job search model that satisfies Assumptions 1-n, 2-n and 3-n and án whích
for every t~0 a~~(t)~~3, sufficient for B'(t)~o on [O,T~ is that for every
te[o,T~ and for every xe~a,(3~ there holds that
(15) F~'(x) ~ - ~Z~t)
a (t)
Further, i},mr B'(t) ~ 0 and BL(T)~B(T). Sufficient for equatáon ( 15) to hold
for xe~a,(3~ and te[O,T~ is that
(16) Condition 2a is satásfied and a'(t) 5-J~2(t).
or that
,
(17 ) Conditáon IIa is satisfied and ~(
x) ~- a( t)
x ~a(t )
The proof is in the appendix. Jensen 8e Vishwanath (1985) proved that a
condition analogous to (16) is sufficient for 9 to be decreasing in a
discrete-time model with positive search costs and zero benefits. The
functions a(t) satisfying (16) with an equality sign is ~(t)-1~(ttk) with k~0.
Clearly, there is a trade-off between the condition on F and the condition
on a(t). If J~(t) decreases sharply then, for most F, equation (15) is
satisfied whereas if a(t) decreases moderately then the class of F for which
(15) is satisfied is restrictive.
Let us return to the cases in which a(t) is constant on [O,T~ and
~(0)~~(T). In such cases sp'(t)~0 on [o,T~, so, from equation (14), for every
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te[O,T~ B'(t)~0, i}r~ B'(t) ~ 0 and BL(T)~B(T). Consequently, B(t) increases as
t goes from 0 to T but jumps downward at T. From the results above it follows
that Condition IIa is sufficient for B(T)~B(0), so it is well possible that in
the long run 8 is smaller than than the B during the first days of
unemployment. However, it is important to note that B(t) does not move from
B(0) to B(T) in a monotone way. In the general case, if a(t) is more or less
constant while ~(t) decreases because of strong future decreases of a, then
B(t) increases. It is well conceivable that during the first weeks of
unemployment the so-called scar effects play no part and a is constant while
after that a decreases. If the latter scenario is true then a monotonically
decreasing hazard rate cannot be explained solely by duration dependence of a.
In sum, it appears both from this paragraph and from Proposition 4 that the
conditions needed for a monotonically decreasing hazard that is due to a
monotonically decreasing arrival rate are too strong to be acceptable a
priori.
In this chapter we have examined under what conditions B is an increasing
function of ~ in stationary models, and under what conditions B is a
decreasing function of duration t when a is a decreasing function of t, in
nonstationary models. A topic for further research would be to examine the
comparative dynamics of 8 with respect to a in nonstationary models; that is,
to examine how the function B(t) changes when the whole function a(t) is
shifted upward.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the sign of the effect of an increase of the
job offer arrival rate on the hazard of the unemployment duration
distribution. It was shown that previously derived sufficient conditions on
the wage offer distribution for this effect to be positive in job search
models can be weakened considerably at no cost, to include virtually every
conceivable wage offer distribution. In particular, all families of
distributions generally used to model wage offer distributions in structural
job search models and other income-related distributions do not satisfy the
conditions derived before but do satisfy the conditions presented in this
chapter.
The results have some implications for both structural and reduced-form
empirical analyses of unemployment duration. First of all, the interpretation
of the estimates of reduced-form models is facilitated. If an explanatory
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variable is found to have a positive influence on the hazard and this variable
is believed not to influence determinants of the hazard other than the job
offer arrival rate (e.g. number of working individuals in the household), then
it can be concluded that the variable has a positive influence on the job
offer arrival rate. Also, if it is believed that the influence of an
explanatory variable on the hazard mainly acts by way of the arrival rate
(e.g. local unemployment percentage) then reduced-form estimates can be used
to check whether the data are in agreement with these prior beliefs. Another
implication concerns the estimation of structural job search models. The class
of distributions satisfying the sufficient conditions presented in this
chapter is very large, so it is likely that small departures from the families
assumed in applications do not result in distributions not satisfying the
sufficient conditions. Therefore, it is likely that slight changes of the
shape of the wage offer distribution do not imply a sign-reversal of the
relationship between the arrival rate and the hazard. Consequently, one may
say that in this sense the estimates of structural models are insensitive with
respect to the assumed family of wage offer distributions.
The analysis in this chapter generated some by-products which may be of
independent interest. It is shown that generally in job search models the
absolute value of the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the level of
benefits is an increasing function of the level of benefits. This suggests
that in reduced-form empirical analyses the log hazard should be allowed to be
a non-linear function of log benefits. It is also shown that, in nonstationary
job search models in which the arrival rate is a decreasing function of
duration, the conditions on the wage offer distribution and the time path of
the arrival rate that are needed to obtain a hazard that is a monotonically
decreasing function of duration are too strong to be acceptable a priori.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We start by restating the equation linking Q,F` and P,
(Al) Q(x) - ~(x).(fc(x)-x)
Because a~~~~, equations (1) and (2) imply that
(A2) a~ - ~(~) - a.f{~).Q~ - P~ ((Pfe)~(~) - B.f(~)-(f~(m)-~))
The latter equality follows because of equation (Al). Consequently, ae~aa~o if
and only if
(A3) ~ ~ f(~).(P(~)-~) - 1
~(~)
(note that B and ~(~) are positive). Equation ( 1) can be rewritten as
~-b - p.(F~(~)-~)
so inequality ( A3) can be rewritten as
P{~)-~ ~ f(~) .(!~(~)-m) - 1
~ - b-~(~)
Because b~0, sufficient for this is that
F~(~)-~ ~ f(~).(l~(~)-~) - 1
~ ~`(~)
or, equivalently,
(A4) f~~~) ~ ~(~).(f~(~)-~)




u'(x) - - - ~(x).(u(x)-x)dx F(x ) J
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So inequality (A4) is equivalent to ~(~) ~~.~'(~). Of course the latter is
just another way of writing Condition Ia. Because fC(rp) exceeds ~, Condition Ia
is weaker than Condition la (which states that ~'(~)51). Note that
inequalities (A3) and (A4) are equivalent if and only if b-o, so only in that
case Condition Ia is necessary and sufficient for 88~8~ to be non-negative.
Condition Ib is satisfied if and only if the derivatíve of log Q(ex) with
respect to x is non-increasing at x- log ~. This derivative equals
-ex.~(ex)~Q(ex). Since ex is a strictly increasing function, Condition Ib is
satisfied if and only if x.~`(x)~Q(x) is non-decreasing at x-rp. Because of
equation (Al) the latter holds if and only if x~(~(x)-x) is non-decreasing at
x-rp, which can easily shown to be equivalent to Condition Ia.
By multiplying both sides of inequality (A4) with ~.~`(~) and by using




which can be rewritten as
R Q
fwy~(w)~(w)dw ~ ~.y~(rp). j ~(w)dw
~ ~
So Condition Ia is equivalent to
~
(A5) J(wy~(w) - rpy~(~)).~(w)dw ~ 0
Sufficient for (A5) to hold is that w.y,(w) increases on ~a,Q~. The latter is
equivalent to Condition IIa. Clearly, the requirement that w.y~(w) increases is
weaker than the requirement that y~(w) increases, so Condition IIa is weaker
than Condition 2a.
Equation (A4) is derived by using the assumption that b~0. More generally,
if one assumes that b~~r for some ~r, then the left-hand side of (A4) can be
replaced by (~(~)-~r)~(~-~r) (note that ~~b~~r). One can show that sufficient for
the revised equation (A4) to hold is that (w-~).y~(w) increases on ~~,Q~. The
latter holds if and only if dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-w~(w-~) for every we~~,Q~, which
in turn is weaker than Condition IIa for every ~~0. However, in the sequel we
will stick to ~r-0 since this makes the weakest assumption on b.
Condition IIb is satisfied if and only if the derivative of ~(ex) with
respect to x does not increase on ~-m,logQ~. This derivative equals
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-ex.f(ex)~l!`(ex). Since ex is strictly increasing, this is satisfied if and
only if xf(x)~F(x) does not decrease on ~-m,Q~, which is just another way of
writing Condition IIa.
From the definition of F`,
~
~(ex) - ! ew.f(ew)dw
x
Karlin ( 1968) shows that if an integrable function g(x) is log concave then
the function defined by the integral of x to infinity of g is also log
concave. Consequently, sufficient for ~(ex) to be log concave is that ex.f(ex)
is log concave. However, it is easily seen that ex.f(ex) is log concave if and
only if f(ex) is log concave. In sum, Condition IIIa implies Condition IIb.
Note that this method of proof can also be used to prove that Condition IIb
implies Condition Ib.
It remains to establish the relationship between Conditions IIIa and 3a.
Condition IIIa is satisfied if and only if ex.f'(ex)~f(ex) does not increase
on ~logcx,logQ~, which holds if and only if xf'(x)~f(x) does not increase on
~a,J~~. Likewise, Condition 3a is satisfied if and only if f'(x)~f(x) does not
increase on ~a,~i~. Consequently, if for every xE~a,(3~, f'(x)~0 then Condition
IIIa is weaker than Condition 3a. If for every xE~a„~~, f'(x)~0 (which is
possible only if Q~~) then the reverse holds. In all other cases the
conditions are not nested. Still, it always holds that Condition IIa is weaker
than Condition 3a (because 3a ~ 2a -s IIa).
5.A.2. Truncation from above
Examine a distribution satisfying Assumption 1(with interval of support
~a,~3~) that is truncated from above at w(a~w~~3). For clarity, symbols
referring to this truncated distribution are given a subscript t. There holds
that ft(x)-f(x)~F(w) on ~cx,w~ and ~t(x)-(~(x)-F`(w))~F(w) on ~cx,w~. Therefore,
~Vt(x) - ~V(x) . ~(x)
i'`(x)-~(w )
By differentiating this we obtain
(A6)
xe~cx,w~
d log y~t(x) d log ~Y(x) t x.y~(x) .~(w)d log x - d log x ~(x)-~(W)
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Because the second part of the right-hand side (r.h.s.) is positive it follows
that the condition
d log y~t(x)
d log x ~-1 for every xe~a,w~
is weaker than Condition IIa. Further, the second part of the r.h.s. of (A6)
increases as w decreases and it goes to ~ if wyx. So, if the first part of the
r.h.s. of (A6) is ~-1 (that is, the original distribution does not satisfy
Condition IIa) then for sufficiently small w the left-hand side (l.h.s.) of
(A6) is ?-1 for every xe~cx,w~ (that is, the truncated distribution does
satisfy Condition IIa). Alternatively, if ~ is sufficiently large then the
l.h.s. of (A6) is ~-1 for every xe[~,w~. This is sufficient for Condition Ia
to be satisfied for the truncated distribution (see Appendix 5.A.1) so in that
case ae~aa~o.
5.A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose there is an x such that for every w~x dlog~(w)~dlogw ~-1. Then for
every w~x dlogy,(w)~dw ~-l~w, which implies that
b'w~x, f d logdyzV(Y) dY ?- f y dY
This is equivalent to
dw~x, log y~(w) - log y~(x) ~ log x- log w
which in turn is equivalent to
b'w~x, ,V(w) ~ x.~V(x)Iw
Consequently, there are x and c(O~x,c~~) such that for every w~x y~(w)~c~w.
From the main text, this implies that F is non-defective. Suppose there are e
and x ( O~e,x~~) such that for every w~x dlogy~(w)~dlogw ~-(lfe). Following the
argument above we obtain
Vw~x, ~V(w) ~ x1fE,~V(x)~wlfe
Again, from the main text, this implies that F is defective.
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5.A.4. The sign of a8~aa if ~ is large




Because for every xGJ3, ,~i(x)G~ this implies that if QGW then it is necessary
that X}r~ y~(x) -~ for F to be non-defective. Consequently, if ,OGm and y~(x) is
ultimately monotone, then y~(x) increases at all points sufficiently close to
~3, which implies that the Conditions la and Ia hold for ~ sufficiently close
to ~3, so in such cases ae~aa~o.
Suppose that Condition Ia is not satisfied for any Q~EGa,Q~, so
fC'(rp)~p(~)~~ for any ~EGa,Q~, and that a-0. There holds that ~c(~) is positive
and increasing on GO,~i~. Let E be a number between 0 and ~3. It follows that
for every ~GO,E~, p(~)~~C(0)~0 and therefore p'(~)~u(0)~~. By integrating the
latter inequality from ~-x with xEGO,E~ to ~-E, one obtains that for every
xEGO,E~ there holds that
p(x) G p(E) f~c(0).(log x- log E)
If x is sufficiently small then the r.h.s. of this inequality is negative, so
by contradiction it follows that for every E~0 there are ~EGO,E~ for which
Condition Ia holds.
Now suppose Q-~ and a~0. If Condition Ia is not satisfied for any ~EGCx,J3~
and y~(x) is ultimately monotone, then y~(x) has to be non-increasing at
sufficiently large points. Consequently, y~ is uniformly bounded on Gcx,~~. We
use this result when examining the sign of aB~aA for large ~. From inequality
(A3), ae~aa~o if and only if
P t F(~) ? ~v(~).[~`(~).(~(~)-~)l
Because of equation (Al), this is equivalent to
(A7) ~ t ~(~) ? ~(~).Q(~)
If b~ then ~ while of course p, A and the functions y~, ~ and Q are
unaffected. The lim ~ of the l.h.s. of (A7) equals p~a and is therefore
strictly positive. Because Q(~) tends to zero as ~ and ~~(~) is uniformly
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bounded, the lim ~ of the r.h.s of (A7) equals zero. Because l:, ~~ and Q are
continuous in their arguments, this implies that whatever the shape of the
wage offer distribution, inequality (A7) is always satisfied for sufficiently
large ~. Note that from equation (A2) it immediately follows that the lim b-~
of aB~aa equals zero.
5.A.5. Utility maximization
We examine under what circumstances Condition IIa-u is satisfied for some
well-known classes of utility flow functions. If u(x)-xc for x~0, with O~c~m,
then Condition IIa-u is equivalent to Condition IIa, so then these are
satisfied for the same wage offer distributions. If u is a CARA utility flow
function (u(x)- 1-écx for x~0 with O~c~~) then Condition IIa-u is weaker than
Condition IIa. In fact, it can be shown that the former condition is
equivalent to
d log y~(x) ~- cx
d log x - 1 e-cx for every xe~a„0~
For every ce~O,W~ and every xe~0,m~ the r.h.s. of this inequality is smaller
than -1.
The logarithmic function is frequently used to model the utility flow
function in a structural empirical search framework (see for example
Narendranathan 8z Nickell (1985 ), Ridder 8s Gorter (1986 ) and van den Berg
(1990b)). If u(a)~0 (that is, a~l) then Condition IIa-u is weaker than
Condition IIa. The former condition here equals
d log y~(x) ~-1 - 1
d log x log x for every xe~a„Q~ (a~l)
If u(oc)~0 (O~a~l) then Conditions IIa-u and IIa are not nested. However, ~~1
because u(~)~0, and it can be shown that sufficient for Condition Ia-u to hold
is that y~(x).u(x)~u'(x) is non-decreasing for every xe~~,Q~. Therefore, if
u(x)-1og x then Condition Ia-u is weaker than Condition IIa. In sum, for all
utility flow functions considered the conditions on the shape of F for ae~aa
to be non-negative in search models with utility maximization are weaker than
the corresponding conditions in models with income maximization.
We now check whether the second term of the r.h.s. of equation (11) does
not decrease in b for some well-known classes of utility flow functions. Using
equation (10) one can show that if u(x)-xc for x~0 with O~c~~, then the second
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term always increases in b. If u is logarithmic then obviously the second term
equals 1. Again it should be noted that for these utility flow functions
~81ogB~8logb~ is not decreasing in b under conditions more general than
Condition IIa. On the other hand, if u is a CARA utility flow function then
the second term (and, in fact, the whole r.h.s. of equation (11)) increases in
b for small values of b but not necessarily for large values of b.
5.A.6. Proof of Proposition 4
Let t be an arbitrary point in [O,T~. By rewriting equation (14) it follows
that B'(t)50 if and only if
a'(t)
a(t) ~ ~(~(t)).~'(t)
By substituting equations (12),(Al) and (13) we obtain
á(t~) 5 ~v(~(t)).P.(~(t)-b) - ~v(~(t)).B(t).(~(~(t))-~(t))
which, because ~'(x)-y,(x).(p(x)-x) (see Appendix 5.A.1), can be rewritten as
~(t~) 5 ~V(~(t)).P.(~(t)-b) - B(t)-F~'(~(t))
Because ~(t)~b, sufficient for this to hold is that
~(t~) 5 - B(t).l~'(~(t))
A sufficient condition for this inequality can be obtained by noting that
0~8(t)~a(t),
a'(t) ~ - a~(t).~'(m(t))
If for every xe~a,~i~ inequality (15) is satisfied then clearly the inequality
above is also satisfied. Therefore, if for every xE~a,Q~ and for every te[O,T~
inequality (15) is satisfied, then for every tE[O,T~ B'(t)~0. Because the
left-hand limits of A'(t) and ~'(t) exist at t-T it follows that the left-hand
limit of B'(t) at T exists and is non-positive.
Suppose Condition 2a is satisfied. Then for every xe~a,Q~ ~'(x)51. If in
addition a'(t)S-~2(t) (or, equivalently, -a'(t)~a2(t)~1) then inequality (15)




The essays in this dissertation deal with microeconometric models of
individual labour market behaviour. The emphasis is on structural analysis of
transitions between different states on the labour market and durations in
those states. Chapter 1 briefly describes the common themes and the
distinctive features of the different studies.
In Chapter 2 we specify and estimate a structural job search model for the
unemployed that allows for transitions from unemployment into
nonparticipation. Moreover, one version of the model deals with the influence
of prospective wage increases during employment on the search behaviour of the
unemployed. The model is estimated using Dutch data from the mid-eighties. The
results indicate that almost every job offer is acceptable. The reason for
this is the combination of a very small job offer arrival rate and low values
of utility in unemployment relative to employment. If one turns down an offer,
then generally one has to wait for a very long time before the next offer
arrives. In the meantime one remains unemployed, which is disliked both for
pecuniary and for non-pecuniary reasons. The results imply that at an
individual level a decrease in benefits is ineffective in reducing
unemployment duration. For groups of individuals that almost never get a job
offer, about half of the spells of unemployment end in a transition into
nonparticipation.
The estimation results in Chapter 2 appear to be robust to varying certain
assumptions underlying the empirical model specification. However, throughout
the chapter the assumption of stationarity is maintained, which may bias the
results. Chapter 3 introduces nonstationarity in job search theory. In a
general setting the consequences of nonstationarity for the optimal strategy
of unemployed individuals and the duration of unemployment are examined in
great detail. We also present comparative dynamics results. Furthermore, by
assuming the time-varying explanatory variables to be step functions of time,
we are able to derive additional properties of the time path of the optimal
strategy. Generally these properties are in accordance with economic
intuition.
In the second part of Chapter 3 it is shown that the results derived in
the first part can be fruitfully used for the empirical analysis of
unemployment durations. As an empirical illustration we estimate a
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nonstationary structural job search model that allows for the level of
benefits to be a decreasing function of unemployment duration, using a Dutch
retrospective survey from 1983. For individuals with a low-to-medium level of
education, the results indicate that, since the probability of getting a job
during the first two years of unemployment is rather small, the anticipation
of the decrease of the benefits level that occurs after about two years of
unemployment is quite strong. One may say that for the short-term unemployed
individuals it holds that the benefits level for the long-term unemployed is
an important determinant of their strategy because they know they may well
become long-term unemployed themselves. The estimated model can be used for
simulating alternative benefits policies like shifting a part of the time path
of the level of benefits. Note that all these results cannot be obtained by
using stationary models. Moreover, the analysis in Chapter 3 reveals that the
reduced-form models of unemployment duration that are generally used to
analyze the influence of the benefits level on duration, are not able to
represent some of the essential features of nonstationarity due to decreasing
benefits. However, it should be noted that the specification of the structural
model estimated in Chapter 3 is rather restrictive. Also, in order to be able
to estimate the model, extensive use is made of subjective information
concerning the optimal strategy and the wage offer distribution. A topic for
further research would be to relax some of the rigidities of the model
specification and to examine the reliability of the subjective information.
In Chapter 4 we analyse the labour market behaviour of employed
individuals by estimating a structural on-the-job search model. This model
allows for non-zero and wage-dependent costs associated with moving to another
job. It is shown that the optimal strategy of an employed individual has the
reservation wage property if the costs of moving do not increase too fast as a
function of the wage. The model is estimated using a Dutch retrospective
survey from 1985. The results indicate that the state of present housing, age
and characteristics of the present job have a large influence on the
willingness to move. At an individual level, an increase of the job offer
arrival rate has a larger positive effect on job mobility than a decrease of
the costs associated with moving to another job.
The empírical analysis in Chapter 4 is flexible in the sense that
identification of the structural parameters of interest is achieved without
the need to make strong assumptions on certain distributions and other
(structural) parameters. It appears that the estimation results satisfy all
non-imposed properties of the theoretical model. Moreover, extensive
sensitivity analysis of the results shows that these are robust to varying a
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number of assumptions underlying the empirical model specification.
Nevertheless, it seems interesting to extend the model by allowing jobs to
have more stochastic characteristics than the wage only. Because, just as in
Chapter 3, the data used to estimate the model include subjective responses of
individuals on their strategy, another topic for future research is to examine
the quality of these responses.
A more general issue for further research would be the evaluation of the
predictive power of structural job search models like those used in this
thesis. In particular it would be interesting to examine whether a model
estimated with data collected prior to a major policy change is able to
predict individual behaviour after the policy change. If the policy change
occurs just after the collection of the data used to estimate the model, then
it may be hard to distinguish between the effects of the anticipation of that
change and other determinants of behaviour, like duration dependence of the
arrival rate of job offers. Therefore there should preferably be a relatively
large time span between the dates at which the data to estimate the model are
collected and the date at which the policy change occurs. This implies that
panel data are needed following individuals for a large number of years.
The issue of Chapter 5 is the sign of the effect of an increase of the job
offer arrival rate on the expected duration of unemployment. It is shown that
previously derived sufficient conditions on the wage offer distribution for
this effect to be negative in stationary job search models can be weakened at
no cost, to include virtually every conceivable empirical wage offer
distribution. In particular, all families of distributions generally used to
model wage offer distributions in structural job search models and other
income-related distributions do not satisfy the conditions derived before but
do satisfy the conditions presented in Chapter 5.
The results in Chapter 5 have some implications for both structural and
reduced-form empirical analyses of unemployment duration. First of all, the
interpretation of the estimates of reduced-form models is facilitated. For
instance, if an explanatory variable is found to be positively related to
duration, and this variable is believed not to influence determinants of
duration other than the job offer arrival rate, then it can be concluded that
the variable has a negative influence on the job offer arrival rate.
Furthermore, since it is likely that small changes of the shape of the wage
offer distribution do not imply a sign-reversal of the relationship between
the job offer arrival rate and duration, one may say that in this sense the
estimates of structural models are robust with respect to the assumed family
of wage offer distributions.
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By now the use of job search theory for the theoretical and empirical
analysis of individual labour market behaviour over time has become
widespread. Structural empirical analysis based on this theory seems to
provide a fruitful platform for a deepening of economic insights into this
behaviour. This thesis provided some new plays on this platform.
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SAb1ENVATTING
Dit proefschrift bevat micro-econometrische analyses van het gedrag van
individuen op de arbeidsmarkt. Uitgangspunt is de z.g. `job search theory',
een micro-economische theorie die dit gedrag poogt te verklaren, met name voor
zover dat betrekking heeft op het zoeken naar een nieuwe of andere baan. Deze
theorie houdt expliciet rekening met verschillende vormen van onzekerheid
zoals die zich voordoen op de arbeidsmarkt. Verondersteld wordt dat
beslissingen van individuen geleid worden door het streven het verwachte nut
te maximaliseren. Op basis van de theorie worden modellen geconstrueerd die
geschat worden met behulp van econometrische technieken. Hierbij wordt gebruik
gemaakt van gegevens uit omvangrijke enquêtes onder werkenden en werklozen in
Nederland.
De gebruikte modellen zijn struktureel van aard. Dit betekent dat het
theoretische kader van de `job search theory' de algemene vorm van de modellen
vastlegt. In het bijzonder maken de vergelijkingen die de strategie
beschrijven die (volgens de theorie) ten grondslag ligt aan het gedrag van
individuen, deel uit van de te schatten modellen. Het schatten van zulke
modellen maakt het mogelijk gedetailleerde uitspraken te doen over het
arbeidsmarkt~edrag van werklozen en werkenden en het hoe en waarom van de
(in-)effektiviteit van bepaalde beleidsmaatregelen ter vermindering van de
werkloosheidsduren en vergroting van de arbeidsmobiliteit. De
schattingsmethoden die aan de orde komen zijn de z.g. `maximum likelihood'
methode en de niet-lineaire kleinste-kwadraten methode.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een korte beschrijving van de gemeenschappelijke thema's
en onderscheidende kenmerken van de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een model voor werklozen geconstrueerd en geschat dat
toelaat dat men als werkloze uit de arbeidsmarkt stapt. Een uitgebreide versie
van het model houdt bovendien rekening met de invloed op het gedrag van
werklozen van verwachte loonstijgingen in een eventuele toekomstige baan.
Beide versies worden geschat met gebruik van gegevens uit het midden van de
jaren tachtig. Uit de resultaten volgt dat voor werklozen bijna iedere
aangeboden baan acceptabel is. Een verlaging van het uitkeringsniveau is
ineffektief in het verlagen van de werkloosheidsduur. In groepen individuen
die praktisch nooit een baan aangeboden krijgen stapt ongeveer de helft van de
werklozen uit de arbeidsmarkt voordat een baan is gevonden.
Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert niet-stationariteit in `job search theory'. In
een algemeen kader wordt onderzocht wat de gevolgen voor de strategie van
werklozen en voor de werkloosheidsduur zijn als wordt toegelaten dat
verklarende variabelen als het uitkeringsniveau en de verdeling van aangeboden
lonen variëren met de werkloosheidsduur. Aangetoond wordt dat de evolutie van
de optimale strategie van werklozen over de tijd kan worden beschreven met een
differentiaalvergelijking. Hoe specifieker de veronderstellingen die gemaakt
worden over de manier waarop de verklarende variabelen met de
werkloosheidsduur variëren, hoe gedetailleerder de eigenschappen die afgeleid
worden voor de oplossing van die vergelijking.
In het tweede deel van Hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat de resultaten uit
het eerste deel op een vruchtbare manier kunnen worden gebruikt voor de
empirische analyse van werkloosheidsduren. Als illustratie wordt een model
geschat dat rekening houdt met het feit dat het niveau van de
werkloosheidsuitkering in het algemeen daalt als de werkloosheidsduur een
bepaalde periode overschrijdt. Hiervoor worden retrospectieve gegevens uit
1983 gebruikt. Het blijkt dat individuen met een laag of gemiddeld
opleidingsniveau zulke dalingen van het uitkeringsniveau sterk anticiperen.
Hoofdstuk 4 bevat een analyse van het arbeidsmarktgedrag van werkende
159
individuen. Het is aannemelijk dat de kosten die verbonden zijn aan het
veranderen van baan behoren tot de belangrijkste faktoren die inflexibiliteit
van de arbeidsmarkt veroorzaken. Daarom wordt bij de analyse speciale aandacht
aan deze kosten gegeven. Aangetoond wordt dat de optimale strategie van een
werkend individu de reserveringsloon-eigenschap heeft als de kosten verbonden
aan het veranderen van baan niet te sterk stijgen als een funktie van het
loon. Het model wordt geschat met gebruik van retrospectieve gegevens uit
1985. Het blijkt dat de situatie op de woningmarkt, leeftijd en
karakteristieken van de huidige baan een sterke invloed hebben op de mate van
bereidheid om van baan te veranderen, terwijl de gezinssituatie en de
gehechtheid aan de omgeving hier een relatief geringe rol spelen. Op een
individueel niveau heeft een relatieve vergroting van het verwachte aantal
aangeboden banen in een bepaalde periode een groter positief effekt op de
arbeidsmobiliteit dan een relatieve verlaging van de kosten verbonden aan het
veranderen van baan.
Hoofdstuk 5 is theoretisch van aard en bevat geen empirische resultaten.
Het onderwerp van dit hoofdstuk is de relatie in `job search theory' tussen,
enerzijds, het verwachte aantal banen dat een werkloos individu in een
bepaalde periode aangeboden krijgt ( oftewel de snelheid waarmee banen worden
aangeboden) en, anderzijds, de verwachte werkoosheidsduur. In het algemeen
wordt onderkend dat een vergroting van de snelheid waarmee banen worden
aangeboden twee tegengestelde effekten heeft op de verwachte
werkloosheidsduur: een negatief effekt vanwege het gemiddeld groter aantal
mogelijkheden om de toestand van werkloosheid te verlaten, en een positief
effekt vanwege een kritischer houding van de werkloze ten opzichte van banen
juist als gevolg van de gemiddeld grotere keuzemogelijkheden. In Hoofdstuk 5
wordt aangetoond dat elders in de literatuur afgeleide voorwaarden op de
verdeling van aangeboden lonen die er voor zorgen dat het negatieve effekt
domineert, enorm afgezwakt kunnen worden. Alle families van kansverdelingen
die in het algemeen gebruikt worden om de verdeling van aangeboden lonen en
inkomensverdelingen te modelleren voldoen niet aan de elders afgeleide
voorwaarden maar wel aan de voorwaarden die in Hoofdstuk 5 worden afgeleid.
De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 5 hebben implicaties voor de empirische analyse
van werkloosheidsduren. Zo wordt de interpretatie van de schattingen van
gereduceerde-vorm modellen vergemakkelijkt. Bovendien zijn schattingen van
strukturele modellen robuust ten aanzien van de specificatie van de verdeling
van aangeboden lonen, in die zin dat het aannemelijk is dat kleine
veranderingen in de specificatie van die verdeling geen tekenverandering
impliceren in de relatie tussen de snelheid waarmee banen worden aangeboden en
de werkloosheidsduur.
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een korte samenvatting en evaluatie van de verschillende
resultaten.
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